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Chapter 1 
Opening the Black Box 
 
§1. Introduction 
 
How can a national government influence the making of European Union 
(EU) policies? This question is central to this study. The majority of rules 
and legislation annually issued by the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament is binding for national governments. Key to understanding the 
intricate relation between the national and the EU level are the legal 
principles of supremacy and direct effect of EU law.1 As European decisions 
directly impact on the member states, governments have a strong interest to 
minimize the constitutional, legal, administrative and financial costs related 
to their implementation or ‘taking’ (Börzel 2003). Their representatives are 
very active in the process of formulating and ‘uploading’ certain preferences 
about their contents and form to the EU level. But national politicians and 
officials are not the only stakeholders active in this process of ‘shaping’ new 
EU policies. With the growing salience of European policies and politics, a 
plethora of public and non-state actors has become actively involved in this 
process. Within the academic field of EU studies, this has inspired new 
thinking about the nature and mechanisms of the interaction between the 
governments of the member states and the EU.2 Although the 
‘Europeanisation’ of national governments has been the subject of extensive 
 
                                                 
1) As established by a number of landmark Court of Justice rulings including Van 
Gend en Loos (1963) and Costa v Enel (1964). 
2) This study uses the shorthand notion European Union (EU) to encompass its 
predecessors, including the European (Economic) Community (EC and EEC).  
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research projects since the early 1990s, the variables relevant for a national 
government’s shaping capacity have remained seriously understudied. 
 
This book reports of an attempt to open the ‘black box’ of how national 
governments deal with EU policy-making and to analyse its content. It is 
examined how and when a national government participates in the shaping 
of EU policy, with the aim to single out relevant moments and variables. 
Public attention for the EU generally focuses on ‘grand’ history-making 
package deals and European Council summitry. What happens in Brussels, 
however, accounts for only a fraction of the resources and efforts national 
governments devote to the different stages of the EU bargaining game. This 
study analyses processes at the national and at the European (EU) level, as 
well as the interaction between these two locations of public policy-making. 
The theoretical part of this book (chapters 2 and 3) examines academic and 
practitioners’ insights into the position of national governments, in order to 
account for their role and capacity in the EU policy process. The empirical 
part (chapters 5-8) analyses ‘the Dutch case’: the empirical realities of 
European policy-making by and in the Netherlands and for two ‘routinised’ 
internal market decisions.  
 
This first introductory chapter presents the central puzzle of this study and 
defines its key notions, assumptions and arguments as well as the research 
design and the methods used in search for answers. 
 
 
§2. Why study governments in the EU?  
 
§2.1 Introducing EU studies 
The academic domain of this study is formed by a sub-discipline of 
International Relations theory, known as European Studies, or – more 
adequately – ‘EU studies’. As the process of European integration widened 
and deepened over the decades, so the domain of EU studies has grown. That 
‘member states matter’ is generally not contested, but the role and position 
of national governments in the European Union is the subject of much 
academic debate.  
 
In order to sketch this debate, four important EU studies perspectives, all to a 
varying degree concerned with the description or analysis of a particular 
‘opportunity-structure’ for national governments, are summarised in table 
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1.1. A distinction is made between ‘grand’ integration theory (Nugent 1999), 
which flourished in the early days of European integration and witnessed a 
revival in the mid-1990s (see Trannholm-Mikkelsen 1991, Stone Sweet and 
Sandholz 1998, Moravcsik 1999) and two newer, policy-oriented concepts: 
multi-level governance and Europeanisation (see Hooghe and Marks 2001, 
Knill 2002, Börzel 2003).  
 
Table 1.1 Perspectives on governments within the EU  
Theory / perspective Claim Added value 
Intergovernmentalism ‘Governments rule’ National governments as ‘shapers’ 
and ‘takers’  
Neo-functionalism ‘Supra-nationalism 
rules’  
How supranational institutions have a 
life on their own  
Multi-level governance  ‘Messy state’  By-pass of government by other 
actors ‘going Europe’ 
Europeanisation ‘Impact of Europe’  Adaptation to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness 
 
Probably the most prominent EU studies theory, intergovernmentalism, 
offers a rather outspoken view on the role and influence of national 
governments in EU policy-making. Participating in the European integration 
process is a purposeful choice for their self-preservation – governments do 
interact, but in a strategic and dominant way as ‘masters of the treaty’. They 
act as a ‘gatekeeper’, and are able to regulate all interactions between the EU 
and the domestic level. For the purpose of this study, the added value of 
intergovernmentalism lies in its emphasis on the central role of national 
governments and their representatives as ‘shapers’ and ‘takers’ of EU 
policies. It is argued that EU membership can actually enhance the 
autonomy of national governments vis-à-vis their national constituencies and 
thus serve as a ‘rescue’ of the national state (Milward 1992). This ‘rescue’ is 
often associated with the dynamics created by the internal market project in 
the 1990s which facilitated national financing of the welfare state (see: 
Corbey 1995).  
 Intergovernmentalism has been criticised for the assumption of rational 
governments having sufficient information to foresee the consequences of 
their actions; for its tendency to marginalize the significance of 
supranational institutions and the interplay between them and for separating, 
rather artificially, processes at the domestic and EU level (see Willcott 1995, 
Garrett and Tsebelis 1996, Puchala 1999). Although recent, ‘liberal’ 
intergovernmentalist accounts of EU policy-making do offer a theory of 
national preference formation (through conflict between domestic groups), 
intergovernmentalism does not give us tools to describe or explain ‘feedback 
Going Europe or Going Dutch 
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processes’ or ‘integration dynamics’, i.e. how participation in EU policy 
processes impacts upon the initial preferences of actors at the national level 
through effects of socialisation and adaptation.  
 
The idea that, while working together, national representatives active at the 
EU level can develop a sense of collective identity, which leads them to 
redefine their ‘national’ preferences in interaction (Sandholtz 1993, 
Kerremans 1996) is central to the second classical theory of European 
integration: neofunctionalism. It is presumed that the European Union 
slowly but gradually develops into an autonomous source of political 
authority, located separate and ‘above’ that of the member states, hence 
‘supra-nationalism’. National governments would gradually ‘wither away’, 
as policy-making competencies are taken up at the supra-national level by 
the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European 
Parliament. The entrepreneurial role of these institutions has been the subject 
of later works with a neofunctionalist tone (Trannholm-Mikkelsen 1995, 
Sandholz and Stone Sweet 1999).  
 
These recent revivals of the old debate have also demonstrated how useful 
political science-based insights into comparative politics and policy-studies 
are for the study of the EU. A closer examination of how national 
governments deal with the demands of EU policy-making means taking 
stock of these recent EU studies approaches, which originate in the early 
1970s. Two paradigms concerned with the patterns of interactions both 
within the EU and between the EU and the domestic level are multi-level 
governance and Europeanisation.  
 Multi-level governance analyses the interaction of supra-, sub- and 
national level actors in making EU-policies (see Hooghe and Marks 2001, 
Bache and Flinders 2004). Relevant for this study is the supposedly 
changing locus of political control that would drift away from national 
governments, both upwards towards the European level of decision-making 
and downwards towards sub-national governments (Länder; provinces; 
autonomous regions) (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 4). The steady increase of 
players and the widening of the playing field has led analysts to state boldly 
that governments are ‘no longer the sole objects of integration, nor the 
exclusive link between the national and the EU level’ (Sandholtz 1996, 412) 
and to focus their studies on ‘how government executives may lose their grip 
on power’ (Marks 1996, 341). The result is a rather ‘messy state’. However, 
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governance is not satisfactory as to describing how governments continue to 
play a central role in processes of preference formation and representation.  
 
Like governance, Europeanisation is a modern buzzword in EU studies 
(Cowles et al. 2001, Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, Börzel and Risse 
2003). Although definitions and interpretations abound, Europeanisation is 
commonly understood as a variable which impacts upon the member state 
governments, to the effect that domestic policy areas become increasingly 
subject to common policy-making at the EU level (Börzel 2002, 6). This 
strand of literature can be grouped under the heading: ‘how and to what 
extent is the member state Europeanised?’. Volumes focusing on the 
management of EU-affairs in one or multiple member states flourish in 
abundance (Falkner 2001, Goetz 1995, Harmsen 2000, Wessels et al. 2004, 
Rometsch and Wessels 2001, Zeff and Pirro 2001). In addition, recent 
studies explaining implementation performance through the actions of the 
government in question in the negotiating stages offer tentative attempts to 
academically link the stages of governments ‘shaping’ and ‘taking’ EU-
policy (Bursens 2002, Börzel 2003, Falkner et al. 2005, Rood et al. 2006) – 
but this remains a field of study largely unexplored. 
 
§2.2 Added value and relevance 
Paraphrasing the key question of Europeanisation studies (‘to what extent is 
the member state Europeanised’) a question driving this study is: ‘how and 
to what extent is the EU nationalised?’ Through which venues and at which 
crucial moments do national governments attempt to influence EU-policy-
making? Which conditions and characteristics are relevant for their 
motivation and capacity to do so?  
 
Part of the interest in the position of national governments stems from the 
observation of a ‘gap’ between modern EU studies concepts and public 
discourse. Newer EU studies perspectives, such as multi level governance 
and Europeanisation focus on the limitations and constraints upon national 
governments to deal with the demands of EU membership. At the same time, 
political and media accounts of the EU policy process continues to be 
dominated by the reportedly prominent position of member states and their 
governments. One example is the discourse about the ‘national positions’ of 
the twenty-five member states which ‘win’ or ‘lose out’ in the intricate 
decision making process. Congruently, a lot of the influence opportunities in 
Brussels are organised along national lines: staff recruitment, committee 
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presence. Apparently, for politicians and policy-makers, the central level of 
government remains a focal point of EU policy-making, as the location 
where interests are melded into ‘national positions’ for a battle in the 
political arena of EU level negotiations. A study of how governments 
attempt to influence what happens at the EU level of common policy-making 
and which moments and variables are relevant for their performance is an 
attempt to close this apparent gap between theory and discourse. 
 
Figure 1  Mechanisms of ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ EU-member-state interaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The practical relevance of this study lies both at the level of member state 
governments and at the EU level. The precise legal and regulatory impact of 
EU membership is disputed. Although it is often assumed that this 
‘regulatory pressure’ is very high, empirical analysis generally focuses on 
the regulatory impact of legislation. In this respect, analyses focusing on the 
Netherlands have assessed that a mere 14% of national laws would directly 
result from EU legislation and policies.3 But this focus on directly binding 
legislation is too narrow. Governments are confronted with framework-laws, 
decisions, case law of the Court of Justice, as well as more ‘soft instruments’ 
such as the results of benchmark studies and policy co-ordination, which 
produce norms and standards to be taken into account when developing 
national policies.  
 
For governments wishing to be active at the EU level, investing in the 
quality of their actions is more relevant than in the old days of economic co-
operation between six or twelve then-EC member states. Those wishing to 
be relevant in EU policy-shaping will have to invest actively in getting their 
 
                                                 
3) Algemene Rekenkamer (2004, 8), but figures are highly contested, see also 
Bovens and Yesilkagit 2005. 
European Union 
National government 
Europeanisation Shaping EU policies
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act together. In order to secure the aforementioned ‘link’ between processes 
at different levels, it is important to secure knowledge and insights into how 
the EU works at different levels of the central government administration. If 
civil servants of government ministries, responsible for dossiers with an EU-
dimension, are aware of this link to assess potential consequences for 
national and EU-related actions, problems with implementation and 
enforcement may be foreseen. In order to minimize adaptation costs, insights 
into the process of how the shaping of these rules can be influenced and how 
to increase the ‘goodness of fit’ between existing legislation and newly 
proposed EU policies (Knill 2002, Cowles et al. 2001) are highly relevant. 
The processes of change and adaptation sketched by multi-level governance 
and Europeanisation form an important impetus for the study of national 
shaping capacity. 
 
Insight into the role of national governments in the shaping of EU policies, a 
process known as complex and intricate, is just as important to the EU itself. 
As the European Commission has repeatedly stressed, the quality of EU 
rules and legislation relies upon active support from national governments 
for their negotiation and implementation.4 Also, as the EU lacks its own 
executive, the administrative capacity of the EU and thereby, indirectly, its 
political legitimacy depends to a large extent on the functioning of its 
member states and their national political systems (Schmidt and Thomassen 
1999). Therefore, apart from contributing to the emerging ‘third wave’ in EU 
studies, a second purpose of this study is to build an understanding of current 
practice and to design and test a framework for the systematic analysis of 
national shaping capacity for both academics and practitioners.  
 
 
§3. About definitions and scope 
 
§3.1 The central puzzle 
This study does not engage in normative debates, for example those about 
democratic control and legitimacy of EU policy-making. Nor are the ‘why-
questions’ of integration explored (Van Ham 2002, 2) – it is not investigated 
 
                                                 
4) The relevance of sound internal management of EU affairs within the member 
states has been underlined in the Helsinki European Council Conclusions 
Directives for Internal Reform, 10-11 December 1999. 
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why the governments of the member states have judged that ‘there is more to 
be gained from being inside the EU than from being outside’ (Nugent 2003, 
442). As its prime focus is on exploration and descriptive analysis, this study 
fits into the middle box of the EU studies ‘mosaic’ (Wiener and Diez 2004, 
19; see table 1.2). However, as discussed in the theoretical chapters, theories 
primarily designed for explanation and normative debate may add rather 
valuable insights into the puzzle of shaping capacity.  
 
Table 1.2 This study placed into the ‘mosaic’ of EU studies  
 Polity Policy Politics 
Explanatory/understanding  (X)  
Analytical/ descriptive  X  
Critical/normative    
 
The central research question or ‘puzzle’ of this book is the following: 
 
Which variables determine the capacity of the Dutch 
government to shape new EU policies? 
 
§3.2 Defining the scope 
This section defines the different notions in the research question and the 
scope of this study. 
 
‘Shaping capacity’ can be defined as a government’s ability to perform in 
the process of shaping or formulating new EU policies. The subject of this 
study is thus the process of shaping – not the performance achieved, which 
may be defined as national government influence.5  
 
Member state governments are signatory to the treaties that established the 
European Communities and the European Union. Member state is a rather 
misleading notion, as the state functions in a country governed by a complex 
public-private system (Van Schendelen 2002, 27). National government is 
shorthand for the political and administrative organisations at the central 
state level, competent for setting and enforcing public policies. The 
empirical part of this book is confined to the Dutch government: the central 
 
                                                 
5) Academic assessments of influence, common in political science, are 
nonetheless very useful as a source for research methods, see chapter 6. 
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government level of the Netherlands, a founding member state of the then-
EC. The analysis examines the ambitions, preferences, capabilities and 
resources for EU-related actions of the Dutch executive layer of government 
(‘Rijksoverheid’), including Cabinet and the government ministries.6  
 
However tempting, this book does not deserve to be placed on a bookshelf 
dominated by intergovernmentalists. First, though the object of study is 
state-centric, in the discussion, the lens is widened to include other possible 
channels for state-level interest representation: courts; sub-national levels of 
government; citizens; political parties and organised interests (Nugent 2003, 
443). These may root in the domestic level, but use transnational and trans-
governmental relations and contacts for their EU-directed actions. Second, as 
discussed in chapter 2, that governments would be unitary actors, a key 
claim of intergovernmentalism, is regarded as ‘a matter for empirical 
exploration and not a prior assumption’ (Bulmer and Lequesne 2005, 3). 
Governments operate in a policy environment, the conditions and 
characteristics of which facilitate or hamper a national government’s ability 
to perform. Different EU studies approaches offer divergent perspectives on 
this ‘opportunity-structure’ – a notion taken from ‘neo-institutionalism’ 
(March and Olsen 1989, Aspinwall and Schneider 2001). According to this 
perspective on public policy-making, political and policy outcomes result 
from the strategic interaction of (groups of) actors: governments and supra-; 
sub- and non-state actors. These individuals and organisations try to ‘upload’ 
their wants, desires and preferences about the desired outcomes to the EU 
level, where common decisions are made. In the EU context, preferences are 
formulated and presented in the form of negotiating positions. Government 
representatives choose and pursue actions that aim to close the gap between 
preferences, positions and outcomes. Key to neo-institutional reasoning is 
the claim that this takes place in a political context filled with ‘institutions’. 
This academic notion refers to those formal or informal rules, practices and 
norms that constrain or enable actors and thus create some ‘order and 
predictability’ (March and Olsen 2005, 5).7 By studying EU policy-shaping, 
 
                                                 
6) See De Rooy (2003) for an analysis of the effects of Europeanisation of the 
subnational level of government (provinces; municipalities) in the Netherlands. 
7) The academic notion ‘institutions’ is not to be mistaken for the EU- or 
supranational institutions: the organisations at the EU level (Commission; 
European Parliament, Court of Justice) charged with common policy-making. 
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it is thus relevant to analyse the routings and obstacles that governments are 
confronted with in this process of preference formation and representation, 
both at the national and at the international (EU) level.  
 
The Dutch government participates in the shaping of EU legislation 
according to cumbersome rules and procedures laid down in the treaties. 
Policy-making competencies are divided in an intricate interplay amongst 
the EU’s institutions (Council of Ministers; European Parliament and 
European Commission). When used in this study, the notion EU policy-
making refers to this process of shaping new EU decisions, whatever legal 
form they may take. The book focuses on those stages in which new policy 
is tabled, discussed and set, i.e. the phases of agenda setting, negotiations 
and decision-making around new EU policies.8  
 
Many EU studies analyses focus on the Council of Ministers as the most 
important decision-making institution. One example is offered by studies 
concerned with the intricacies of quantitative voting power analysis (see 
Hosli and Soetendorp 2000). A first problem with these studies is their 
implicit assumption that voting would be the dominant mode of policy 
setting (Wallace 2005, 36). Council voting records demonstrate that voting is 
much less common than media accounts of EU policy-making would make 
us believe (see Mattila and Lane 2001 and chapter 6). Second, the emphasis 
on the stages of decision-making does not do justice to the interaction 
between the institutions that is so characteristic to the EU’s policy process. 
Although the Council formally remains the prime venue for national interest 
representation, the role of the European Parliament has developed from that 
of a ‘toothless tiger’ to a serious co-legislator. Because of this formal role in 
the legislative process, the Parliament should certainly not be 
underestimated. Empirical analyses of how governments deal with Brussels 
show that governments put much time and efforts in influence attempts 
directed at the European Commission and the Parliament, in order to make 
use of its ‘power of the pen’ (see Nugent 1999). Lobbying efforts directed at 
both institutions should, therefore, be duly taken into account when 
analysing the process of shaping EU policy by national governments.  
 
 
                                                 
8) The transposition and enforcement of EU policy in the Netherlands have been 
the subject of recent analyses (Versluis 2003, Mastenbroek 2004). 
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In the year 2000, the Council and the Parliament issued 11.414 legal acts, the 
majority in the form of regulations and directives.9 The empirical scope of 
this book is limited to the analysis of the negotiations around the latter 
‘decision-type’. Directives are used for setting specialised sectoral policies, 
especially in the field of policy harmonisation between the member states. It 
is important to underline the distinction between this ‘normal’ legislation 
with the grand, ‘history-making’ decisions concerning treaty reform or 
budgetary frameworks. (Peterson and Bomberg 2000) The latter attract much 
more media attention than the day-to-day Brussels policy-making process 
and have been the focus of recent, broad analyses (e.g. Moravcsik 1999, 
Laursen forthc.).  
 
This research project focuses on the ‘first pillar’ of the European Union (see 
table 1.3), which concerns economic, social, monetary and related policies. 
Between and within the EU’s three pillars, a balance is struck between 
supranational and more intergovernmental modes of co-operation.10 
Dependent on the relevant policy area, governments are thus confronted with 
different ‘opportunity-structures’ for shaping EU-policies. In the second and 
third pillars, concerned with foreign and security policy and police and 
justice cooperation in the field of criminal matters, governments can act 
more autonomously, as the member states share the right of initiative and 
decisions can only be made unanimously. As this ensures a national veto in 
the final stages of decision making, the ability of governments to influence 
EU level developments is not as challenged as is the case in the first pillar, 
where most proposals for new rules are decided conform the supranational 
‘Community method’. According to this procedure, governments must share 
the initiative and legislative competencies with the European Commission 
and the European Parliament.  
 
                                                 
9) Alesina, 2001, 61. Regulations have a general scope, and are obligatory in all 
its elements and directly applicable in all member states. Some 80% of all EU 
legislation is issued in the form of directives (Dinan 2000, 421). A directive is a 
legal act which is directly applicable in the member states when its provisions 
have been transposed into national law. National governments are left the 
choice for method and format. The case studies analysed in this study concern 
two directives in the field of internal market policy harmonisation.  
10) The notion ‘intergovernmental’ refers in this respect not to the corresponding 
‘classical’ integration theory (see chapter 2) but to a particular modes of 
decision-making ‘between’ governments. 
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Table 1.3 Pillar structure of the European Union 
European Union 
First pillar Second pillar Third pillar 
European Community 
 
Legal regime: EC Treaty 
Common Foreign 
and Security policy 
 
Legal regime: Title V, EU 
Treaty 
European Coal and 
Steel Community  
 
(1952-2002) 
European Atomic Community 
European Security 
and Defense Policy 
 
(on the basis of art. 17 EU) 
Police and Judicial co-
operation in criminal matters 
 
Legal regime: title VI EU 
Treaty 
 
The vast majority of first pillar decisions are made under the ‘majority-
voting’ procedure, a mode of decision-making that gained importance with 
its proliferation in successive treaty changes since the mid-1980s.11 With 
majority-voting, governments can be overruled in the Council, by a winning 
or blocking coalition of member states. Collectively, governments have lost 
influence because of the co-legislative competencies of the European 
Parliament in the co-decision procedure, valid for many first-pillar policy 
areas. What these procedural innovations imply for the ‘opportunity-
structure’ for governments wishing to be active at the EU level is 
investigated in chapter 3. 
 
How to assess how governments contribute to the shaping of EU policies? 
The key mode of decision-making in the EU is negotiating: a process by 
which actors strategically pursue preferences in a process of common 
deliberations without a hierarchically placed authority (Zartman 1977, 621-
3). Negotiation lies ‘at the heart’ (Wallace and Wallace 1996, 32) of a 
policy-process based on the principles of consensus, cooperation, 
compromise, and compensation (Rood 2001). A prime analytical difficulty is 
that these bargaining processes are typically multilateral (instead of bilateral, 
i.e. involving only two parties) and involve a wealth supra- and subnational, 
state- and non-state actors. Second, the concept of a neat policy chain or the 
 
                                                 
11) The original Treaties of Rome (1957), establishing the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and Euratom, were amended and extended with the Merger 
Treaty (1965), the Single European Act (1986); the Treaty of Maastricht 
(1992); the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2001). Outside 
the time frame covered by this study, a new Constitutional Treaty was signed 
by the heads of state and government in 2004. 
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distinction between prenegotiating and the actual negotiating stages are 
misleading in the working practice of the EU. Often, dossiers pass back and 
forth between different levels – proposals may skip certain phases, accelerate 
because of political pressures, or be stored away for years until the advent of 
a new national Council Presidency, with a fresh interest in the matter.12 A 
small number of highly sensitive dossiers form the exception, in the sense 
that they are not systematically discussed in working groups or in the 
committee of Permanent Representatives of the member states (COREPER), 
but are only dealt with at a high political level in ministerial Council 
meetings or summits. To systematically analyse this process, this study 
deploys a particular ‘process tracing’ technique originating in political 
science and influence analysis: ‘intensive process analysis’. For more on the 
research design, see chapter 6. 
 
As to the time frame, this study is limited to an analysis EU policy-making 
up to the year 2000. This implies that more recent developments, including 
the Constitutional Treaty and its rejection by a majority of Dutch voters 
through a referendum on June 1st, 2005 and subsequent analyses of (the lack 
of) political saliency of EU policy-making in the Netherlands, are explicitly 
not discussed. However, when appropriate, mention will be made of 
contributions and reform proposals issued since 2000.13  
 
 
 
                                                 
12) The influence of the EU Council Presidency, an office which every member 
state holds for six months according to a rotation scheme, on the outcomes of 
EU policy-shaping are debated (see Elgström 2003, Schout et al. 2004). The 
2002 European Council meeting in Sevilla adopted changes to the system 
which sould ensure more coherency of EU agenda´s. But the government 
holding the Presidency continues to enjoy certain competencies in the field of 
agenda management and external representation which give it a clear advantage 
over other delegations.  
13) Including many recent advices to the Dutch government on the organisation 
and co-ordination of Dutch EU policy (Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur 2005, 
Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken 2005, Raad van State 2004, De Zwaan 
2004). See also chapter 5. 
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§4. Organisation of the book 
 
This book has been structured in four parts: 
 
1) Theory: how governments shape EU policy (chapters 1, 2 and 3) 
No single theory can both explain and describe the complexities of EU 
policy-making. Individual accounts always report of attempts to capture 
‘parts of the beast’ (Puchala 1972, 267). In the theoretical part of this book, 
chapter 2 reviews the abovementioned ‘classical’ theories, to look for 
insights into the concept of national shaping capacity. In chapter 3, it is 
investigated which suggestions as regards to the ability of governments to 
influence EU level developments can be extracted from newer EU studies 
perspectives: multi-level governance and Europeanisation. Although the 
shaping capacity of governments is indeed challenged by a number of 
developments, a systematic exploration of the opportunities and threats in 
this chapter demonstrates that this category of actors continues to be 
particularly prominent in the EU policy process.  
 
2) Designing a framework and a method for analysis (chapters 4 and 6) 
Europeanisation-literature has focused almost exclusively on processes of 
national adaptation to the EU. Not much is known about the variables that 
are relevant for how and when these ‘Europeanised’ national governments 
attempt to shape new EU policies. To remedy this gap, existing insights are 
collected and categorised in a framework for analysis in chapter 4, drawing 
on a review of recent scholarly and practitioners’ contributions to EU studies 
literature. As the first results are rather unstructured and fragmented, these 
variables are listed and their relevance and potential impact – positive or 
negative – on shaping capacity are discussed. It is argued that national 
shaping capacity is a combination of the motivation or will of governments 
to be active at the EU level – including preferences, ambitions and objectives 
– and their ‘potential’ – the capabilities, skills and resources deemed 
necessary to influence the policy-process according to these preferences. The 
discussion singles out a number of variables, which – considering the 
theoretical insights discussed in previous chapters – are considered 
particularly relevant. These can thus be expected to ‘light up’ in the 
empirical analysis. These include the constitutional and policy congruence 
between the national and EU level, the relative salience of the issue at hand 
and the strategic, anticipation and co-ordination capacity of the government 
in question. 
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Chapter 6 introduces the format and method of the qualitative case-studies: 
detailed reconstructions of real-life decision making practices around two 
EU directives, with a special focus on and the shaping activities of Dutch 
government representatives with the help of ‘intensive process analysis’. In 
order to make process analysis suitable for analysing EU level processes, the 
original research method (Huberts 1988) has been adapted and dissected in 
eight subsequent steps. Two case studies are disaggregated into many 
discrete points in time, each of which represents an individual observation or 
a data point. Two categories of data sources are used: ‘people’, i.e. national 
and EU level actors involved at the political and administrative level, and 
‘papers’: academic analysis and policy documents. Document analysis for 
the policy reconstruction included archive research in the Dutch Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs. The resulting ‘paper trail’ is 
complemented with a number of structured interviews. Prior to composing 
the final draft of the report, it has been consulted with a number of selected 
academic experts and EU policy practitioners, in order to establish ‘validity 
through pooled judgment’ (‘peer reviews’). Moreover, the author has 
profited from field research in Council working groups and regular contacts 
and interviews with government officials involved from different 
government ministries in EU policy-shaping through training and research 
projects.  
 
3) The Dutch case – An empirical analysis (chapters 5, 7 and 8)  
In order to examine how shaping works in practice and to test the framework 
for analysis, the empirical part of the book is concerned with ‘the Dutch 
case’. It could be assumed that the Netherlands, as ‘largest of the small 
member states’, can rely upon considerable political clout within the EU. 
However, in this long-standing member state, there is much discussion about 
the directions and contents of its national EU policy and the potential of the 
central government to realise these objectives. Chapter 5 discusses the 
shaping capacity for EU-policy-making of the Netherlands on the basis of 
the framework designed in the previous chapter.  
 
The first case-study, presented in chapter 7, concerns the Gas directive 
(98/30/EC), for which the Netherlands government, traditionally a staunch 
opponent of energy liberalisation because of the state monopoly on national 
gas supply, became a pusher or ‘pace-setter’. The second case study in 
chapter 8 concerns a reconstruction of the shaping of the Biopatent directive 
(98/44/EC), dealing with the complex and controversial matter of patenting 
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biotechnological inventions. These cases have been selected according to a 
‘most-similar systems’ methodological design (Przeworski and Teune 1970, 
32-4). The two directives to be analysed both are strongly driven by the wish 
of the European Commission for EU level harmonisation of legislation in a 
formerly nationally organised policy field. Both were adopted under the co-
decision and majority-voting procedures. As to the domestic level, the 
negotiations were in both cases co-ordinated by the government department 
of Economic Affairs. The cases differ, however, as regards to the voting 
behaviour of the Dutch government in the decision-making stages of the 
policy-process. The Dutch government delegation voted against the 
Biopatent directive in the Internal Market Council meeting in November 
1997. One sub-question of the case study analysis is how this voting 
behaviour relates to the shaping capacity of the Dutch government. 
 
4) Conclusions and considerations (chapter 9) 
The concluding chapter 9 reports of the empirical analysis that served to find 
out which conditions and characteristics make up a government’s shaping 
capacity. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss what the empirical 
analysis offers from an analytical point of view and for the shaping of EU 
policies in general and the efforts of the Dutch government in particular. 
Last but not least, as the scope and time frame of this book are necessarily 
limited, the chapter discusses promising avenues for further research and 
shortly reviews the continuing debate on Dutch shaping ambitions and 
potential after the 1990s.  
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Chapter 2 
Governments in European Integration 
Theory 
 
§1. A tale of two why-questions 
 
In the slipstream of the ‘acquis communautaire’ of rules and legislation, 
within EU studies, the ‘acquis académique’ (Wessels 1997, 268) developed.1 
This chapter and the following aim to explore this academic heritage, in 
order to look for insights into the role and shaping capacity of national 
governments. This chapter starts out by reviewing relevant insights from the 
two ‘classical’, macro-level theoretical accounts of integration, endlessly 
reformulated since their emergence in the 1950s and 1960s: 
‘supranationalism’ and ‘intergovernmentalism’. Both schools focus on the 
two ‘why’-questions: why integration, and why now? (Van Ham 2001, 2), 
both have a strong normative dimension underlying their academic base and 
both have always easily used empirical developments as evidence for their 
respective claims (see Haas 1958, Hoffmann 1966 and 1999, Moravcik 
1999). But where neofunctionalism sees the EU slowly but gradually 
developing into an autonomous source of political authority, separate and 
‘above’ that of the member states, which are weakened and diluted as a 
result, intergovernmentalism argues how unitary governments rationally 
determine the course of integration.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is not to discuss the contents, merits and flaws of 
both theories – as this has been done extensively elsewhere (see for example 
 
                                                 
1) The ‘acquis communautaire’ refers to the total body of some 15.000 EU-laws 
and regulations. Candidate member states have to implement the acquis as one 
of the requirements for membership. 
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Rosamund 2000, Wiener and Diez 2003). Their premises merit introduction, 
however, in order to clarify their perspective on EU-member state relations; 
to identify the variables determining shaping capacity and to understand the 
innovations proposed by more recent EU studies approaches. 
Notwithstanding their different purpose – on explaining rather than 
exploring the role of governments in the EU – it wil be argued that these 
‘grand theories’ (Nugent 1999) do add valuable insights into the puzzle of 
shaping capacity. 
 
 
§2. Neofunctionalism 
 
§2.1 Introducing Neofunctionalism 
 
Table 2.1 Classical theories on EU-member-state interaction 
Theory / perspective Claim Added value 
Neo-functionalism ‘Supra-national 
institutions rule’  
How supranational institutions have a life 
of their own  
Intergovernmentalism ‘Governments rule’  National governments as ‘shapers’ and 
‘takers’  
 
Based on the work of David Mitrany (1943) and applied to the emerging 
European Community through contributions of Ernst Haas (1958), Leon 
Lindberg (1963) and Philip Schmitter (1970), neofunctionalism developed 
into a social scientific account of the ‘Monnet-method’ of integration. The 
latter notion refers to Jean Monnet, a high-ranking French government 
official who initiated post-war European cooperation initiatives based on the 
pragmatic idea of functional integration.2 Ernst Haas (1958, 16) defined 
integration as ‘the process whereby political actors in several distinct 
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and 
political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or 
demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states’. Neofunctionalism, 
the most prominent supranational integration theory, has three 
characteristics: the notion of ‘spill-over’ between sectors and policy areas; a 
 
                                                 
2) Interestingly, David Mitrany actually disliked the earliest post-war attempts for 
West-European integration as a ‘regional fallacy’ because they were 
territorially limited and would lead to domination by the largest member-states. 
(quoted in Rosamund 2000, 37). 
Chapter 2   Governments in European Integration Theory 
 
 
 
 
19 
pluralist perspective on policy-making and the key role reserved for 
institutions at the supranational level.3 
 
Initially, neofunctionalism opposed the realist concept of states as unitary 
actors. Instead, it deployed a pluralist or ‘cobweb’ (Webb 1983, 11) 
perspective on public policy-making. Government policy is considered a 
resultant of access by public and private actors, who would link with similar 
groups in other member states and thus put pressure on political decision 
makers. The major sources of these pressures were regarded to be 
bureaucratic politics (policy communities) and interest groups. Organised 
groups of individuals or organisations promoting issue-specific, sectoral 
interests would make contact across national boundaries and engage in 
lobbying activities to promote further co-operation (‘transnationalism’). But 
also inside national governments neofunctionalists expected ministries and 
departments to forge direct links with their counterparts in other countries 
(‘transgovernmentalism’). These cross-border contacts would be enhanced 
by a driving force that is perhaps the most famous invention of 
neofunctionalism. ‘Spill-over’ would make the interests and loyalties of 
these groups gradually to be transferred from directed towards national 
governments to a higher political level, that of the EU.  
 
Functional ‘spill-over’ of integration between policy sectors rests on a 
number of hypotheses (Haas 1958, 283-317, see also Rood 2001, 25). 
Spillover should be initiated at the domain of ‘low politics’: politics and 
policy areas that are momentarily deemed less controversial by national 
governments, such as economics and social affairs.4 Once co-operating, 
pressure groups would organise trans-nationally and ‘upgrade’ common 
 
                                                 
3) Functionalist work kan be read as an anticipation of work on interdependence 
and transnationalism (Keohane and Nye 1977), theories which share the 
prospect of the transcendence or at least the containment of national states.  
4) The distinction between ‘low’ and ‘high’ politics has been introduced and later 
modified by Hoffmann (1966). It concerns a distinction between two categories 
of politics, those aiming at the maximization of the common good (low politics) 
and those of zero-sum games (Hoffmann 1983, 23).‘Whether an issue falls into 
one or the other category depends on its momentary salience – on how essential 
it appears to the government for the survival of the nation or for its own 
survival, as well as on the specific features of the issue (…) and on the 
economic conjuncture’.  
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interests to a supranational level of authority. Government representatives 
would take up this societal demand for integration as a result of political 
pressures, as well as practical experiences (political spill-over).5  
 
Another characteristic of neofunctionalism is the central role attributed to 
those politicians and officials working at the EU-institutions (the 
Commission and the Court of Justice and, more recently, the European 
Parliament). National officials working within these organisations would be 
socialised into the new ethos so that there would be a gradual, creeping but 
inevitable extension of competencies. EU-institutions thus exploit their role 
as honest broker to mediate among governments and mobilize national 
policy makers and interest groups into transnational elite networks. Recent 
contributions with a neofunctionalist tone have highlighted in this respect the 
proliferation of majority voting and the need for governments to reach 
package deals and issue linkage in EU negotiations (see Trannholm 
Mikkelsen 1991, Sandholz and Stone Sweet 1991).Through the generation of 
technical, legal and political information and ideas, EU-institutions are hence 
able to persuade policy makers to policies that go beyond their initial 
intentions – and thus propel integration forward. Slowly but gradually, 
policy integration would thus find its way into the venues of ‘high politics’.  
 
§2.2 Supranational socialisation at the EU level? 
One could easily claim that neofunctionalism has ‘not much to offer’ as 
regards to the topic of EU-member state relations (Bulmer and Lequesne 
2005, 5). Ultimately, the position of national states within the framework for 
co-operation would be weakened, as through institutional dynamics, national 
loyalties are transferred to ‘a new political community, superimposed over 
the pre-existing ones’ (Haas 1958, 16).6 However, neofucntionalism has two 
central claims, which merit a closer look for the purpose of this study.  
 
                                                 
5) The relevance of experiences and socialisation has been highlighted in 
‘transactionalism’ (Deutsch 1968, 1978). 
6) With the development of neo-functionalism, this idea of a unavoidable finalité 
present in original analysis has been watered down – Lindberg (1970, 309) 
speaks of a ‘symbiotic relation’ between the supranational level and the 
national states participating, meaning that the growth of the European 
Community would come to a halt when a certain balance would have been 
found. 
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First, neofunctionalism goes ‘beyond the state’, in the sense that it offers a 
pluralist theory about the ways in which preferences arise out of negotiations 
over diverse interests between societal groups. As negotiating positions are 
constructed at the domestic level, the mechanisms for their formulation are 
relevant for the definition of shaping capacity. Whatever the final 
consequence of processes of cooperation and integration, these mechanisms 
should be taken into account in an analysis of how governments deal with 
the impact of European integration and how they attempt to shape its 
contents. 
 Second, and perhaps even more relevant, an important hypothesis in 
neofunctionalism focuses on the ‘transfer of loyalties’ (Haas 1958) of 
government representatives from the national to the EU level. As national 
officials who are regularly present at EU level policy-making settings are 
socialised into a spirit of co-operation and mutual understanding, an esprit 
de corps develops (Laffan 1998, Checkel 1999, Risse and Wiener 1999). 
Allegedly, national preferences, originating in the national capitals are 
thereby gradually ‘moulded’ into a commonly constructed ‘European 
interest’. 
 
Table 2.2 A Neofunctionalist perspective on governments 
 Focus Government? What happens 
at central 
government 
level? 
How to shape 
EU policies 
Neofunctionalism  Community-
building at 
supranational 
level; 
integration 
Weakened, 
interests rede-
fined in terms of 
regional, rather 
than national 
orientation 
 
− More inter-
bureaucratic 
contact re-
places nation-
al bodies by 
EU institutions 
− Increase in 
majority voting 
and Parlia-
mentary 
powers 
− National inter-
ests translated 
into common 
interests 
− Socialisation 
at EU level 
− Supranational 
institutions au-
tonomous role 
 
For our analysis, it is relevant to shortly examine to what extent these 
predications are mirrored in today’s EU policy-making system. Are national 
government representatives increasingly socialised into an EU level polity, 
even to the extent that national loyalties and allegiances are ‘forgotten’ at the 
expense of national preferences and negotiating positions? Has there been ‘a 
shift of loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new centre’ 
(Haas 1968, 16)? 
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For providing a tentative answer to these questions, recent empirical studies 
on the working of committees at the EU level offer interesting findings (Van 
Schendelen 1998, Christiansen and Kircher 2002). Here, a closer look is 
taken at the results of an extensive international research project to compare 
behaviour of national government officials attending committees at two 
locations in the policy-process: that of the Council and of the Commission. 
In the latter venue, expert committees in the phase of drafting new proposals, 
participants are invited on behalf of the expertise they bring into the 
negotiations; the first type involves Council working groups and comitology 
committees, typical venues for national interest representation. On the basis 
of a survey under some 218 national officials from 14 EU member states, 
Egeberg (2004) argues that there is indeed a differentiation in official 
behaviour amongst these three types of venues for EU level action.7 
Consistent with what can be expected from their organisational features, 
Council working groups and comitology committees appear as 
‘intergovernmental’ arena’s, in which participants predominantly behave as 
government representatives presenting co-ordinated policy positions. In 
contrast, within expert committees, aimed at providing input to the European 
Commission, the focus is on independent expertise and policy contents, 
instead of on preferences and positions.  
 
At first sight, the findings of this and related research projects (see also 
Beyers and Dierickx 1998, Trondal 2004) appear to sustain the expectations 
drawn from supranationalism. First, notwithstanding clear differences 
between different types of committees, the survey shows that the role of 
expertise is crucial to all. ‘Arguing’ rather than ‘bargaining’ is an important 
feature of the system, in the sense that participants indicate how after 
argumentation and discussion on the basis of specialist knowledge, their 
preferences may alter. Committee participants indicate to assign generally 
more weight to arguments put forward by colleagues enjoying considerable 
expertise on the subject, than to their ‘backgrounds’, for example the fact 
that these positions are voiced by representatives of particular (large) 
member states.  
 Second, government officials express a considerable degree of loyalty 
towards the committee in which they participate, which confirms 
 
                                                 
7) See for more on the role of committees the appendix and Hix (1999, 41-5), 
Nugent (1999, 129-33) and Rhinard (2002, 192-8). 
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expectations described in neofunctionalist accounts of EU policy-making. 
Embedded in EU level structures and separated in time and space from their 
primary institutional affiliations back home, officials tend to develop a sense 
of allegiance to the supranational level. Especially within Council working 
parties, participants feel responsible for the proceedings – a finding 
consistent with the image of a sense of ‘common identity’ present at a higher 
level of negotiations, between the ambassadors represented in COREPER 
(De Zwaan 1995, Lewis 1998). These and similar findings, which possibly 
surprise those who find the Council a typically intergovernmental body, have 
led Wessels (1991, 137) to conclude boldly that the Council is ‘not an 
interstate body, but a body at the supranational level’.  
 A third relevant finding is that a large majority of respondents indicate 
to trust the knowledge and expertise provided by the supranational 
institutions involved in the functioning of their committee. This includes the 
Council secretariat and representatives of the relevant European Commission 
DG. The majority of respondents perceive Commission officials – which, 
after all, are nationals of the member states – to act and independently from 
national interests and to pursue a ‘European’ ideal.  
 
But there is more to it than meets the eye, as based on the same data, two 
important caveats should be made.  
 First, the identity evoked in EU level settings does not ‘replace’ national 
identities. The proportion of respondents indicating that they express more 
loyalty to their national government is larger (average 70%) than those 
affiliating to the committee of group at the EU level they participate in 
(average 43%). This primacy of national allegiance is not surprising. 
National officials spend the majority of their working time within national 
administrations. It is interesting to note a distinction in the degree to which a 
supranational allegiance is expressed in answer to the survey. A stronger 
feeling towards the supranational level is experienced among national 
officials representing national positions in Council working parties, than for 
government officials present in ‘independent’ expert committees. One 
explanation is the relative intensity of Council working parties. When new 
proposals are issued by the Commission or the issue salience of existing 
drafts increases through political pressure, for example from the side of a 
new national Presidency, these types of committees tend to meet more 
frequently than expert groups. The latter forum is only engaged in the 
drafting of new proposals and meets often only once in the process, for 
example during a two-day expert conference. This would indicate the 
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‘continuous tension between the home affiliation and the pull of the 
collective forum’ (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997, 279).  
 
Second, in contrast to expectations, co-ordination with the colleagues at 
home is relevant for participants in both types of committees. It can be 
expected that participants of Commission expert committees, which are 
generally not sent by their respective governments to present a national 
mandate, but are invited by the Commission services for reason of their 
personal expertise do not co-ordinate their position at home before departing 
to these venues. However, the survey shows that these participants, if 
government officials, do take into account national considerations (for 
example the fit between the issue at the table and relevant national rules) not 
much less than Council working group participants. The latter are explicitly 
subject to intricate co-ordination procedures for national negotiating 
positions in the capitals, although their intensity varies between the member 
states.8 On average 38% of expert group participants have co-ordinated their 
position with their colleagues, and some 28% even indicate to have clear 
instructions about the position to take.  
 
The findings discussed in this section can be complemented with various 
other studies about national official behaviour within EU level institutions 
(see Beyers and Dierickx 1998, Beijers and Trondal 2003). A common 
observation is that domestic level factors, such as the embedding of expert 
committee members in national administrations, continue to matter more 
than shared EU level experiences. Even for actors who are regularly 
involved in EU-policy-making, this experience functions as a secondary 
socialisation process. An extensive exposure to negotiations and proceedings 
at the EU level does not lead to more supranational role conceptions (see 
Goetz 2000). The data show that the latter feature, although present without 
doubt, remains to a large extent filtered by the national institutions (in the 
sense of organisations, norms and rules) in which the participants are 
embedded, and that supranational features of the policy-process, mostly the 
socialisation that participants of EU level committees perceive, do not 
replace national allegiance.  
 Emphasis on the alledged prominence of national features and the 
central position of national executives in the policy-process is characteristic 
 
                                                 
8) See chapter 4 and the annex for more on national co-ordination of EU affairs.  
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for intergovernmentalism, the second important ‘classical’ integration theory 
to be discussed in the next section.  
 
 
§3. Intergovernmentalism 
 
§3.1 Introducing intergovernmentalism 
The findings, presented in the previous section, on the sustained relevance of 
the national level of policy-making are by no means groundbreaking. 
Already in the 1960s and 1970s, disillusioning experiences with the process 
of integration for some scholars obviously contradicted the neofunctionalist 
logic of integration. Haas (1975) himself criticized neofunctionalism for 
underestimating the political and administrative capacity of the member 
states to adapt to and effectively survive pressures ‘from above’. Because of 
this empirical counter-evidence, most notably the ‘empty chair crisis’ and 
subsequent slowdown of the integration process (a process known as ‘Euro-
sclerosis’), the sustained position of the member states drew renewed 
academic attention.9 Stanley Hoffmann (1966) emphasised the continuing 
importance of national interests in EU policies, the reason why the process 
of spillover would come to a halt when hitting the domains of ‘high-politics’. 
Policy integration would be possible if and only if national governments, as 
‘masters’ of the game, give up national competencies for the sake of better 
policy-making. This ‘integration dilemma’ is easily recognisable as core of 
the dominant state-centric paradigm in integration theory: intergovern-
mentalism. 
 
For intergovernmentalists, the European Union is an international 
organisation with a particularly broad mandate, which serves to uphold and 
strengthen the interests of its member states (Hoffmann 1966, 1994). For 
traditional realists, these interests were a set of constant and fixed 
preferences of decision-makers at the central state level (Krasner 1978, 10-
7). More recent analyses see interests as more variable and dynamic. An 
appealing picture of how interests are formed by the constant process of 
interaction between the international and the national level is offered by 
‘two-level games’. In this analogy of international relations as simultaneous 
 
                                                 
9) Eurosclerosis refers to the stagnation of the policy process in the 1970s as a 
result of political tensions and economic recession (Dinan 2005, 69).  
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chess games, national representatives act on two tables: the domestic and 
international (Putnam 1988, Evans et al. 1994, Anderssen and Liefferink 
1997, 10-12). National political leaders appear at both game boards – across 
the international table sit European counterparts, around the domestic table 
sit the domestic constituency. The link between the two chessboards is the 
requirement for any agreement on the first, international level, to be ratified, 
endorsed or implemented on the second, domestic level. At the domestic 
level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to 
adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing 
coalitions among those groups. At the international level, the same actors 
seek to bargain in ways that enhance their domestic position. A government 
representative would attempt to maximise his or her own ability to satisfy 
domestic pressures, while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign 
developments. The political complexities for the players in this two-level 
game are enormous, since moves that seem rational for a player at one board 
might be impolitic for that same player at the other board. 
 
Two-level game is little more than a metaphor to describe the outcomes of 
international exchange (Rosamond 2000, 147). But the model can be used to 
acknowledge that ‘an understanding of domestic politics is a precondition 
for, not a supplement to, the analysis of strategic interaction among states’. 
The quote is from Andrew Moravcsik (1993, 481) who offers an explanation 
of European integration that actually consists of two separate theories. First, 
a liberal theory of national preference formation, second, a model of EU 
level bargaining between national governments. Interests of governments are 
not a function of their relative position in the world system, but arise through 
domestic conflicts between societal groups, the outcomes of which can be 
explained by the magnitude of benefits to be gained from co-operation, the 
certainty of these benefits and the relative influence (differential 
mobilization) of the producers groups representing economic interests. These 
groups influence governments, which wish to maintain in power and, 
therefore, respond to domestic pressures.  
 
Probably, few EU students trapped in the traditional intergovernmental-
supranational divide would recognise at first sight the author of this quote: 
‘… the EU is a unique, multileveled, trans-national political system’.10 But 
 
                                                 
10) Moravcsik 1999, page 1. 
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although it acknowledges the ‘multi-leveledness’ of the EU system, a core 
assumption of ‘liberal’ intergovernmentalism is that the domestic and the 
international arenas are clearly separate and distinct. For Moravcsik, 
domestic actors do not play a significant role outside and independent from 
government representatives. ‘Groups articulate preferences and governments 
aggregate them’ (ibid. 483). Although they may be motivated by the 
pressures of interest groups upon which they are politically dependent, 
national governments remain the highest authorities within national 
societies, as well as at the EU level, where they are able to ‘orchestrate their 
negotiations carefully’ in order to rationally pursuing a stable set of 
geopolitical or economic interests (Webb 1983, 13). They may agree to 
‘pool’ and delegate competencies to the EU level, but only as long as it is in 
their own interests and insofar as common goals are achieved that would not 
be possible to realise alone.11 Because national governments are able to take 
initiatives and reach bargains in Council negotiations with relatively little 
constraint, the outcomes of EU policy-shaping reflect the lowest common 
denominator (Moravcsik 1993, 501). In contrast to the neofunctionalist view, 
EU-institutions are regarded as agents to facilitate interstate bargaining, but 
they remain creatures of their political ‘masters’, the governments of the 
member states.  
 
The assumption of rationality, central to liberal intergovernmentalism, 
suggests that governments possess all necessary information available and 
use this rationally to pursue their goals. By co-operating and devising 
common policies as solutions for policy problems, governments can actually 
enhance their position ‘at home’. The paradox – which originated with 
Stanley Hoffmann’s article on the ‘obstinate’ nation state (Hoffmann 1966) 
– is that by co-operating, and thus sharing competencies with each other and 
with the EU-institutions, governments can ‘deliver’ to their national 
constituencies better and more adequately, than would have been the case if 
they would act solitary. Alan Milward (1992) has described this process (by 
which member states which have an interest in the promotion of integration 
to accommodate the demands of their national constituencies) as the 
 
                                                 
11) Competencies are pooled at the EU level when national governments agree to 
decide matters by other voting procedures than unanimity. Competencies are 
delegated when supranational actors are permitted to take decision without 
intervening vote by national governments (Moravcsik 1999, 67). 
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‘European rescue of the nation state’. Leon Lindberg (1994) has later 
reversed Milwards argument and used it to explain the entrepreneurial 
qualities of supranational institutions. Lindberg draws an analogy between 
the ability of governments to use domestic interest in order to strengthen 
their position both at home and abroad, and the ability of the supranational 
institutions to gain advantage from the interplay of diverging preferences of 
the member states. 
 
§3.2 Searching for proof of intergovernmental bargains 
 
Table 2.3 An Intergovernmentalist perspective on governments 
 Focus Government? What happens at 
central 
government 
level? 
How to shape 
EU policies 
Intergovern-
mentalism 
Negotiations 
between unitary 
governments 
Shapers not 
shaped them-
selves; masters 
of the treaty 
− homogeneity 
between mem-
ber states 
− Hierarchical 
system of uni-
tary states 
− National inter-
est defined in 
negotiations 
between 
domestic 
societal groups 
 
− Co-ordination: 
national inter-
est aggregated 
and coherently 
represented, 
monopoly of 
national repre-
sentatives 
− Focus on 
Council as 
prime venue for 
governments 
 
The same empirical studies described in §2.2 provide interesting insights 
into the presumed dominance of national governments within the EU system, 
a claim so central to intergovernmentalist reasoning. At first sight, the 
centrality of national government representatives feeds the image of national 
governments as key players of the European game. Even in Commission-
organised expert committees, government elites remain key actors. Their 
prominence is easily explained by the possible impact of European 
legislation. It is clear that if governments have to implement binding 
decisions, most notably directives, into their national legal systems, they 
have an incentive to invest a lot of time and energy into the ‘shaping’ of 
these rules and laws at the EU level. And indeed, multiple recent volumes 
have discussed national systems for dealing with the ‘impact of Europe’, one 
prominent feature being the systems for formulating and co-ordinating 
national preferences for EU policy developments (see Kassim 2000, Zeff and 
Pirro 2001, Wessels et al. 2003). These processes of conflict between 
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domestic groups are extensively described in the first step of liberal 
intergovernmentalist reasoning, and rightly so as it appears from these 
policy-oriented studies that the impact of Europe is ‘differential’ (Héritier et 
al. 2001, 2). There are important differences between national systems, 
including the degree of centralisation, the methods of co-ordination and the 
involvement of different actors such as parliaments; regions and lobby 
groups.  
 
What is particularly interesting from these studies is the degree of internal 
diversity that characterises national governments and the processes of 
preference formation. It would be interesting to see to what extent the way a 
government ‘deals with Europe’ has an impact on the way national positions 
are formulated and represented, an exploration of which requires looking 
outside the liberal intergovernmentalist framework. The aforementioned 
studies repeatedly demonstrate how the negotiating positions represented by 
government officials not so much result from a mere consultation of societal 
interests, but be the outcome of negotiation, bargaining and conflict between 
and within government departments, national parliaments or societies. Apart 
from domestic producer groups, central to Moravcsik’s theory, there is a 
considerable impact of ‘bureaucratic politics’, i.e. different government 
departments with contrasting views on the subject matter. What is crucial is 
that it appears that governments have much difficulties to control these 
processes at the domestic level and that the picture of ‘effective systems for 
the internal management of external relationships [which] enable states to 
arrive at the international bargaining table fully prepared to take part in 
negotiations’ is not sustained (Metcalfe 1994, 276). The active role of 
domestic groups in Brussels outside the framework offered by national 
governments cannot be so easily explained with the tools offered by liberal 
intergovernmental reasoning (see Wessels et al. 2003, Kassim 2000, Zeff 
and Pirro 2001). In support of the argument made by Bulmer (1983): ‘it is 
just as important to understand the national institutional settings as to 
understand the EU level institutions, in order to get a grip on the EU policy 
process as a whole’ (Wallace 2000, 7).  
 
The next step in liberal intergovernmentalist reasoning focuses on how 
governments behave at the EU level. There, the preferences emerging from 
domestic conflict are expected to be consistently and coherently represented 
at the EU level by government executives. But the findings are 
contradictory. First, if the central claims of intergovernmentalism ring true, 
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the survey results would show a prominent and continuing allegiance of 
national government officials to their national government. However, the 
data demonstrate, in contrast, how a gradual ‘supranationalisation’ of 
loyalties can be witnessed and that a considerable proportion of the officials 
involved in the survey feels loyal to the committees in which they 
participate. Rather than national backgrounds, it is the quality of the 
arguments and the expertise delivered by the speaker that are convincing. 
Second, according to the data, national co-ordination is not as important as 
the intergovernmentalist framework leads us to believe. In Council working 
groups, the prime venue of national interest representation where one would 
expect the tightest co-ordination, 45% of all instructions have not been co-
ordinated within the relevant government ministry. More than half (53%) of 
all instructions have not been co-ordinated ‘inter-departmentally’, i.e. with 
the Foreign Ministry or co-ordinating authority in the national capital. 
Finally, only 35% of all officials claim to have ‘always a clear instruction on 
the position to take’ which leaves a majority of cases in which instructions 
are vague and to be further elaborated on the basis of an individual 
assessment. In other words: the image of ever-vigilant, comprehensively 
prepared member state principals is misleading (Kassim and Menon 2002).  
 
 
§4. Discussion 
 
The debate between the classical theories of European integration tends to 
sketch contrasting scenarios: the EU would be stuck between the two 
extreme poles of ‘international organisation’ on the one hand and ‘super 
state’ on the other hand. ‘Those writing within the intergovernmentalist 
tradition stress the perennial capacity of the member states to control 
developments in the EU, while their adversaries emphasize the ability of the 
EU institutions to extend their own power at the expense of the member 
states’ (Menon 2003, 172). The discussion of recent empirical findings in 
this chapter already indicates that on this continuum, ‘a variety of 
intermediate outcomes are possible’ (Rosamond 2000, 105). For this reason, 
it has been argued that the ‘old’ debate fails to capture the complexity and 
dynamism of what happens in the EU on an everyday basis.  
 Kassim and Wright (1991, 845), for example, point at the fact that 
neofunctionalist predictions about the intrinsic conflict of interests between 
national and supranational actors are not mirrored in actual EU politics. 
Policy practices in the corridors of the Council and European Parliament 
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building; the Commission DG’s and the national capitals show that large 
differences of opinion occur between and within the member state 
governments and between and within supranational institutions. The Council 
is by no means a coherent institution and over amendments on legislative 
proposals, frequent battles take place between the Commission and the 
Parliament.  
 
The intergovernmentalist perspective on how governments formulate, 
deliver and defend preferences has been subject to similar criticism.  
 A first strand of critique has focused on the fact that 
intergovernmentalism does not go into the organisational dimension of 
‘domestic’ (Bulmer 1983) or ‘bureaucratic politics’ (Allison and Zelikov 
1999). Empirical accounts of national EU policy-making point at the internal 
diversity within member state governments, the dominant role of 
bureaucratic politics within formal procedures for EU policy-making at the 
national level and the role of domestic groups in Brussels, being active 
outside the framework offered by national governments (see Wessels et al. 
2003, Kassim 2000, Zeff and Pirro 2001). In-depth study of individual 
member states could reveal how ‘[…] the policies that governments pursue 
at the EU level are the outcome of often complex processes of intra-
governmental bargaining, bureaucratic politics and co-ordination of variable 
quality’ (Kassim 2000, 259).  
 Second, critics have pointed their arrows at the part of (liberal) 
intergovernmentalism that is describes ‘just another’ two-levelled bargaining 
process at the EU level. Instead of governments responding to political 
pressures ‘nested’ within states and negotiating positions subsequently being 
uploaded from national capitals to Brussels, it is argued that EU-member 
state governments face a continuous ‘bypass’ of actors that hamper their 
capacity to act as a gatekeeper and chief negotiator. ‘Positions are watered 
down during the domestic co-ordination process and in negotiation with the 
Commission and other member states’ (Spence 1993, 49). 
Intergovernmentalists are thus accused of exaggerating the degree of 
individual and collective control of governments over the EU policy process 
and, by relying on a picture of ‘shapers not shaped themselves’ (Wessels 
2003, 8), thereby neglecting integration dynamics, such as the possibility 
that actors change positions during EU level negotiations.  
 
The original purpose of the ‘sterile controversy’ (Risse 1996, 59) was to 
explain processes of inter-state co-operation, rather than to extensively 
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describe what happens what happens within and between states. This does 
not mean that the debate between intergovernmentalism and 
neofunctionalism does not offer valuable insights for policy analysis into the 
relevant events actors, factors and relations in the shaping process. The 
revival of the old debate in the 1990s has further elaborated, theoretically 
differentiated and empirically investigated how processes of preference 
formation at the domestic level are relevant for how states behave at the EU 
level, and how the role of supranational institutions can be key to 
understanding European outcomes. As we will see, both are relevant factors 
to take into account for analysing shaping capacity of governments. 
However, existing studies have also a tendency to focus on the singular 
moments of change and crisis, the arena of the ‘history-making’ decisions in 
European integration (Peterson 1999). Examples of such thoroughly 
researched events include the coming into being of a common agricultural 
policy, the 1988 White paper on the completion of the single market; the 
successive negotiations on treaty change in Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice 
and the European Convention (See Moravcsik 1993 and 1998, Sandholtz and 
Zysman 1989). The process of shaping policies on a day-to-day basis is more 
adequately analysed with the tools offered by comparative politics and 
policy analyses. These academic sub-disciplines, primarily concerned with 
analysing modes of governance and interaction both within the EU (multi-
level governance), and between the EU and the domestic level 
(Europeanisation) have migrated into EU studies in the 1970. These 
disciplines had long before departed from the conventional concept of the 
nation state shared by neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism: member 
states as hierarchical, authoritative structures of decision-making confronted 
with ‘sub-layers’ (provinces and municipalities) and ‘supra-layers’ (the EU’s 
institutions). Political science and policy analyses had long before departed 
from this traditional image of the nation state. The next chapter investigates 
how these perspectives see the role of governments and examines their 
speculations about the ‘opportunity-structure’ and capacity of governments 
to shape new EU policies. 
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Chapter 3 
Governments in the Theoretical New 
Europe 
 
§1. Introduction 
 
For academic research on the EU, the 1990s became the decade of pluralist 
and policy-oriented studies, most notably (‘multi-level’) governance 
approaches and Europeanisation. In this ‘second wave’ of EU-member state 
analysis (Holzhacker and Haverland 2006, 10), concerned with the form and 
impact of interaction between different locations of policy-making, two 
mainstreams can be distinguished. First, (multi-level) ‘governance’-studies, 
in which the network character of EU policy-making is emphasised, but 
which remain rather ambivalent on the role of governments. Where 
prominent analysts explicitly study ‘the conditions under which central state 
executives may lose their grip on power’ (Marks 1996, 341), others 
emphasise how member states retain a very substantial role in decision-
making (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler Koch 2004, 102). The ways in which they 
deal with these demands at the national level is central to ‘Europeanisation’-
studies, focusing on the impact of the EU at the national level.  
 This chapter investigates how these perspectives on EU-member state 
interaction see the role of national governments and critically examines a 
number of implicit hypotheses as regards to their ‘opportunity-structure’ and 
capacity to shape new EU policies. 
 
 
§2. Integration theory on the move from ‘why’ to ‘how’ 
 
The recent approaches on EU-member state interaction discussed in this 
chapter have been referred to as the theoretical ‘new Europe’ (Rosamond 
2000, 99). This suggests that attention for the interplay between EU- and 
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member state level developments was radically innovative. Indeed, EU 
studies have long been dominated by IR-theorists, discussing the how and 
when of member state integration. The first volumes discussing the 
intricacies of policymaking and national governments adaptation date back 
to the 1970s, when academics from sub-disciplines of political science 
(comparative politics, policy analysis and public administration studies) 
became interested in the emerging polity and the interaction between the 
national and the EU level (Wallace 1970, 1973).  
 
The ‘domestic-politics approach’ was coined by Simon Bulmer, who 
emphasized the importance of analysing ‘the lower of the two tiers involved 
in EC policy-making’ (1983, 352): i.e. the domestic level. Although this is 
regarded the basic unit of EC policy-making, ‘whether the governments are 
really as powerful as intergovernmentalism would have us believe, must 
depend on specific examination’ (ibid. 354). Governments can be 
constrained by specific interests and by transnational forces, but they may 
also impose a policy on domestic interests, deriving power from their formal 
position in both the EU and the domestic constituency. Bulmer also 
underlined the role of domestic pressure and interest groups, ‘forcing’ 
governments to take a certain stance in Brussels. He developed a framework 
of national ‘policy styles’: the interaction between the government’s 
approach to policymaking and the relationship between government and 
other actors in the domestic political system. Internal political and 
administrative processes determine the outcome of intra-state bargaining and 
the negotiating position of national states. 
 
The ‘newness’ of recent approaches can thus be debated, but the fact that EU 
studies made a decisive ‘governance turn’ (Rosamund 2000, 110) was due to 
some crucial policy developments after 1985. Through the White Paper on 
the completion of the EU’s internal market and subsequent development of 
new competencies by the Commission, the scope of EC policies was 
extended to include areas previously dealt with by national governments. 
The 1991 Maastricht treaty, by which the European Union was formally 
founded, acted as a ‘watershed’. With the addition of the ‘second’ and ‘third’ 
pillars (see table 1.3), a period of predominantly market-oriented EU policies 
gave way to the development of a ‘Euro-polity’. Treaty amendments 
introduced a number of new notions and principles, with the potential to alter 
the balance of power between the different categories of actors participating 
in EU policy-making: subsidiarity, co-decision and a more structural 
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involvement of the sub-national level. With the proliferation of majority 
voting, governments (and the interests they traditionally represented) could 
no longer rely upon the protection of a national veto in the Council. This 
instigated an increase in the volume and diversity of interests represented in 
Brussels (Mazey and Richardson 1993, 3).1 The increase in legal and 
administrative workload of the institutions – and thereby the volume and 
degree of interactions between the EU and the national level – is visible in 
the ‘acquis communautaire’. The whole of EU rules and legislation more 
than doubled from 1983 to 1998 (Maurer and Wessels 2003, 44).  
 
In parallel, the ‘theoretical new Europe’ further developed (see Andersen en 
Eliassen 1993, Ladrech 1994, Börzel and Risse 2000, Caporaso, Cowles and 
Risse 2000, Mény, Muller en Quermonne, 1996). Two mainstreams, (multi-
level) governance and Europeanisation, are discussed in the next sections. 
 
 
§3. Multi-level governance: the messy state 
 
Table 3.1 Newer EU studies perspectives on governments 
Theory / 
perspective 
Claim Added value 
Multi-level 
governance  
‘Messy state’ By-pass of government by other actors ‘going 
Europe’ 
Europeanisation ‘Impact of Europe’ Adaptation to increase efficiency and effectiveness 
 
Governance refers to the setting of public policy through an interaction of 
state and non-state actors, the result of which cannot be reduced to one actor 
in particular. In describing how public policy is being made, this container 
notion emphasizes the dependence of policy makers at the central level on 
support from lower government levels, the private sector and civil society. 
As the EU has been described as a ‘hybrid form’ of public policy-making 
without a single ruler (Rosamond 2000, 110), governance has been 
 
                                                 
1) During the time period under study, the number of interests officially 
represented at the EU level in ‘Eurogroups’ grew from 525 in 1993 (Mazey and 
Richardson 1993, 6) to 700 in 1998 (Greenwood 1997, 527).  
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gratefully picked up and applied in academic EU studies, as well as by the 
EU institutions themselves (European Commission, 2001).2  
 
The ‘multi-level’ variant of governance studies has been developed in the 
course of the 1990s, in analyses of EU structural and cohesion policies. Sub-
national actors were closely involved in the formation and implementation of 
regional support plans and policies, the result being much contact between 
different private and the public actors and locations of policy-making. 
Building upon empirical findings on the role of interest groups and lobby 
representatives, as well as private firms and non-governmental organisations 
in the EU policy process (Mazey and Richardson 1993, Van Schendelen 
2003), multi-level governance was gradually stretched to other EU policy 
domains. It extensively described how the process of making new policies 
between member state governments and other interested actors results in 
dispersed policy-making competencies at different locations at the regional, 
national and the EU level. Because this latter notion is used to deny its 
relevance in a non-hierarchical system, it has been suggested to use the word 
‘location’ instead (Wallace 2000, 73).  
 Detailed review articles of multi-level governance abound (Jachtenfuchs 
2001), so that for the purpose of this study, a management summary should 
suffice.  
 
Against the state-centric image of further integration serving as a rescue of 
the nation state under pressure (Milward 1992), governance analysis places 
three related claims. 
 First, collective decision making at the EU level is seen as a loss of 
control for individual governments. On the one hand, there are restrictions 
on the ability of individual governments to veto EU decisions. On the other 
hand, there is an erosion of collective government control, as the Council of 
Ministers, the formal venue for national interest representation, increasingly 
competes with the European Parliament for legislative powers. As a result, 
decision-making competencies in the EU are not monopolized by national 
governments (Hooghe 2001, 4) but rather shared by actors at different levels.  
 
 
                                                 
2) For example, governance has been presented as a possible solution to co-
ordination and legitimacy problems at the EU level and within the member 
states (Schout and Jordan 2005). 
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Second, by moving decision-making competencies to the supranational 
level. government representatives would ‘move from a position of “decision 
maker” to that of “co-decision maker”’ (Wessels 1991, 136). The central 
position of the EU institutions emanates from their competencies in the 
different stages of EU policy-shaping.3 For the stage of policy design and 
enforcement, the European Commission is largely responsible. Originally, 
supranational analysis focused on the autonomy of the European 
Commission, which has been claimed to be responsible for regulating of 
about 80% of legislation (Van Schendelen 2002). There is the famous quote 
by Hull (1993, 83), claiming that when a decision is adopted by Council and 
Parliament, it ‘usually contains 80 per cent of [the original] proposal’ – 
whereas in the same contribution, it is estimated that some 95% of all 
lobbying efforts take place after the drafting of the proposal, because then 
generally interested parties become aware of the fact that something is in the 
making. In the decision-making phase, among the Commission’s assets are 
its agenda-setting capacity under the co-operation procedure and the level of 
expertise and experience that responsible Commission officials bring to the 
different level of Council deliberations. Last but not least, the Court of 
Justice provides judiciary control. The Court is the final arbiter on EU legal 
matters that in landmark rulings has established principles as the supremacy 
of EU law and the direct effect and applicability of certain categories of EU 
decisions (see Weiler 1983). The procedural innovation of co-decision-
making with the Council has considerably increased the formal position of 
the European Parliament in EU policy-shaping.  
 
The third claim in multi-level governance is related to the domestic level. 
Here, resulting from similar procedural and policy-making developments, a 
new engagement of other actor categories can be witnessed, with an 
emphasis on that of the regions (Wallace 2000, 31). The development of EU 
regional policies has run parallel to (and should thus be analytically 
separated from) various national decentralisation initiatives, which 
altogether reinforce the image of increasing regionalisation of public policy-
making. However, in the course of the 1990s, new opportunities for sub-
national levels of government have been created at the EU level. These take 
essentially three forms: formal representation at the EU level, funding of 
 
                                                 
3) See for a description of the EU policy-process the appendix. 
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regional policies through EU’s structural and cohesion policies and cross-
border co-operation.  
 
But it is not only sub-national actors that have been engaged in EU 
policymaking. Against the claims, in intergovernmentalism, that the 
preparation and formulation of preferences remains firmly ‘nested’ within 
the state and that economic interests will always dominate these processes of 
domestic preference formation, multi-level governance studies points at the 
increasing importance of departments; agencies and non-state actors which 
the national government is no longer able to control. Governments thus 
become interaction forums or ‘bargaining arena’s’ for actors and 
organisation fiercely lobbying for different interests. This has initiated the 
dilution of traditional co-ordinating authorities charged with the 
responsibility for national EU-policy-making. Originally, the preparations of 
EU level negotiations were the responsibility for the government 
departments of Economic or Foreign Affairs. With the increasing volume 
and scope of EU legislation, the authority of these authorities has been 
challenged, both from the ‘bottom-up’, by individual government 
departments actively present in Brussels, and ‘top-down’. The latter refers to 
the emergence of the European Council as the forum through which strategic 
choices are made and political bargains are struck, which makes that 
Government or Prime Ministers’ Offices have become more involved in the 
organisation of national EU-policy-making.4  
 
Multi-level governance argues that this ‘bypass’ of national governments 
takes place both directly and indirectly. Directly, because actors outside the 
central government compete with its representatives at the EU level for 
access and influence, most notably in the European Commission, as well as 
in the European Parliament. The challenge for governments is the need to 
satisfy both their European partners and their domestic constituency – not in 
the least national parliament, which should ratify or implement common 
 
                                                 
4) In the new member states which joined the EU in May 2004, preparatory 
mechanisms are often co-ordinated by the Government Office. This may be 
explained by the more hierarchical structures prevailing in these countries, but 
also by the ‘lessons learned’ from problems in the ‘old’ member states, where 
the co-ordinating authority is traditionally located at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
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decisions. Because so many ways are now open to domestic actors which are 
not satisfied by interest representation through the channels of national 
government, governments face competition in their shaping attempts by 
actors which ‘go transnational’ (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler Koch 2004, 104). 
As result, multi-level governance claims that national governments are no 
longer in a position of ‘monopolist’ or ‘gatekeeper’ of the flows between the 
domestic and the international level of analysis. Indirectly, as a result of 
domestic groups drawn into the European policy process and organising 
themselves transnationally, European policy-making takes place under more 
public scrutiny, so that ‘the action has shifted from national governments 
and technocrats in semi-isolation to domestic politics in the broad and usual 
sense’ (Hooghe 2001, 10).  
 
To be sure: these three interrelated developments – the impact of EU 
decision making on the national level; the role of the supranational 
institutions and an EU-engagement of actors other than governments – had 
been present in the integration process for decades. However, they were 
reinforced by the developments in EU policy integration since the late 
1980s. Although multi-level governance has rightfully been called a 
‘compelling metaphor’ (Rosamond 2000), it remains covert what this new 
situation (interdependency of actors; interaction within and between 
networks) it so adequately describes implies for the ability of national 
governments to formulate new EU policies. Have governments, confronted 
with a new situation of complexity and multi-actorness, only lost out, or are 
new opportunities present?  
 
Before this new ‘opportunity-structure’ is discussed in more detail, this 
review of newer EU studies is complemented with a second mainstream: 
Europeanisation studies. 
 
 
§4. How Europe hits home: studies of Europeanisation  
 
Like governance, Europeanisation is a modern ‘buzz word’ which has been 
considerably stretched since it introduction in the early 1990s.5 Although 
 
                                                 
5) Definitions range from Knill (2001, 1: ‘how European integration affects 
domestic administrative practices and structures’); Ladrech (1994, 69: ‘an 
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definitions and interpretations abound, Europeanisation is commonly 
understood as a variable which impacts upon the member state governments, 
to the effect that domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to 
common policy-making at the EU level (Börzel 2002, 6).6 If a certain actor 
or organisation is ‘Europeanised’, what happens at the EU becomes part of 
its structure or behaviour.  
 Europeanisation can take place through different mechanisms: directly, 
through binding laws and politics; and indirectly, through the change of 
existing ‘opportunity structures’ or framing beliefs and expectations of 
actors (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002). Note that the latter aspect if 
Europeanisation is close to early definitions of integration. Haas (1958, 4-5) 
defined European integration as a condition in which specific groups and 
individuals showed more loyalty to European-level institutions than to 
national authorities. However, generally, the concept of European integration 
is concerned with what happens at the EU level, whereas the focus of 
Europeanisation-literature lies ‘at home’, i.e. on what happens within the 
member states.7 
 
Europeanisation has been called the ‘forgotten dimension’ of integration 
studies (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler Koch 2004, 109), quite remarkably, as 
academic attention for how integration affected domestic social and political 
systems can be traced back to the early 1970s. But it was not before the mid-
1990s that Europeanisation developed into an important ‘touchstone for 
theories’ on the domestic impact of the EU (Cowles, Risse, and Carporaso 
 
                                                 
incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree 
that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational 
logic of national politics and policy-making’) to Héritier (2001, 3: ‘the process 
of influence deriving from EU decisions impacting upon member state policies 
and structures’).  
6) Note that EU dynamics can also be extended to states other than EU member 
states. This ‘external’ dimension of Europeanisation refers to ‘a process of 
change in national institutional and policy practices that can be attributed to 
European integration’ (Hix and Goetz 2000, 27). Van Schendelen (2002, 31) 
defines Europeanisation even more generally as ‘an increase in cross-border 
public and private issue formation in Europe’.  
7) An exception is the definition applied by Risse et al. (2001): ‘Europeanisation 
is the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of 
government’. 
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2001, Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, Mény, Muller and Quermonne 1996). 
Interestingly, the concept has been stretched to include EU-related processes 
in states outside the EU (Sciarini 2004), as well as candidate states 
(Papadimitriou 2004). 
 
Within Europeanisation studies, two broad mainstreams can be 
distinguished. First, studies focusing on explaining adaptation to EU 
membership in the member states in terms of convergence and divergence of 
policy and polity, second, analyses concerned with explaining problems with 
implementation and transposition of binding EU legislation in the member 
states.  
 
§4.1 Explaining national adaptation  
One school within Europeanisation literature centres on the rather intriguing 
question to what extent organisational, constitutional and procedural 
pressures ‘from above’ would force national administrations to converge into 
one common administrative model. In other words: to what degree would 
‘Europeanisation’ imply the formation of a mature European decision-
making system (Andersen and Eliassen 1993, Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 
2000) according to a kind of isomorphism? An abundant supply of 
arguments predicts either convergence, or continuing differentiation between 
the member states.  
 
For the claim that national political and administrative systems in the 
member states would gradually converge into one similar model as a result 
of European Union membership, two explanations are heard.  
 First, building upon neo-functionalist predictions (Haas 1958), it has 
been claimed that through gradual ‘socialization’ into the practices of the EU 
system, social learning will occur: the process whereby ‘actors through 
interaction with broader institutional contexts (norms or discursive structures 
acquire new interests and preferences’ (Checkel 2001, 25). This process 
would lead to a gradual diffusion of shared values within the national 
systems of the member states and a common administrative culture and 
increasingly similar national structures would progressively develop in all 
EU member states.  
 A second explanation is a presumed ‘logic of optimisation’. The idea is 
that European integration creates common problems to the member states, 
which have to arrange national procedures to participate in common 
decision-making and to implement binding EU decisions into national 
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legislative systems. The logic of optimisation predicts that over time, there is 
a gradual ‘convergence’ of national practices, around the most effective 
solutions of how to manage EU at home. The most successful modes will be 
adopted in all member states.  
 
However appealing at first sight, recent comparative studies on the impact of 
the EU on national governments at the central state level do not sustain these 
expectations. Two conclusions of this ‘impact-literature’ stand out.  
 Firstly, Europeanisation is not making the member states (more) similar. 
Adaptation towards the EU is differentiated, depending on domestic political 
and administrative structures, cultures and working practices. Everywhere, 
the increasing scope and volume of EU policies have resulted in more 
attention for what happens at the EU level, and an increase in the range and 
frequency of contacts between national governments and the EU level 
(Wessels and Rometsch 1996, Harmsen 1999). But if any conclusion can be 
drawn, it is that of diversity in ambitions, arrangements and processes within 
national governments to cope with EU demands. There is so far neither 
question of convergence of national administrations, nor indication that 
processes of optimisation, socialisation, coercion or mimicry would be at 
play. The impact of the EU is ‘differential’ (Heritier 2001), i.e. incremental, 
irregular and uneven over time and between locations (Featherstone 2003, 
4).  
 
Second, the process is slow and incremental and has nowhere resulted in 
grand strategy changes or an abrupt overhaul of existing arrangements. 
When analysing national arrangements for dealing with EU negotiations, it is 
surprising to what extent procedures rely on procedures set up in the early 
years of membership, sometimes dating back to the1950s, and how little 
these have been adapted to the developments discussed in the second section 
of this chapter. There is no systematically directed domestic organizational 
or procedural adjustment to changes in the EU environment. Slow and 
incremental adaptation is the norm, with ‘an emphasis on the immediate’ 
(March and Olson 1998, Aspinwall and Schneider 2001). 
 
This diverse pattern of adaptation has, alternatively, been explained by a 
‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 1989, 21-39). When designing 
structures for co-ordinating and implementing EU policies, national 
administrations tend to stick to pre-existing conceptions of appropriate or 
legitimate forms and behaviour. In line with ‘neo-institutional’ theory, the 
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impact of the EU is mediated through existing structures and values. 
National arrangements for dealing with EU affairs reflect a ‘search for 
familiarity’ in ‘domesticating’ the EU (Harmsen 1999, 85). This preservative 
pattern of institutional development would explain differences between the 
member states as regards to policy styles, ambitions and politico-
administrative opportunity-structures, including the party system, the role of 
parliament, the degree of administrative fragmentation and the dominant 
conception of co-ordination (Kassim 2000, 250).  
 To establish the link with the shaping: comparative studies concerned 
with the possible convergence and divergence of national systems have 
demonstrated that member states and national governments react to 
European integration pressures in a different way, dependent on traditions 
and cultures. But which variables determine how a government, each in their 
own way, shape European policies? 
 
§4.2 Explaining implementation performance 
A second mainstream within Europeanisation debates centres around 
explaining the implementation or transposition deficit: why have 
governments problems to implement measures they have agreed upon in the 
shaping of legislation (Mendrinou 1996, 4)?8 Where early explanations 
focused upon administrative shortcomings in the implementation process, 
recent studies have investigated the ‘goodness of fit’-hypothesis. This thesis 
links implementation performance to the degree of congruence of national 
policy and legislative arrangements with new, European rules and legislation 
(Duina 1997, Knill and Lenschow 1998, Knill 2001, Green Cowles Caporaso 
and Risse 2000, Börzel and Risse 2003, Börzel 2003a). Shaping behaviour 
or – as it is often referred to – ‘uploading’ efforts by national governments 
are inspired by the desire to minimize adaptation costs. The assumption in 
much of the literature is that national governments will act as ‘guardians of 
the status quo’, protecting national traditions against intrusion from the EU 
 
                                                 
8) The European Commission monitors the application of Community law and 
implementation records and regularly publishes the results in scoreboards and 
reports. In mid-2005, the transposition deficit – the average percentage of 
directives not transposed into national law – was 1.9% for the EU-25, implying 
that 245 directives were not transposed in time in one or more Member States 
(Source: European Commission 2005). 
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level. Adjustment processes are expected to be more problematic if the 
degree of ‘misfit’ between the EU and the national level is high. 
 
The ‘goodness of fit’-hypothesis has been rejected on several occasions 
(Knill and Lenschow 1998, Héritier and Knill 2001, Haverland 2000, Treib 
2003) and thus, the framework for explaining national implementation 
performance has expanded. It now encompasses a wealth of mediate 
variables, including national politico-administrative traditions and the policy 
context (Knill and Lenshow 1998) which would hamper or facilitate the way 
governments deal with implementation; the number of institutional and 
political veto points that actors encounter (Haverland 2000, Cowles, 
Caporaso and Risse 2001) and the national political process (Heritier 2001). 
The more institutional veto points, or policy actors, or politico-
administrative misfit, the more problematic implementation will be.  
 
At the same time, the link with the shaping side of EU policy-making is 
emphasised. Treib (2003) claims that the preferences of a government for 
new EU legislation will not always conform to existing legislation. In 
contrast, governments can be willing to change the status quo at the domestic 
level, for example in response to party political pressures. Thereby, 
governments purposefully press for new existing arrangements in Brussels, 
using the EU level as an instrument to achieve domestic change.  
 A related attempt to link the ‘top-down’ (in the sense of: 
implementation) and ‘bottom-up’ (in the sense of: shaping) dimensions of 
Europeanisation is offered by Börzel (2003). This contribution lists a number 
of variables with a possible impact upon the capacity of member states to 
‘upload’ particular preferences, with the aim of facilitating policy 
implementation at a later stage. Distinguishing between political and 
administrative capacities, three different explanatory variables are analysed: 
the degree of fragmentation, measured as the number of veto players that at 
the domestic level; the resources that a member state holds, and the level of 
support for EU integration. The conclusion from an assessment of shaping 
and taking responses of the EU-15, focusing on the much-explored field of 
EU environmental policy, is that whereas political fragmentation and 
resources appear to carry little explanatory power. Leaders or ‘pace-setters’ 
in EU environmental policy are generally amongst the smallest member 
states with relatively little administrative capacity (Denmark; Netherlands). 
The most effective shapers and takers share a low level of administrative 
fragmentation, many resources and high levels of administrative legitimacy. 
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The active use of resources and the legitimacy of EU related actions are 
relevant variables for both explaining success in EU policy-shaping, as well 
as for explaining a government’s implementation performance.  
 
The majority of ‘Europeanisation’-literature hence remains concerned with 
the ‘domestic impact of Europe’ and dominated by a ‘top-down’ or ‘second-
image-reversed’9 (Gourevitch 1978) perspective. At the same time, there is a 
clear (but often implicit) link with multi-level perspectives and shaping 
capacity. Some Europeanisation literature has discussed the relevance of 
‘uploading’ or ‘shaping’ attempts of governments in relation to their 
implementation capacity, but this dimension of EU policy-making is 
predominantly regarded as explanatory for domestic adaptation or 
implementation performance.  
 
Table 3.2 Dimensions of Europeanisation 
Dimensions of 
Europeanisation 
Output  Input  
Direction ‘Top-down’ flow:  
EU ► member state level 
‘Bottom-up’ flow:  
member state ► EU level 
Effects on structures and 
actor behaviour 
‘Taking EU policies’:  
Change and adaptation on 
domestic patterns and 
structures; implementation 
‘Shaping EU policies’: policy 
preparation, interest 
representation, lobbying and 
negotiating 
 
However, one key reason for national governments to adjust politico-
administrative structures and actor behaviour to the EU is to enhance their 
ability to influence common decision-making. Adaptations to exploit the new 
opportunities provided by the participation in the European Union are to be 
considered as an integral part of the process, or: ‘the other side of the coin’. 
That these ‘feedback loops’ from the domestic to the EU level and back are 
not included in most definitions and studies of Europeanisation is a serious 
omission. Van Schendelen (2002, 37) argues that the EU is not only a 
source, but also an important focus of what happens within national 
governments. Relatedly, Bulmer and Burch (2000, 4) have argued that the 
 
                                                 
9) In a major contribution to the IR-debate in the late 1950s, neo-realist Waltz 
(1959) argued how the domestic system is the key to understanding 
international structures or war and peace as the second image. Gourevitch 
(1978) argued in contrast for a ‘second-image reversed’, explaining how the 
international system would not only be a consequence of domestic politics and 
structures, but a source. 
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‘old’ notion of Europeanisation, that they term ‘reception’, needs to be 
complemented by another dimension, the ‘projection’. One powerful counter 
argument is that this would risk to conceptually ‘over-stretch’ the already 
considerably broad concept of Europeanisation (Radaelli 2000). Therefore, 
the term Europeanisation should be reserved for the ‘top-down’ dimension 
(Bulmer and Lequesne 2002, 6). However, regardless of which concept or 
notion is used to cover the outcomes, the question how national governments 
influence the EU, while processing EU demands in distinct national ways 
and while seeking to avoid problems with implementation at a later stage, 
merits more and systematic academic analysis.  
 
This chapter proceeds with an examination of the expected implications of 
these claims for national governments and their shaping capacity. 
 
 
§5. A new ‘opportunity-structure’ for national governments  
 
The debate within (multi-level) governance and Europeanisation is 
essentially about the environment in which governments operate, which is 
characterised by a strong degree of interconnectedness of political and policy 
arenas, and poses challenges of adaptation both at the level of the EU and for 
the member states internally. For the purpose of this study, the supposed 
implications for governments can be caught in six ‘implicit’ hypotheses, 
which are discussed and critically examined below. This analysis is founded 
on the notion ‘opportunity-structure’, grounded in neo-institutionalism 
(March and Olsen 1989, Aspinwall and Schneider 2001). According to this 
theory of public policy-making, formal and informal structures or 
‘institutions’ shape actor behaviour: rules, norms and practices that create 
opportunities or constraints for actors, governments in this case.10 The effect 
of institutions can be either constraining or empowering (Aspinwall and 
Schneider 2001, 3) and the result is one particular opportunity-structure.  
 
                                                 
10) This theoretical notion ‘institutions’ should be distinguished from the EU level 
organisations designed for common policy-making, most notably the European 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice. 
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Table 3.3 The new ‘opportunity-structure’ for governments 
Constraints on national governments Opportunities for governments 
Role of supranational institutions ‘Integral’ involvement as shapers and takers 
Majority voting Venues for access and influence outside the 
Council chain 
Bypass by subnational and other actor 
categories 
Consensual nature of the policy process 
 
§5.1 A critical examination of hypothesised constraints  
Which are the constraints that national governments face when they attempt 
to participate within the modes of governance described in the previous 
sections? A literature review identifies three supposedly relevant elements of 
the EU-policy process: the role of supranational EU-institutions; the 
increasing occurrence of majority voting and the engagements of domestic 
actors in the EU’s policy-shaping process.  
 
 “The independent role of supranational EU-institutions” 
 
A key thrust of multi-level governance is to demonstrate that ‘even 
collectively, national governments are constrained in their ability to control 
supranational institutions they have created at the European level’ (Marks 
1996, 352). The notion ‘supranational institutions’ generally refers to the 
triad European Commission, European Parliament and the Court of Justice. 
The latter institution’s role is predominantly concerned with setting the 
overall framework for policy-making realities, by ensuring that the law is 
observed in the interpretation and application of the treaties and of the 
provisions laid down by the competent Community institutions. Although 
the Court’s importance can hardly be underestimated, related to the policy 
process, the focus is most dominantly upon the European Commission and 
the Parliament.  
 
The position of supranational institutions has been claimed to constitute an 
important constraint upon the collective control of national governments in 
the EU decision-making framework (Hooghe 2001, 8-9; Earnshaw and 
Judge 2001, Nugent 2003, 174-205). This relation between the member 
states and the EU level institutions has been described with the help of 
‘principal-agent’ theories. The principals, or member states, have many 
problems to control their ‘agents’, if only because the presence of multiple 
member states ‘prone to competition and conflict’ makes monitoring and 
control over the supranational institutions problematic. This also leads to 
intricate compromise outcomes, which leave room for the agent to exploit. 
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Moreover, there is the procedural constraint on change: while a member 
state needs to muster agreement among its partners to introduce change, the 
European Commission ‘need only dent the united front of state executives in 
order to block a proposed change’ (Marks et al. 1996, 354) 
 Due to the complexity of policy-making, these organisations (and the 
people working for them) use the autonomy they are granted maximally to 
pursue their own ideas and preferences, which may differ from those of the 
member states. Steps toward further co-operation, which member states take 
willingly, may produce unintended and undesired consequences – a claim 
obviously originating in classical neofunctionalism. 
 
An interesting paradox which has been present in the construction of 
common policy-making from the beginning, however, is that the EU’s 
workforce is recruited from the member states, but not representing them. It 
has been argued how ‘most of the people who devise and operate EU rules 
and legislation are […] people who spend the majority of their time as 
national policy-makers’ (Wallace 2000, 7) – an observation described as 
‘administrative interaction’ (Maurer et al. 2000).11 However, European civil 
servants are recruited through implicit but finely balanced national quotas, 
or, in official terms: with ‘respect for geographical balances’ (Dinan 2005, 
205). Although expected to act as loyal Europeans, civil servants working 
for the supranational institutions will not completely divest themselves of 
their national loyalties (see also §2.2). Because EU policies tend to be very 
specialised and covering a broad domain of issues, under-staffed European 
Commission departments are no longer cautiously guarding their domain but 
instead eager for national government input. One could even argue that, from 
the viewpoint of legitimacy and expertise, it is a potential advantage for 
common policy-making that the EU’s staff has a wide range of knowledge 
and information across the member states. 
 
According to influential observers of the EU policy process, the stage of 
drafting new policy proposals is increasingly regarded as an opportune time 
for member states to make a sustained lobbying effort to inject national 
preferences into the EU policy process. This includes regular contacts 
between national government ministers and Commissioners (Dinan 2000, 
 
                                                 
11) Note that this element leans upon neo-functional logic, which predicted 
extensive interpenetration amongst bureaucracies (Webb 1983, 19) 
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225) and the strategic employment of national (top-level) officials within the 
EU level institutions through seconded expertise or patronage. This also 
holds for the European Parliament. Within the EP, the potential for influence 
of nationals is even more prominent, as its members are elected by national 
constituencies, but more and more governments also second national 
officials to the staff offices of the Parliament.  
 That certain member states are more willing than others to ensure that 
compatriots are involved into he drafting of favourable policy initiatives can 
be explained by the fact that originally, the European Commission embodied 
‘the European interest’. Supranational institutions were thus not designed as 
another forum for blunt national interest representation, a task explicitly 
deserved for the Council of Ministers. Some member states, including the 
Netherlands, have held this ‘ideal’ view on the traditional EU institutional 
set-up longer than others (see chapter 5).  
 
Be that if it may, if governments indeed actively and increasingly seek these 
new ways for access and influence, the effects of the relative autonomy of 
these supranational institutions upon their ‘opportunity-structure’ are 
negated. The rather bold claim that the growing competencies of 
supranational institutions would constrain governments in their capacity to 
influence the EU policy process, should in any case be more differentiated. 
 
 “The widespread practice of majority voting in the Council” 
 
The proliferation majority voting since the late 1980s has been called the 
most obvious constraint on the control of individual national governments on 
the outcomes of Council decision-making (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 4). One 
key reason for the traditional dominance of member states in the policy-
shaping process was that each of them held the key to the final, unanimous 
vote in the Council of Ministers. Notwithstanding size or political clout, a 
veto could be the end of many rounds of arduous negotiations. Under the 
system of qualified majority voting, for most decisions, only a blocking 
minority of member states can prevent a majority decision to be taken. The 
allocation of votes depends on an intricate mix of variables including GDP, 
population size and political clout.12  
 
                                                 
12) The re-allocation of votes often gives rise to conflict between the member 
states, such as that between Belgium and the Netherlands during the treaty 
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The possibility of voting in the Council has been claimed to reinforce a 
development of circumvention of national governments by other 
stakeholders, as ‘interests, which had once been able to rely upon their 
national governments as a last resort of protection at the Council of 
Ministers could no longer afford to do so’ (Greenwood 1997, 53). This 
would obviously weaken governments as they could be outvoted and thus 
‘fail’ to represent national interests. No doubt, the possibility of voting has 
changed negotiating behaviour of national representatives in the Council 
(Hosli 1996, 258). But whether this change does effectively constrain the 
shaping capacity of individual governments remains to be seen. Regular 
observers of Council processes have claimed how participants at all levels 
(administrative working groups, the ambassador’s committee COREPER 
and the ministerial Council-level) indicate to be constantly aware of the 
votes that are or should be drawn ‘on board’. Referring to this ‘Damocles’ 
sword’ hanging above the negotiations, rather paradoxically, ‘working in a 
world of [majority voting] helps to stimulate convergence’ (Bal 2004, 130). 
As delegations anticipate a possible vote, they act upon that by working on 
creating new coalitions and formulating compromise acceptable to all. This 
change in working practices has also inspired governments (and related 
actors) to act more pro-actively by seeking coalitions and influencing new 
policies before they reach Council level. Seen in this light, the proliferation 
of majority voting constitutes for governments a mere adaptation of their 
working methods, rather than a direct threat.  
 
 “The bypass by domestic actors active at the EU level” 
 
An important assumption of ‘state-centric’ integration theory is that the 
domestic and the foreign or EU policy arena are clearly separated. Domestic 
actors stay within national borders and government representatives are 
charged with voicing and negotiating national and ‘domestically 
constructed’ interests at the international or EU level. In contrast, pluralist 
theories including multi-level governance offer empirical analysis of the 
level and extent to which different categories of domestic actors have 
become engaged in EU level policy-making.  
 
                                                 
negotiations in Nice (2000) – the latter country succesfully arguing for one 
more vote than its neighbour in the new weighing system. 
Chapter 3   Governments in the Theoretical New Europe 
 
 
 
 
51 
First, local and regional levels of government have been prevailed upon to be 
present at the EU level rather than being represented by their national 
governments. The German Länder, Spanish Communidades Autonomas and 
the Dutch Provinces all have EU representatives and offices in Brussels.  
 Second, nongovernmental groups as well as private lobbies and their EU 
consultants have long since found their way to Brussels. It seems that these 
groups have acknowledged more rapidly than national governments the new 
working methods in Brussels. Apart from the need to be present in the 
drafting stages of proposals, they are very active in lobbying the European 
Parliament. Members of the European Parliament, who have seen their 
competencies increase with two subsequent treaty changes in the 1990s, are 
more than happy with these inputs, which are often directly translated into 
amendments on legislative texts. 
 
Third, while national arenas remain important for the formation of national 
preferences, sub-national as well as private actors are not nested exclusively 
within them but create trans-national and trans-governmental links and 
associations. The central government level in the member states serves in 
this picture as a ‘bargaining arena’, in which different ideas, agendas and 
interest are being competed: states are being gently melded into a multi-level 
Euro-polity by their leaders and actions of numerous sub-national and 
supranational actors (Hooghe 1996). Multi-level governance sees the threats 
for governments in the potentially serious consequences for traditional co-
ordinating authorities at the central government level (Hooghe 2001, 7). Not 
only do co-ordinating authorities, mostly Foreign Affairs Ministries, lack the 
overview of what happens in different working groups, expert and 
comitology committees. What is more, the increasing need for specialisation 
makes that even if this overview could be composed; co-ordinators are 
heavily dependent upon expert officials or specialists for providing the 
necessary expertise. This development has been described in robust terms as 
the evolution ‘from gatekeeper to post office’, a service which the co-
ordinating authority generally delivers for a range of new stakeholders, 
among which the experts from the ministries. Although this it is not to be 
denied, diplomats hold to the argument that they see their task evolving from 
foreign policy in general to overseeing the broad lines and leaving the details 
to the experts.  
 
The implications, though, are clear: this leads to a co-ordination dilemma. 
Efforts to consistently represent collective interests under a ‘national’ 
Going Europe or Going Dutch 
 
 
 
 
52 
heading may be hampered by separate efforts by representatives of other 
domestic groupings. Constituencies and interest groups that develop a vested 
interest in EU policies pressure governments not to reverse them (see 
Pierson 1996, Pollack 1997). If they do not manage to converge preferences 
and set the same line for EU-related actions, governments can be confronted 
with serious competitors at the EU stage, which may undermine national 
shaping ambitions. One prominent example is the debate on the distribution 
of the EU’s structural funds, where attempts of national governments, 
including the Dutch, to argue for redistribution in favour of poorer member 
states are frequently undermined by lobbies of subnational levels of 
governments, such as regions and provinces.  
 
The latter section held an important ‘if’. If governments are not able to deal 
with these pressures from below, they may feel constrained in their EU-
directed actions. In response, certain governments have tried to reinforce 
their grip on these new actors, for example by making clever use of 
nongovernmental interests in an innovative public-private partnership (Van 
Schendelen 2002). Other studies demonstrate that while structural policy, the 
field where multi-level governance originated has indeed stimulated 
increased regional activity; this engagement has followed distinctly national 
lines (Keating and Hooghe 2001, 250). Related analyses show that the 
impact of regional governments at the EU level in working practice has not 
been significant – it has even been argued that the position of national 
governments has been strengthened at the expense of regional and local level 
(De Rooij 2003). To get private and organized interests ‘on board’ in an 
early stage, federally organised governments in particular are known for 
inviting their representatives to be actively present in the aforementioned 
Commission expert groups. By strengthening co-ordination efforts ‘at 
home’, governments have attempted to include as many stakeholders as 
possible in the formulation of national preferences and negotiating positions. 
In the representation of these positions, governments have also made use of 
the fragmentation of the playing field. When similar, parallel efforts share 
the same underlying goal or objective, one could speak of a ‘multiplier’-
effect. For example, regional engagement can even involve an opportunity 
for more access and influence by national governments. For this strategy to 
work, however, it is necessary to reach agreement over the preferred 
negotiating strategy in an early stage.  
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§5.2 A critical examination of hypothesized opportunities  
The previous section has discussed how developments which, at first sight, 
can be regarded as primarily threatening the prominent position of 
governments within the EU, may also be regarded as challenges. At the same 
time, the literature also identifies certain chances or opportunities for the 
shaping ability of governments, including: the integral nature of government 
participation from the design up to the implementation of new EU policies 
and legislation and the observation that EU policy-making is highly 
consensual in nature, so that diverging preferences are almost always sought 
to be taken aboard. 
 
 “The integral presence and involvement of governments throughout 
the policy-chain” 
 
Government representatives are nearly always represented in the EU’s 
decision-making system. Due to the increased salience of EU level policy-
making, more and more national officials become ‘Europeanised’ in their 
daily work, in the sense that they are looking for access to Brussels and try 
to obtain a say in policy-shaping. It is towards the Council-stages that many 
national procedures for interest representation are directed and not 
surprisingly, many accounts of member state influence within the EU-
structures tend to focus on this stage (see Hosli and Soetendorp 2001). But 
national government representatives are present or sought in other phases, 
most prominently those of policy design and legislation. This is, rather 
paradoxically, a result of the competencies of supranational actors and the 
growth of influence of regional and local levels and private, semi-public 
actors as well as associations and Eurogroups. National governments are 
‘pushing to get into Brussels because they think it is relevant’ (Wessels 
1998, 281).  
 
This ‘administrative merger’ or ‘fusion’ between processes, preferences, and 
procedures at the EU and at the national level is an interesting self-fulfilling 
prophesy (Wessels 1997). The argument runs as follows: it is in the interest 
of the member states to co-operate so that they achieve effective policy-
outcomes, in times when their individual action capacity is limited due to 
growing interdependence and high societal demands. Therefore, at the EU 
level, mechanisms for common policy-making have been designed, which 
serve two purposes. First, as intergovernmental co-operation mechanisms 
generally foster non-compliance problems (‘rogue’ states try to take the 
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benefits but avoid the costs of co-operation), supranational control structures 
to ensure co-operation are designed. But these supranational actors tend to 
create their own dynamics, so that the member states risk to be 
overshadowed. Therefore, second, sufficient access and participation by and 
from the member states should compensate for the loss of competencies at 
the national level. These two pressures, the efficiency of more co-operation 
and participation to make up for the competencies shared with supranational 
institutions have resulted in a range of complex procedures for common 
policy-making. Related, Wright (1996, 146) argues how governments have 
effectively ‘traded’ competencies and decision-making powers which were 
traditionally located at the EU level for access to and influence in the 
European policy-making arena. 
 
The EU level bureaucratic system is thus ‘shot through’ with national 
officials and influences (Kassim and Wright 1991, 835). This integral 
involvement, through human resources, active presence, expertise or formal 
roles, gives governments an obvious advantage over those actors with 
limited engagement in only part of the process. But, as neglect or absence in 
earlier phases can no longer be remedied by a veto in the Council phase, 
government representatives need a thorough insight into the different venues 
for access and influence. In order to affect of their shaping capacity, these 
possibilities have to be effectively explored and applied. 
 
 “The consensual nature of the policy process” 
 
In contrast to the claim that national shaping capacity would have been 
diluted by the modes of collective decision-making in the EU, including 
majority voting, insiders’ accounts of EU negotiations emphasise the 
practice of accommodating extreme preferences or ‘outliers’. Consensus has 
been called ‘one of the norms vital to making EU decision-making work’ 
(Peterson 2000, 58). 
 Quantitative analysis of Council voting records show that, although 
voting has become more common since the early 1980s (Hayes-Renshaw 
and Wallace 1997, 49), taking the vote remains exceptional. In average, only 
20% of all legislation is formally contested. In 15% of all Council decisions, 
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one or more member states voted against. Abstentions by one or more 
member states occurred in 5% of all decisions.13  
 An example of the impact of this norm regulating the behaviour of 
Council negotiators can be seen in Swedish voting behaviour. In the years 
after EU accession of the country in 1995, Sweden was a frequent ‘foot-
dragger’, in the sense that it voted often against new EU legislation. These 
numbers rapidly decreased over the following years, as Swedish negotiators 
realised that apparently, this was not the way things work in Council 
practice.  
 
This does not mean that majority voting would not influence negotiating 
behaviour, but that its impact is covert. With reference to this ‘clear 
preference for unanimity’ (Hix 1999), the intuitively appealing claim that 
governments would ‘lose out’ because of constraints upon their ability to 
dominate decision making processes should be somewhat differentiated. One 
explanation for this is the permanent nature of EU negotiations as a 
‘permanent negotiation institute’ (Bal 1995, 1) in which package deals and 
trade-offs are very easy. The fact that participants tend to meet regularly 
over different topics facilitates package deals and bargaining. At the same 
time, it makes that delegations would in the long term regret an image as 
regular ‘foot dragger’ in negotiations. Participants know that their relation is 
not temporary and thus ‘think twice before ruthlessly seeking to maximize 
their individual interests’ (Héritier 1996, 157). 
 
 “Government’s internal adaptation to deal with the demands of 
membership” 
 
The previous sections have already indicated that governments have not 
passively undergone the effects of increasing impact and complexity of EU 
policy-making. To turn the discussed constraints into potential new venues 
for access and influence, governments actively adapted their organisation 
and working practices to the demands of EU membership. It has been 
outlined, in the section on Europeanisation, how each member state has been 
struggling with the way how to design a system of dealing with the demands 
 
                                                 
13) The numbers range from 75% (1994) to 86% (1996), negative votes covering 
12% (1996) to 19% (1998) and abstentions ranging from 2% (1996) to 11% 
(Mattilla and Lane 1994). 
Going Europe or Going Dutch 
 
 
 
 
56 
of EU membership that is both efficient (in terms of costs and benefits) and 
effective (in the sense of: attaining the goals that it is meant to attain).  
 
Wessels and Rometsch (1996) already observed that, when it comes to 
participation in EU policy-making, some domestic political structures and 
actors have been strengthened, wheras others have their role being weakened 
or their authority being questioned. The process of EU policy-making at the 
domestic level resembles ‘governmental’ or ‘bureaucratic politics’. The 
latter refers to a political theory-paradigm originating in International 
Relations-theory, according to which national government behaviour (in 
particular regarding foreign policy) is formed by the interaction of 
competing preferences and bargaining games between domestic actors 
(Allison and Zelikow 1999).  
 The group of ‘winners’ within the system generally includes the 
ministries and departments, the Permanent Representation to the EU, as well 
as the Government/Cabinet Office.  
 
The heads of state and government have generally responded to the 
increasing value of the European Council by attracting specials expertise and 
institutional support to their offices. As for individual government 
departments, comparative studies show how government ministries have 
made organisational adjustments to cope with EU demands, creating special 
structures to coordinate European issues and adjusting personnel policies to 
recruiting officials with the necessary skills to function in an EU-dominated 
environment (Wessels 2003). A third group of actors which have seen their 
position strengthened are the national Permanent Representations or EU-
embassies in Brussels. These institutions have streamlined their ‘upstream’ 
functions (from the domestic to the EU level: providing a contact point for 
national officials) and ‘downstream’ responsibilities for providing 
information for and advising the national capital on EU issues (Kassim 
2000b). 
 
At the same time, two categories of domestic actors have been characterised 
as ‘losers or latecomers’ in the EU process.  
 First, as discussed in the section on governance, this includes the 
traditional co-ordinating authorities for EU affairs. Almost everywhere, 
special inter-ministerial co-ordination mechanisms have been set up in all 
member states to deal with the increased ‘competition’ over EU policies 
between all kinds of interests and stakeholders (see Kassim 2000, 2001). As 
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said, there are marked changes between the member states between the role 
and composition of the different committees; the co-ordinating authority and 
the available mechanisms for getting to a negotiating position, but generally, 
the authority of foreign affairs ministries faces challenges from several 
directions.  
 A second group of acknowledged ‘losers’ are national parliaments. The 
legislative is arguably the national institutions most displaced by the 
emergence of an EU dimension to their work (Wallace 2000, 28). National 
parliaments usually have a formal role in EU policy-making but are rarely 
influential (see Wessels et al. 2003) due to the fact that they lag behind in 
their control function and fail to oversee rapid developments at the EU level 
(see for the Dutch case, Del Grosso 2000 and chapter 5).  
 
The observation that different categories of actors within governments have 
reacted and adapted differently to European demands leads to the question 
what has been done to ensure that the national position is voiced coherently 
and consistently in different EU level venues over time. Here we touch upon 
the topic of national EU co-ordination, frequently discussed in volumes 
dealing with member states adaptation to Europe and examined in more 
detail in chapter 4. For now, it suffices to note that the organisation of the 
national co-ordination system for EU affairs is often related to the more 
general ‘effectiveness’ of a government to influence Brussels. A member 
state would be effective if it succeeds in ‘getting its way’ in EU level 
negotiations. The obvious problem is, however,, the difficulty to establish 
adequate comparative criteria to judge ‘success’ upon. Intuitively, the degree 
to which a government is ‘successful’ in Brussels seems to be the degree to 
which its preferences are mirrored in the final decision. However, 
negotiations in the EU are interrelated games where success on one game 
board goes at the expense of giving in on another. Moreover, preferences are 
often re-formulated in the course of the process so that it is difficult to assess 
the initial objective against the final outcome. This serious complication 
explains why judgements of national systems of dealing with EU affairs not 
often go ‘beyond the anecdotal’ (Metcalfe 1987).  
 However, even if assessing effectiveness is ‘a bridge too far’, it must be 
possible to construct an overview of the different conditions or 
characteristics, in short: the variables that make up for national government’s 
shaping capacity. This is the purpose of the following chapter. 
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§6. Discussion 
 
This and the previous chapter have presented recent analyses regarding the 
‘opportunity structure’ in which governments operate when shaping EU 
policies. The prime focus of classical integration theory was on ‘why-
questions’, instead of analysing policy processes. Both intergovernmentalism 
and neofunctionalism highlight different elements of the shaping process to 
be relevant. But the result for governments in terms of their ability to shape 
new EU policies is disputed. Asking intergovernmentalists about the ‘how’ 
of policy-shaping – although this is not their first interest, they would place 
much value on political clout, national co-ordination capacity and the 
agenda-setting and legislative powers of governments. Supranationalists, in 
contrast, would highlight the relevance of expertise that governments bring 
into the negotiating system and the dominance of the administrative level in 
EU policy-making, which would only gradually – but surely – ‘spill over’ to 
the political level.  
 
To get over this controversy, a second mainstream in integration theory 
emerged from the inward migration of political scientists and public 
administration students in the late 1980s, when attention shifted to the 
administrative consequences of European integration and the analysis of 
European and national policy processes. EU studies policy-analysis 
(Jachtenfuchs and Kohler Koch 2003) does not compete with classical 
theories, but is rather complementary. The object of research is not ‘why the 
member states formed the EU’, but ‘how the EU forms the member states’. 
This attention shift has been called ‘the next’ phase of European integration 
Studies (Héritier 2000) or the ‘theoretical new Europe’ (Rosamond 2000, 
163). However, a literature review shows that newer paradigms are not as 
innovative as sometimes claimed. Attention for the different levels and 
locations of policymaking in EU studies can be traced back to the early 
1970s.  
 
Multi-level governance studies focus on ‘what happens at the EU level’ and 
in the interplay between the EU- and the (sub-) national level. This 
interaction is ‘… transforming politics and government at the European and 
national levels into a system of multi-level, non-hierarchical, deliberative 
and apolitical governance, via a complex web of public-private networks and 
quasi-autonomous executive agencies’ (Hix 1998, 54). New lines of 
communication and representation are supposed to engage and empower 
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sub-national, trans-national and non-governmental actors in the EU. As a 
consequence, a ‘multi-tier negotiating system’ or a system of ‘interlocking 
politics’ (Risse-Kappen 1996, 60) has emerged. The challenges that 
governments face have led to a different playing field or ‘opportunity 
structure’. The EU does not only place pressures on its constituent member 
states (the need to adapt, implementation pressure, economic competition), 
but it also presents them with opportunities for influence. The latter includes 
not only economic benefits but also the possibility of a legitimising political 
discourse for policies otherwise not domestically possible (‘the EU forces us 
to …’).  
 
The latter dimension has been discussed in recent Europeanisation literature, 
concerned with ‘the impact of the EU’ on the level of the member states 
(Wessels and Rometsch 1996, Zeff and Pirro 2002, Maurer and Wessels 
2003, Kassim 2000, Peters and Wright 2001), it has emerged that shaping 
capacity is understudied. Current research focuses on the question ‘how and 
to what extent are the member states Europeanised’. If reference is made to 
the ‘shaping’ of new policies, this is to explain patterns of domestic 
adaptation and implementation performance (Bursens 2001, Börzel 2003, 
Falkner et al. 2003, Mastenbroek and Van Keulen 2004). Only recently, in 
what has been called the ‘third wave’ in EU studies, calls have been made to 
find out how exactly member states ‘hit’ Brussels (Beyers and Trondal 2003, 
2, see also Bulmer and Lequesne 2005). 
 
This emphasis on ‘what happens at home’ risks implying that a member state 
would passively undergo the effects of common EU policies. As the analysis 
of multi-level governance has demonstrated, however, national governments, 
however challenged in their traditional position, remain a particularly central 
player in the shaping of European policies and legislation – if only because 
of their prominent position in the (co-) legislative Council of Ministers. As a 
result of the increasing salience of EU issues, national governments are 
pressured to perform in what has been called the ‘struggle for a say’ in EU 
policy-shaping (Beyers and Trondal 2002). On the other hand, due to the 
same developments that have engaged new stakeholders active in Brussels, 
the constraints on governments are quite serious. To use a sports analogy: it 
is simply more difficult to score when playing on a larger field with more 
(and more competitive) players, particularly when the salience of the game – 
and thereby the pressure – is high. For any EU-lobby, the chances for losing 
out have increased as governments can be outvoted or individual positions 
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considered irrelevant for the final outcomes. When national input could still 
be secured by a national veto, setting up national negotiating instructions 
could relatively easily be dominated by central governments, i.e. their co-
ordinating authorities. It can thus be expected that for governments wishing 
to be active at the EU level, investing in the quality of their actions becomes 
more relevant than in the old days of EC co-operation. In a wider and EU 
dealing with policy areas with more political saliency, those wishing to have 
relevance in EU policy-shaping will have to invest actively in ‘getting their 
act together’. 
 
The processes of change and adaptation environment sketched by multi-level 
governance and Europeanisation may serve as an impetus for the study of 
national shaping capacity. However, the literature review has demonstrated 
that, so far, this has not led to systematic analysis. The impact of the ‘messy 
state’ discussed in recent EU studies perspectives, upon the motivation and 
potential of governments to influence EU policies, deserves closer 
examination.  
 Which variables matter for the capacity of an individual government to 
influence the formulation of new EU-policies? A next step is to structure and 
categorise existing insights in a framework for analysis, to be applied in the 
country study and empirical case studies. 
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Chapter 4 
Designing a Framework for Analysis 
 
§1. Introduction 
 
All twenty-five national governments take part in the shaping of EU policy, 
most notably in the legislative Council-phase, where they possess formal 
veto powers in decision-making. No member state dominates the policy 
process: all ‘win some and lose some’ – large member states just as often as 
small ones. But to what extent ‘does size matter’ for national shaping 
capacity? The literature review in the previous chapters has showed that we 
lack academic descriptions, other than anecdotal, of this and related 
dimensions and variables relevant for the shaping process. To explain this 
academic neglect, it is tempting to point at the sheer complexity and 
particularities of the EU policy process, which indeed considerably 
complicate attempts for analysis. But this is no excuse not to gather 
structured insights into the ways in which national governments shape EU 
policies, in order to account for their prominent – but debated – position in 
the discourse on EU policy-making.  
 
This chapter presents an overview of the conditions and characteristics 
deemed relevant for national shaping capacity (§2). It is argued that the 
actions of national governments directed at influencing the EU level of 
common policy-making are based on a combination of its preferences and 
ambitions concerning the issue at hand, and the resources and capacities 
available for EU-related actions (§3). These variables and ttheir presumed 
negative or positive effects on shaping capacity are discussed (§4).  
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§2. Relevant variables: a literature review 
 
Attention for the broad question ‘how and by whom EU policies are being 
shaped’ can be found in several EU studies sub-streams: in classical 
integration theory; in policy- and polity ‘impact-of-Europe’-studies and in 
‘linkage’ studies concerned with the interaction of various actors operating 
between and within member states and the EU, including lobbying literature 
and more practically oriented manuals. The first two strands in EU studies 
have been extensively discussed in the previous chapters. Contributions to 
the ‘grand theories’ discussed in chapter 2 are primarily interested in 
explaining co-operation by governments, whereas this book is concerned 
with exploring their potential to influence. This does not mean that there are 
no relevant insights to draw from neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism on the role and position of governments (see table 1.1) 
– but a search for possibly relevant variables must not stop here. In the past 
decades, interest in the European policy process has culminated in a wealth 
of academic analyses and textbooks. In the early 1970s, Helen Wallace 
(1973) already emphasised the relevance of government organisation, 
administrative style and traditions, particular policy goals and objectives as 
well as domestic politics. More than twenty years later, in a textbook in 
which other contributions describe the ‘top-down’ dimension of 
Europeanisation (Bulmer and Lequesne 2005), she ranges a number of 
influence techniques that national governments can deploy directed at EU 
policy-making. These include ‘formal’ powers, such as voting weights and 
economic leverage, which culminate into a less tangible factor ‘political 
clout’. Also, national policy-style, a notion introduced by Simon Bulmer 
(1983) is considered relevant for the potential use of threats, coercion and 
assertive issue-linkage, to which some member state governments are more 
inclined than others (who may gain more from their persuasive ideas).  
 
The 1990s was a particularly fruitful decade for this ‘second wave’ within 
EU studies. Multi-level governance and ‘Europeanisation’ are both 
concerned with the interaction flows between the regional, national and 
European locations of policy-making. In particular the impact of the EU ‘at 
home’ has become clear in recent years (Wessels and Rometsch 1996, Zeff 
and Pirro 2002, Maurer and Wessels 2003, Kassim 2000, Peters and Wright 
2001). Moreover, recent studies re-integrate the issue of domestic 
adaptation, i.e. the ‘taking’ with that of participation at the EU level, the 
‘shaping’ (Bursens 2001, Börzel 2003). Related analyses offer insights into 
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institutional linkage mechanisms, established by governments to operate 
between the domestic and the EU levels of policy-making. A particularly 
prominent issue discussed in these studies is national EU policy co-
ordination: the structure and procedures at the central state level designed for 
formulating preferences of different stakeholders into one national position 
to be represented in EU level negotiations (Van den Bos 1991, Pappas 1995, 
Wright 1996, Kassim and Wright 2000 and 2001).  
 Besides discussing similarities and differences of member state systems 
for managing European policy-making and implementation, contributions 
such as that by Peters and Wright (2001) discuss related variables, such as 
the particularities and complexities that EU level actions invoke in 
comparison to policy-making at the domestic level and the ‘complex issue’ 
of effectiveness of co-ordination – to be judged according to the issue, the 
policy types and requirements and objectives (ibid. 170).  
 
For the purpose of this study, two more elements which go beyond the 
traditional separation of the domestic and the EU level should be highlighted 
(Kassim 2000, 2001). Peters and Wright do not only stress the required 
ability of a national government to anticipate new EU legislation (the 
‘reception’ side of Europeanisation) but also the ability to ‘shape the EU 
agenda’ and ‘to tap the resources available in Brussels’ (bottom-up). 
Necessary conditions are not only ‘political clout’, which is linked to size – 
but size can be ‘negated or diluted by ineptitude or self constraint’. Another 
relevant variable is congruence between the EU and the national level, 
mainly as regards to constitutional and administrative structures and policy 
climate and contents.  
 
Then, there is lobbying literature. Lobbying can be defined as a particular 
influence technique mostly associated with informality. Of many related 
works (Mazey and Richardson 1993, Greenwood 1997), three contributions 
will be highlighted.  
 
In 1993, Van Schendelen edited a comparative study on public and private 
lobbying by the member states (Van Schendelen 1993) with the purpose to 
present and analyse a number of country-studies of how member states lobby 
the EU. The focus is largely on country-styles, or what Bulmer would call 
‘policy-style’: major national characteristics both in structure (degree of 
fragmentation and decentralisation, political structure, public-private 
relations; formal representation in Brussels) as in attitudes (towards 
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internationalisation; coalition partners; EU-mindedness). In more recent 
work (2002), the author designs a particular technique (‘public affairs 
management’) to ‘professionalize’ of public-private EU-directed lobbying 
efforts, by systematically using techniques and routes: such as formal and 
informal contacts; networking, alliance-building and agenda-formation, 
using procedures and public-private co-operation. The volume concludes by 
referring to the apparent decrease in effectiveness of national governments 
influence. Due mainly because of more cumbersome domestic co-ordination 
and the ‘bypass’ of interest groups active at the EU level, the author 
witnesses a trend throughout the member states. Therefore, a call is being 
made to include more descriptive examination of comparative case studies, 
making use of theoretical insights. This, in particular the link to theoretical 
EU studies, is a field to which the current study wants to contribute. 
 
Similarly focused on practitioners use, Humphreys (1997) has drafted a 
‘manual’ of how to shape EU policies. The author identifies three different 
types of instruments: negotiations, lobbying and briefings. Negotiations are 
formal venues for interest representation, lobbying is the informal influence 
of other players and outsiders with their own powers of influence; briefing is 
the way to pass information through, be it in written form or verbally. The 
advice is to always prepare in advance a ‘negotiating strategy’ for each 
individual piece of legislation or policy for which national input is needed.1  
 This strategy should include: the objectives preferred (what outcome do 
you want? How realistic is this? Which are fall-backs and interim 
solutions?); the resources deemed necessary, including if possible a full 
negotiating team (lead official; administrative support, a lawyer, an EU co-
ordinator and the responsible diplomat/official from the national Permanent 
Representation to the EU) and, for example, skills and language training; the 
allies and coalition-partners with shared concerns and objectives as well as 
the rivals and objectors to your preferences; a planned timetable of 
negotiations; consultations and meetings; information flows; position papers 
 
                                                 
1) A strategy can be defined as a systematic action plan aimed at achieving a 
coherent set of goals and objectives for the middle-long and long term. A 
national EU strategy ideally includes an idea on the development of the 
European integration and the country’s position and role within this process. 
This grand design may subsequently be translated into short-term priorities 
between competing interests and preferences for individual dossiers. 
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and finally, the need for co-ordination to ensure coherency of actions in 
order to ‘avoid speaking with a forked tongue’ (p. 324).  
 The volume does not classify as a theoretical contribution to further the 
‘shaping’ dimension within EU studies – nor does it aim to be. Rather it is a 
valuable insiders account of ‘how to make the Brussels machinery work for 
you’ (the subtitle), primarily directed at civil servants from the United 
Kingdom.  
 
Third, in a much-cited textbook on government and politics and EU policy-
making, Neil Nugent (1999, 472-8) goes into the issue of national 
governments trying to influence EU policy-shaping. As he identifies 
between national influence attempts directed at the supranational institutions, 
thereby going beyond the formal procedures that focus on the Council chain, 
this contribution can be shared under the ‘lobby’-heading. Influence attempts 
of governments focused on the European Commission including a national 
‘staffing policy’, the co-ordinated use of expert networks; as well as contacts 
at the political level between governments and DG’s, Cabinets or the 
College. At the Council level, variables conducive for governments 
influence include the following: political size; political saliency of the issue 
at stake; policy objectives, i.e. the desire to be active; the capacity to act in 
terms of domestic political situation; membership of alliances and coalitions; 
the procedure applying; skills and competencies of national negotiators as 
well as the quality of the national co-ordination mechanisms for EU affairs. 
 
There are also individual and comparative country-studies of how states deal 
with EU membership, many of which focus on the ‘big three’: the United 
Kingdom (Bulmer and Burch 2001, George 2001), France (Lequesne 1993, 
Ladrech 1994, Menon 2001) or Germany (Goetz 1995, Bulmer et al. 2001). 
There is also much analysis of adaptation processes in smaller member states 
such as Austria (Falkner 2001), Denmark (Bursens 2002) or Ireland (Laffan 
2002). In an analysis of the Netherlands, Hosli and Soetendorp (2000) focus 
on the Council, which they describe as ‘the prime venue for national interest 
representation’. Important variables which may increase the chance that a 
national action is successful include: relative voting power of a member state 
within the Council setting, which is linked to size and political clout; the set-
up of national co-ordination mechanisms for dealing with EU affairs, which 
can be explained by the degree of fragmentation and the level of 
politicisation of EU policy-making at the domestic level, which determines 
the ambitions and preferences of a particular member state. 
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Last but not least, in a first and promising attempt to link the ‘top-down’ and 
‘bottom-up’ dimensions of Europeanisation, which are often treated 
separately, Börzel (2003) seeks to explore those variables that define 
member state’s capacity in both respects (see chapter 3). Three explanatory 
variables are analysed in more detail: the degree of fragmentation, assessed 
by the number of veto players at the domestic level; the resources and the 
level of support for EU integration. A key finding is that whereas political 
fragmentation and resources appear to carry little explanatory power. 
Whereas ‘pace-setters’ in EU environmental policy-shaping are amongst the 
smallest and least-contributing countries, the most effective shapers and 
takers share a low level of administrative fragmentation, many resources and 
high levels of administrative legitimacy, thus recourses and legitimacy are 
relevant variables to explain performance both in EU policy-shaping as well 
as in subsequent implementation. 
 
Table 4.1 Variables deemed relevant for shaping capacity 
Ambitions, objectives, aspirations, preferences determining political salience (Peters and 
Wright, Héritier 1995, Nugent 1999) 
Political clout, translated in formal representation and voting weights (Peters and Wright 
2001, Hosli and Soetendorp 2000)  
Fit or congruence between EU and domestic constitutional and administrative structures 
(Bulmer 1983, Börzel 2003) and domestic policy contents (Falkner 2005); 
Degree of political and administrative fragmentation and centralisation (Peters and Wright 
2001, Börzel 2003, Kassim 2000/1) 
Co-ordination capacity (see for example: Schout 1998, Peters and Wright 2001, Börzel 2003, 
Kassim 2000/1) 
Support for membership, EU-membership, degree of Europeanisation (Börzel 2003) 
Ability to anticipate of new legislation (Hosli and Soetendorp 2000, Peters and Wright 2001, 
Nugent 2004) 
Ability for agenda-shaping and issue-manipulation (Peters and Wright 2001) 
Ability for getting nationals within the system (Nugent 2001) 
Ability for using public-private co-operation (Van Schendelen 2002) 
Policy style (Bulmer 1983), incl. use of threats and coercion, assertivity, search for 
consensus (Wallace 2005) 
Membership of coalitions and ability for active coalition-building (Hosli and Soetendorp 2000) 
 
To the extent that the analyses previously discussed have referred to the 
potential and ambitions of individual governments to exercise control over 
EU level developments, table 4.1 is an attempt to sum up the relevant 
elements. There are a number of remarks to make. First, attention for the 
shaping in these analyses is fragmented and discussed in rather abstract 
terms. Studies are directed at one particular dimension of the interaction 
flow between the domestic and the EU level – where current 
Europeanisation analysis remains firmly focused upon the ‘domestic impact 
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of Europe’, shaping analysis either focuses on informal lobbying (Van 
Schendelen 1993, 2002), one particular aspect of interest representation, 
such as or EU-co-ordination (Kassim 2000, 2001) or aims to provide a 
practical manual for those wishing to be active in EU negotiations 
(Humphreys 1997). Second, the jargon is confusing, as concepts as 
‘influence’, ‘lobby’ and ‘public affairs management’ are used 
interchangeably and variables deemed relevant for processes at the national 
level and those playing a role in EU level interactions, stable and situational 
variables as well as potential and ambition are mixed. Third, practical 
manuals do not relate to Europeanisation and governance literature. For a 
sound analysis of variables influencing national shaping capacity, the 
objective of this study, a first necessary step is to structure and categorise 
existing insights and analyses.  
 
 
§3. Fitting variables into a framework  
 
In the framework to be designed, the characteristics and conditions that are 
considered to affect the ability of a member state government to perform in 
the formulation of new EU policies are considered as the ‘building blocks’ 
of shaping capacity. The impact of these variables can be positive, in the 
sense that governments are enabled to act, or negative, implying that a 
particular condition can hamper national capacity to influence policy-making 
processes. The framework identifies two main categories of variables: will 
vs potential, second, stable vs situatoinal factors.  
 
First, the distinction between variables related to will (interests; ambitions 
and preferences) and those having to do with potential (capabilities; skills; 
knowledge resources) is derived from ‘neo-institutionalism’. Institutions, in 
the sense of patterns of rules, norms and informal behaviour, are assumed to 
‘channel’ processes in setting the rules of the game (Aspinwall and 
Schneider 2001). Bulmer (1983, 35), in his analysis of domestic EC-policy-
making, distinguished between the ‘structures’ of domestic policy-making 
and the ‘attitudes’ regarding integration, two dimensions which should be 
‘synthesized’ to explore member state behaviour within the EU. A 
government can have far-going aspirations and objectives towards EU 
policymaking – for the realisation it is dependent on its capacities for 
shaping EU policies and the resources devoted to influencing Brussels. 
Every stakeholder is confronted with the need to bring both dimensions in 
Going Europe or Going Dutch 
 
 
 
 
68 
line when designing an EUropean policy strategy or merely any action 
towards the European arena. If these two do not match, we are witness to the 
infamous expectations-capabilities gap.  
 
Second, the room for manoeuvre for action by individual national 
governments is defined by the combination of stable constants and more 
instable conditions (Schiemann 1993). At the ‘macro’-level, a number of 
exogenous variables determine the environment in which a government 
operates. Although difficult to be modified in the short run, they may 
positively or negatively affect national shaping capacity. Examples are the 
traditionally strong transatlantic orientation of the Netherlands and the 
preoccupation with economic integration of successive British governments.  
As macro-level, stable variables, ambitions differ from ‘meso’ and ‘micro’-
level preferences, related to particular policy-areas and dossiers. A similar 
distinction can be applied to ‘potential’. When referring to the length of 
membership or the size of the national administration, both relatively stable 
variables, the notion ‘capabilities’ is used. In the case of a particular policy 
issue or negotiating situation, this potential is referred to as ‘resources’. To 
be sure, this distinction serves analytical purposes but is at the same time to a 
large extent artificial. In practice, only time can tell whether a particular 
policy change will qualify as a ‘constant’.  
 
In line with ‘two-level game’-theories (Putnam 1985), most literature 
differentiates between characteristics and conditions governments are 
confronted with at the domestic level, on the one hand, and the structures 
and situation at the EU level on the other hand (Nugent 1998, Soetendorp 
and Hosli 2001, Peters and Wright). The framework for analysis developed 
here purposely tries to avoid this distinction, as the national arena and the 
EU level are considered to ‘intertwine in constant fashion’ (Wright 1996, 
149). At the same time, it should be readily acknowledged that this 
supposedly large degree of intertwinedness of the domestic and the EU level 
complicates the process analysis about national shaping capacity, as ‘it is 
difficult to try to conceive of the relationship in conventional positivist social 
science terms, i.e. with independent and dependent variables and simply 
causality if analysis is to capture incrementalism and continuity’ (Bulmer 
and Burch 2001, 78).  
 
In the next sections, potentially relevant variables are defined, discussed and 
placed within the four boxes of the framework: those concerned with will 
Chapter 4   Designing a Framework for Analysis 
 
 
 
 
69 
and potential and those related to stable and more dynamic developments in 
time. This distinction serves to structure insights as a constructed model. In 
the reality of policy-making, the categories are obviously closely 
interrelated. In particular it is hard to distinguish between variables related to 
motivation and the potential to realise these ambitions, which will be clear 
from the next sections. Variables related to ambitions (§3.1); preferences 
(§3.2); capacities (§3.3) and resources (§3.4) are discussed, possible 
explanatory variables or mechanisms are discussed, as well as the supposed 
positive or negative effects on national shaping capacity. See for the 
overview the framework presented in table 4.2.  
 
§3.1 Ambitions  
A first group of variables relates to the ambitions of a government to be 
actively involved in EU membership and its objectives regarding particular 
areas of co-operation. Different EU member states can pursue diverse 
integration ambitions at various levels. At a more comprehensive ‘macro’-
level of analysis, some governments have ambitious all-encompassing ideas 
about the desired direction of the integration process – be it towards an 
intergovernmental European free market area or towards a more federalist 
constellation in which common policies are developed in areas beyond the 
economic realm. Governments can also be criticised for lacking a ‘grand 
strategy’ on the desired direction and contents of European integration and 
policy co-operation– recently, the Dutch government has met such criticism 
by domestic observers (Social Economic Council 2003, Council of State 
2004, see chapter 5). At the meso-level, a government’s integration 
ambitions are ‘issue-specific’, in the sense that they focus on one or more 
particular policy-areas: structural funds or agricultural policy. Ideally, 
macro- and meso-level ambitions together ‘feed into’ the micro-level of 
particular dossiers and items on the EU’s agenda. This section deals with the 
variables deemed relevant for governments’ shaping ambitions (see table 
4.1).  
 
For adherents of the Realist school in international relations theory, the 
ambitions of a government are a function of a state’s national interests, ‘core 
beliefs’ (Sabatier 1999) or, in French: ‘raisons d’état’ (Morgenthau 1951, 
Krasner 1978). This essentially comprises a state’s goals and objectives it 
concerning security, economy or culture, which are motivated strategically 
(based on a costs-benefit calculation) or ideologically (i.e. driven by beliefs 
and normative ideas). The question which actors and institutions are 
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involved in the procedure by which issues are labelled as ‘national interests’ 
is a core debate in international relations and, relatedly, in EU studies (see 
also §3.3). Differences in national ambitions and objectives of individual 
national governments towards European integration may root in three 
factors: their core values; level of economic development and national 
politics and polity. 
 
First, the ‘core values’ of a nation state should be considered. An example is 
the historically ambivalent attitude of the United Kingdom towards the 
continent and its preference for more intergovernmental over supranational 
solutions for common problems (Menon and Wright 1998). But also France 
has traditionally aspired to play a leading role in integration, inspired by a 
vision of integration as a process within which the member states dominate 
(Menon 2001, 75). Germany and the Netherlands have long been counted 
among the most loyal supporters of integration, albeit for different reasons.  
 Another explanatory variable for a government’s shaping ambitions is 
its relative level of economic development. Wallace (2005, 39) points to the 
fact that the concerns of Germany, the EU’s largest economy and contributor 
to the EU’s budget tend to be taken very seriously. What is more: the 
country’s GDP and economic structure determines to a large extent the sum 
of its contribution and its receipts from the EU budget. Whether a member 
state is a net payer or a net recipient can be to a large degree explanatory for 
its stance to take as regards to EU policy initiatives, as the case of the 
Netherlands but also that of recipient Spain shows. But there is another 
argument. Higher-regulated economies are often ‘pioneers’, ‘leaders’ ore 
‘fore-runners’ when it comes to pushing for EU level regulation, for instance 
concerning environmental policies (Anderson and Liefferink 1997, 10). One 
explanation is that richer member states face more domestic incentives to 
strive for harmonisation at the EU level (Borzel 2002, Héritier 2001). Due to 
strong policy competition between the member states, competitive 
advantages for industry can be achieved by uploading stricter levels of 
regulation into harmonisation policies to be decided at the EU level. Because 
new EU rules and policies often take the form of binding regulations and 
directives, they have to be ‘downloaded’ in lesser-regulated member states. 
Indeed, the small size and open structure of the Dutch economy have defined 
to a large extent the traditional integration objectives pursued by the central 
government. At the same time, the structure and performance of the national 
economy also define the country’s contribution to the EU’s budget, which 
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has been a cause for much national reluctance in some member states, 
including the Netherlands, as a ‘net payer’ to the common budget. 
A third explanation for national ambition regarding European integration lies 
in national polity, policy and politics. Here again, structure and agency 
matter: the tradition of centralised government in the United Kingdom 
explains the government’s choice of ambition towards the EU (Kassim 2001, 
49) whereas the German government, in the past decades, has had 
difficulties in pursuing one coherent European vocation because of the 
federal state structure. These two examples suggest that particularly the 
degree of fragmentation of national politics and administration is relevant for 
national shaping capacity, a hypothesis to be discussed in a next section.  
 
Two other variables, which deserve mention in this respect, are length of 
membership and public support for integration. Whether a government is a 
founding father or a newcomer in the European arena probably influences 
the contents and vigour of its integration ambitions. The argument runs both 
ways. On the one hand, due to mechanisms of socialisation, a long-standing 
member may be more comfortable in the EU arena and, therefore, perhaps 
more willing to give in whereas a new member wants to show its new 
colleagues and domestic constituency its teeth. On the other hand, newer 
members may be inexperienced, and thus less ambitious, whereas old 
members can speak their mind freely and expect some leverage for their long 
allegiance.  
 Börzel (2003) has argued that a higher level of general support may 
increase willingness to ‘swallow’ unpopular decisions from Brussels. 
Relevant in this respect are the cases of Sweden and Denmark, where around 
the majority of the population is largely sceptical towards political and 
monetary integration, which has explained the national stance towards 
related initiatives.  
 
As previously discussed, many analyses of how a member state deals with 
EU membership tend to focus on the ‘potential’ for a government to 
influence EU policy-making. This is remarkable as ideally, how a member 
state shapes EU policies is conform its general objectives. A concrete 
example is offered by the United Kingdom. There, the national integration 
ambition is closely linked to the potential to shape EU policies, in the sense 
of a ‘co-ordination ambition’. The aim of British EU policy is: ‘to ensure 
that for any EU activity or proposal … agreement is reached on a UK policy 
in good time, taking account of identified UK interests and advancing or at 
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least protecting those consistent with overall Government policy with 
realistic objectives taking account of the interests of other members of the 
EU and that policy agreed is followed through consistently during 
negotiations, and put into effect once decisions have been made in 
Brussels’.2 
 Ambitions also set the scope for EU-related actions. Kassim (2001, 70) 
argues that although ‘the UK position may be defined early, communicated 
to other policy actors and defended coherently (…), the UK’s preoccupation 
with sovereignty and its preference for intergovernmental solutions (…), 
have tended to make it an outlier in Council negotiations’. Moreover, ‘the 
good faith of the UK (…) is not taken for granted’. In contrast, the 
traditional pro-European consensus in Germany, combined with the 
economic power would have played a role in its considerable shaping 
attempts, ‘despite administrative bottlenecks and complexities’ (Maurer 
2001, 124).  
 
At the EU level, domestic ambitions ‘fall’ into an European context, which 
can either serve as a ‘push’ or, in contrast, constrain national motivation. The 
notion ‘goodness of fit’ has already been discussed in the section on 
Europeanisation. A related variable at the macro-level is constitutional and 
administrative congruence: the degree to which a country’s political and 
administrative structures and its more ‘soft’ or cultural characteristics or 
what has been called its ‘policy style’ (Bulmer 1983) fit with that of the 
ways Brussels and the other member state operates. The extent to which the 
policy of a member state synchronises with the logic of the EU constitutional 
principles or aspirations is a factor crucial for success. Examples are the 
relative success of successive UK governments in their pursuit of market 
liberalisation and the capacity of protectionist countries to slow down 
liberalisation of air transport and energy markets. In terms of ambitions, a 
government can have completely differing ambitions as to future cooperation 
and thus be an outlier notwithstanding its political size or clout, or purposely 
limit its activities to particular policy areas or individual decisions and thus 
be absent in particular fields.  
 
 
                                                 
2) See Kassim (2003, 93), offering an overview of the degree of centralisation and 
ambitions of national coordination systems for EU affairs. 
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The life of a national government representative is considerably less 
complicated if national administrative style and procedures ‘match’ with 
those at the EU level and with those of possible coalition partners and 
adversaries. Representatives accustomed to an open, flexible and consensus-
building style of negotiating are well prepared for the high degree of 
compromise and the need for coalition building at the European level. 
However, these styles are commonly regarded as ill suited to formulate 
overall steering strategies (the apparent strength of the British and the French 
systems). Those negotiators from centralised systems, where co-ordination is 
more authoritative, may reap the benefits in terms of more self-confidence, 
rapid action and more accustomed to use of threats and coercion (Wallace 
2000, 2005). The elitist, centralising and confrontational style of the French, 
which is evident in the interdepartmental committees at home, can be very 
counterproductive in Brussels. And organisational incongruence with the 
competencies for policy areas between government ministries and European 
Commission DGs can hamper national shaping capacity.  
 
In operating at the EU level, all governments encounter particular 
‘institutions’ in the sense of formal and informal rules and norms relevant 
for their motivation and potential to shape EU policies. Generally, the 
institutional context will be similar for all member states, such as the 
interplay between European Commission, Parliament and Council according 
to cumbersome procedures and legal rules. One exception is the rotating 
national EU-Council Presidency. The government holding the Presidency 
chairs all Council-meetings from working groups up to political summits for 
six months. Often, a national delegation voices positions whereas a 
supposedly ‘neutral’ chairperson is in charge of the meetings. The 
Presidency possesses informational and procedural resources to encourage 
concessions and achieve convergence in EU governments’ negotiating 
positions, for instance in the fields of agenda setting and coalition building. 
Presidencies are also tempted to use these privileged resources for national 
gain and to exploit the position as broker to favour desired outcomes 
(Tallberg 2004, 2). A considerable risk is thus a loss of prestige resulting 
from too vigorous attempts to pursue national interests through European 
means (Schout 1999). The prospect of holding the chair usually leads to an 
impetus for investing into European awareness and domestic co-ordination 
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mechanisms and thus constitutes an excellent case study of the management 
of EU affairs.3 
 
§3.2 Preferences  
Ambitions are the macro-level conditions for determining any government’s 
EU policy in the long term – ‘preferences’ are the corresponding micro-level 
variable. In terms of EU policy of legislation, preferences for certain 
outcomes and results are formulated and represented as ‘negotiating 
positions’. For national governments, the formal setting for issuing these 
positions is the Council of Ministers, although the literature review has 
shown that governments more and more use other ways to voice their likes 
or dislikes about proposed policies.  
 
One categorisation of the different stances that governments may take as 
regards to EU policies builds on insights on different country strategies in 
EU environmental policy-making (Andersen and Liefferink 1997, Börzel 
2002). A ‘pace setting’ strategy involves actively pushing policies at the EU 
level; in contrast, ‘foot-dragging’ is actively blocking or delaying policies 
and fence-sitters either do not bother about the proposed policy to be active 
in the shaping stages or purposefully wait until the others have fought the 
battles. A suggestion in much EU studies literature is that, for ensuring 
national shaping capacity, the link between ambitions, preferences and 
negotiating positions should be coherent between different policy areas and 
settings, as well as consistent over time (see for example Kassim 2000). 
Many (media) accounts of EU policy-making imply that positions mirror a 
deliberate action by a government (representative) with the aim to shape the 
policy process. In order to analyse the shaping process, it is relevant to 
determine how, i.e. by which process and whom these preferences are 
formulated and turned into positions and whether the presumed stability in 
national position is realistic. The latter remark is the reason why many 
accounts of how governments deal with the EU pay a great deal of attention 
to national systems of EU policy-making.  
 
One’s perspective on allegedly dominant actors in setting a country’s EU 
policy depends on the theoretical lens that is applied. Intergovernmentalists 
portray the result of EU policy-making by a national government as shaped 
 
                                                 
3) See for more on the national EU Presidency chapter 6. 
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by the magnitude of benefits to be gained from co-operation; the certainty of 
these benefits, and the relative influence (differential mobilization) of the 
producers groups representing economic interests (Moravcsik 1999, 517). 
One essential claim of yet another perspective, (social) constructivism is that 
interests would be ‘socially constructed’ instead of ‘given’ (Checkel 1999). 
A constructivist perspective may, for example, offer insights into how EU 
policy players are socialised into values and behaviour impacting on their 
presentation of national policy. This ‘social learning’ may lead to an 
adaptation of policy preferences. Constructivist analysis highlights the role 
of discourse as a means of understanding national government behaviour 
(Bulmer and Lequesne 2005, 15). In other words: it is important to look 
beyond ‘Eurospeak’ notions such as ‘member states’ of ‘national positions’ 
in order to find different types of norms and interests and their interaction. 
Policy-oriented perspectives such as the aforementioned ‘linkage’ studies 
have claimed that ‘the policies that governments pursue at the EU level are 
the outcome of complex processes of intergovernmental bargaining, 
bureaucratic policy and co-ordination of variable quality’ (Kassim 2000, 
276). Empirical findings from comparative studies on how governments deal 
with the EU sustain this ‘pluralist’ view on public policy-making, according 
to which the outcomes of national government policy are the resultant of 
effective access by various types of interests (see Wessels 2003). 
 
Apart from the systems for translating the preferences of various groups in 
government and society into negotiating positions (to be discussed in §3.3), 
another explanatory variable is the relative issue salience that the actors 
involved in this process attach to a particular issue (Nugent 2002, 412, Peters 
and Wright 2001, 172). This relevance generally determines how much time 
and resources an actor wants to spend on dealing with it. This factor may 
derive from a wealth of underlying factors including personal utility 
maximisation; considerations of a economic and social nature (as is the case 
with the structural and cohesion policy for the EU’s lesser developed regions 
or with the common agricultural policy for France); political pressures or 
external events which may increase attention arising for joint action 
regarding a particular topic (criminal matters, maritime safety) 
 
A third variable to be discussed in relation to shaping preferences is, again, 
‘goodness of fit’. It can be easily hypothesised that the activity of a 
government in forwarding its preferences is dependent on the congruence of 
existing legislation and new EU policies. After all, there is not much shaping 
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to do in case proposals for new EU legislation ‘fit’ with the way things work 
at home or with the way governments would want things to be arranged. If 
there is policy or institutional ‘misfit’, instead, governments can be expected 
to invest more actively in the shaping of binding EU legislation. Treib 
(2003) has pointed at an intermediate variable, which we may call ‘strategic 
shaping behaviour’. Even in the case of misfit, governments may be inclined 
to support EU proposals that run contrary to national laws or practice, in 
order to change the national status quo and thus use the EU level as a 
leverage to promote domestic change. ‘Goodness of fit’ should, 
consequently, not be mistaken as a static notion, as preferences may change 
during the process of uploading.  
 
The link between ambitions, preferences and positions is even less 
unidirectional taking into account that as preferences, also negotiating 
positions can be taken strategically, as is underlined in negotiation analysis 
(see Meerts and Cede 2004). For example, a member state government can 
then take a position which is close to the European Commission, and 
decision analysis have demonstrated that the further the distance from the 
Commission, the more an actor loses in a negotiation (Bailer 2005, 115). For 
these actions, particular ambitions and objectives should be translated into 
‘persuasive ideas’ and ‘compelling demands’ (Wallace 2005, 4).  
 
Here we come to the potential of governments to shape the policy process.  
 
§3.3 Capabilities 
A third group of variables is related to capabilities. A government may have 
far-going ambitions towards the EU, for their realisation it is dependent on 
its shaping potential: the sum of relatively stable capabilities for shaping EU 
policies and the quantity and quality of resources at a disposal. A number of 
exogenous or relatively stable variables determine national shaping 
capabilities.  
 
First, capacities, just as ambitions, depend on the country’s relative level of 
economic development. Member states which score worse in this respect 
have been characterised as ‘policy-takers rather than policy-makers’ because 
the poorer member states would lack the capacity and money deemed crucial 
for investing actively in common policy-making (Börzel 2002). Moreover, 
domestic problems would take the most of governments’ efforts and thus the 
EU level would be neglected. However, some member states are known for 
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having used their relatively deprived position to plea very successfully for 
EU assistance. Most remarkable is the example of Ireland, which from a 
relatively poor agricultural society has developed into a ‘Celtic tiger’, not in 
the least because of a successful campaign for Brussels funds (Laffan 1998). 
The impact of economic position on shaping capacity is thus not 
unidirectional.  
This holds the same for a second intuitively appealing variable, which is 
relative member state size or ‘political clout’. There is a lot of literature 
assessing the relative ‘weight’ of a member state in Council deliberations, 
relating to objective factors such as population size and economic power, 
reflected in voting weights in the Council (Hosli and Soetendorp 2001, 
Mattila and Lane 2001). The literature is ambivalent, however, about the 
question whether larger member states would be better suited to operate at 
an EU level. At first sight, size does matter. It translates itself into voting 
power, and although votes are not often cast, the ‘shadow of the vote’ 
determines the nature of the negotiations. Larger member states are better 
represented in the Parliament and at official level within the European 
Commission. And when it comes to the grand political summitry, the image 
of the ‘big’ pushing through with unwanted decisions haunts the public 
image of EU policy-making. However, a closer look brings up the question 
whether large member states are indeed as advantaged in their Brussels 
operations as their size would predict. Again, large and centralised 
administrations can be hampered by their lack of flexibility and difficulty to 
prioritise between European dossiers, something which smaller 
administrations may be forced to rely on. Second, the relative size of an 
individual government can be modified by the membership of winning or 
blocking coalitions. Size may be negated or diluted by other shaping 
variables related to motivation or potential (Peters and Wright 2001, 171). If 
a government is a regular outlier as regards to its concrete preferences or 
constitutional set-up, it remains inherently difficult to be accommodated no 
matter its political clout. Germany’s political clout was long negated by self-
restraint (Bulmer and Paterson 1987). If a government organisation is 
fragmented, such is the case in Germany; this may complicates the setting of 
a coherent EU policy. If a government does not invest in EU-related 
resources to increase negotiating skills or anticipation capacity, this may 
dilute its potentially relevant size.  
 
Another relevant factor, of which the impact on shaping capacity can be 
debated, is length of membership. It can be expected that the longer a 
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member state operates within an EU context, the more experience with EU 
related policy-making has been built. This experience may increase 
awareness at a domestic level of the opportunities and constraints that the 
European Union offers as a policy context. Experience may also work at the 
EU level, as it could increase the level of socialisation within EU networks 
and thereby the relative ease by which national negotiators find their way 
into the maze of EU committees and networks and are better enabled to 
voice national positions (Trondal 2004). However, length of membership of 
a member state may also work the other way, as EU-membership and 
dealing with its effects is taken for granted within national public 
administration and a certain ‘EU-tiredness’ is taking place. This is why long-
standing member states often watch jealously the processes in new or 
candidate states where as a result of (the prospect of) membership and the 
need to take over the ‘acquis communautaire’, the EU is actively integrated 
within national administration.  
 
At the domestic level, a prominent variable in much analysis focusing on 
member states ‘shaping’ and ‘taking’ EU legislation is the degree of 
fragmentation of the national polity. Political and administrative 
fragmentation generally includes issues such as organisation of the national 
administration, the state structure (federal or decentralised), state-society 
relations (corporatism) and the political party structure. Although most 
national systems for dealing with EU affairs include an interplay between 
ministries dealing with sectoral interests and co-ordinating authorities, they 
differ as regards to the position and role of the latter and the mechanisms for 
translating preferences into negotiating positions. The different models, their 
pros and cons, and the challenges they constantly face, have been 
extensively analysed in a great number of country studies and comparative 
volumes (Rometsch and Wessels 1996, Hanf and Soetendorp 1996, Mény, 
Muller and Quermonne 1996, Zeff and Pirro 2001, and Kassim 2000).  
 
With the wealth of different systems, it is not easy to determine whether a 
particular national system is fragmented or centralised (Schout and Jordan 
2005). It is clear for most observers, however, that fragmentation impact 
negatively on co-ordination capacity (cf. Metcalfe 1987, Schout 1999). The 
latter notion is the potential to aggregate preferences of various stakeholders 
into a negotiating position to be voiced by government representatives. In an 
attempt to devise a standard of reference with the purpose of facilitating 
comparison, Metcalfe (1994) developed a nine-point policy ‘co-ordination 
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scale’ on which governments can be ranked in terms of their coordination 
capacity. The scales goes up from the lowest level (independent decision 
making by government ministries); beyond the level of mere communication 
and consultation; avoiding divergence and searching for agreement to 
arbitration and setting parameters, up to an active search for agreement, 
central priorities and devising a government strategy to establish a general 
direction of national EU policy. Spence (1999) developed a ‘co-ordination 
chart’ for governments whishing to be effective.  
 
From a review of these texts and related literature, a number of implicit 
standards can be deducted for the performance of national co-ordination 
systems:  
 
A first criterion is the degree to which it contributes to the coherency and 
consistency of national preference formation and representation and the 
effectiveness (i.e. the achievement of pre-determined policy objectives). 
‘Effectiveness is generally perceived (sometimes mistakenly) as good 
positive co-ordination in an area as complex as that of the European Union’ 
(Kassim 2000, 3). Some authors assume very readily that a high degree of 
concentration of EU authority within the national system leads to increased 
coherency in the national bargaining position and thus more favourable 
outcomes. The co-ordination and control over the framing of the national 
negotiating position in particular is considered ‘a key instrument’ in order to 
secure ‘speaking with one voice’ in EU level bargaining (Hosli and 
Soetendorp 2001). Other scholars are more sceptical as to the contribution of 
co-ordination to policy effectiveness (Wright 1996, Menon and Wright 
1998). 
 
Second, the efficiency of the process in terms of time and resources is 
relevant for judging a system. Some member states have a Brussels 
reputation of being extremely well organised, most notably Britain and 
France (Kassim 2000). Other member states are known for being incoherent 
and slow: the southern Club-Med countries and the new EU 10 member 
states. The clue is often found in the degree of centralisation, as the two 
centralised systems of France and the United Kingdom are often cited to be 
very efficient when it comes to coverage of meetings, the timing of 
interventions and circulating information between the capital and the EU 
Permanent Representation. However, this does not mean that centralisation 
is the solution for coordination problems. Organisational efficiency is 
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determined to a large extent by the political-administrative structure and 
organisation of the member state in question and to be assessed in terms of 
delivery and national objectives as regards to domestic EU co-ordination. 
Tightly organised systems, which may be able to guarantee consistency and 
coherency between positions taken in different venues at different times, are 
presumed to be better suited to deal with the large degree of fragmentation 
and sectoralisation of EU policy-making. These claims are based on the 
assumption that the efficiency of the system is the dominant criterion: to 
what extent does the system ‘fit’ and function satisfactory at a domestic 
level? Indeed, political conflicts of interests may lead to inconsistencies, 
such as a lack of coherence between positions taken in different Council 
meetings or lack of control over national members of the European 
Parliament. Although the issue of effectiveness is debated, research suggests 
that the link between organisational efficiency and European outcomes is 
weak (Sepos 2005). 
 
A third criterion is the legitimacy, or the degree to which other stakeholders 
support the outcomes of co-ordination. A hierarchically organised, and thus 
supposedly more efficient system, may come to decisions which are not 
supported by the actors that are subsequently confronted with the 
implications. The relative weight of this criterion has increased due to 
changing circumstances in the position of national governments, which are 
confronted with new actors active in the EU arena. 
 
The anticipation capacity of the system is a fourth consideration. Much work 
on EU policy co-ordination is based on the assumption that preference 
formation can be managed by national governments and that national 
officials effectively act as the gatekeeper for national interest representation. 
Not surprisingly, the main focus of co-ordination is thus on the Council 
phase, but some systems hold a firm grip on what is going on in the phase of 
Commission initiative, taking into account the estimate that after the tabling 
of a European Commission proposal, ‘scope for changing it only exists at the 
margins, involving about 20 per cent of the total proposal’ (Hull 1993, 83). 
A second much-cited estimate claims that 90 percent of all dossiers are 
settled before they reach the ministerial Council level (i.e., 70 percent in 
Council working groups and another 15 percent in the next stage of 
negotiations between permanent national representatives (Renshaw and 
Wallace 1997, 78). The anticipation capacity of the system; the potential to 
act pro-actively on developments at the EU level (Nugent 2004) is highly 
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relevant for that reason. A complex division of power between the central 
government and the regions may lead to horizontal and vertical 
fragmentation resulting in late preference building and minority positions. 
 Last but not least, co-ordination systems should produce positions that 
are sufficiently flexible for government representatives to have room for 
manoeuvre during the negotiations. The previously discussed requirements 
(timely; coherency; consistency) seem to necessitate a tightly organised co-
ordination of negotiating mandates, preferably in the hands of one actor that 
is able to oversee and monitor related processes. At the same time, EU level 
negotiations create their own dynamics precisely because their complexity 
and multi-levelled character. Because of the negotiating nature of EU 
decision-making, amendments are proposed throughout the process and all 
outcomes involve intricate compromise. Instructions for negotiators need to 
be sufficiently flexible to be adapted to changing circumstances or to 
changing positions of the other negotiators, whereas tight domestic 
compromises may bind hands.  
 
If these five standards are not identified and recognised, debates and tensions 
may arise. The problem is, of course, that the requirements may produce 
contradictory and unintended results. A tightly hierarchically organised and 
thus supposedly more efficient system may come to less supported decisions 
which subsequently hard to implement timely and correct. In contrast, a less 
tightly steered system which takes many possibly conflicting opinions into 
account may not be capable with the time constraints which are imposed by 
the EU negotiating order.  
 
One variable closely related to coordination capacity is the quality and use of 
‘linkage mechanisms’ between the national capitals and the EU level, or: 
Brussels. All member states are represented at Council level by an embassy 
to the EU, a Permanent Representation, led by an ambassador, which 
generally serves as the ‘eyes and ears’ for member states in Brussels (see De 
Zwaan 1995, Kassim 2000b). Comparative analysis of the work of national 
Permanent Representations to the EU show that their ‘upstream’ functions 
are performed rather similarly. Concerning their staffing policy, most 
governments have ensured that nearly all departments are represented in the 
national embassies to the EU. Seconded national officials from all 
government departments monitor policy developments and networks of a 
national capital – but also of national business and economic interests – in 
Brussels. Staff at the Permanent Representation to the EU also negotiates 
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national positions, which calls for more co-ordination between the relevant 
expert officials and the more generalist knowledge of the representative. 
Empirical research has demonstrated that officials working at the Permanent 
Representation due to their regular attendance of EU level committees tend 
to develop a strong ‘supranational’ affiliation (Trondal 2004). As officials 
usually circulate from ministries to the Permanent Representation and back, 
their experience may in time increase the EU-awareness of the national 
administration at a domestic level (Soetendorp 2000).  
 Comparatively, there are differences in the involvement of national 
Permanent Representations in what is going on at the domestic level of 
negotiations. In some cases, the Representation participates formally in the 
process, while in others it has no predetermined role The degree to which 
Permanent Representation’s are ‘pro-active’ in foreseeing relevant EU level 
events and developments and reports to the national capital also differs. The 
Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom to the EU (UKRep) is 
known for its structured and rapid information flow to London of the 
minutes of all relevant meetings between member states and EU level 
institutions (Schout 2004), in other member states, such as the Netherlands, 
much leeway is left for national negotiators to ‘mould’ instructions to EU 
realities (Van den Bos 1991).  
 Increasingly, the Permanent Representation is used for recruitment 
policy, that is, for getting nationals into Brussels. If the Permanent 
Representation is the formal link with Brussels, informal links are 
personified by the fellow nationals who work at the EU institutions. Member 
state governments, to a varying degree, keep close watch on the 
developments in the EU institutions, by holding informal meetings and 
keeping lists of nationals who have ‘gone Europe’.4  
 
As was the case with ‘will’, also as regards to national shaping potential it is 
often not clear whether variables are relevant at the domestic or the EU 
level. One example is the ability of a national government to build or join a 
blocking or winning coalition. Interestingly, “surprisingly little scholarly 
work has up till now been produced on coalition behaviour and coalition 
patterns within the EU” (Elgström 2001, 112). A coalition can be defined as 
 
                                                 
4) For example, the Dutch government regularly publishes a booklet with all 
Dutch staff of the EU institutions (‘Nederlanders in Europa, Europa in Den 
Haag’, Ministry of the Interior, Den Haag, SDU: 2004). 
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a set of actors that coordinate their behaviour in order to reach certain pre-
determined objectives. Governments do not only have to express their 
positions but also to make sure that they are supported, as a consequence of 
the increasing practise of majority voting (see for example Hosli and 
Soetendorp 2001). Coalitions serve to reduce the number of negotiating 
actors to a manageable amount. But coalition building between EU member 
governments is much more difficult than it is at the domestic level, if only 
because of the instability and unpredictability of the EU’s policy 
environment (Dwight in: Richardson 1996, 152-153). A rough distinction 
can be made between macro-level coalitions, or more or less permanent 
alliances, and meso-and micro level coalitions as regards to particular 
policy-areas or dossiers.  
 
At the macro-level, Meerts (1997) distinguishes between ten overlapping 
coalition groups of member states within the then-EU-15: large and small 
members; pro-Atlantic; the rich and green Nordics and generally poorer 
southern (‘Club-Med’) countries; neutral countries as well as two particular 
sub-groups (Benelux; Franco-German alliance). Although it is difficult to 
predict coalitions, much more research has become possible after the public 
availability of Council voting records since 1994. It has been suggested that 
coalitions are based upon power; interests; ideology and culture, whereas 
especially the north-south divide and the net contributor-recipient divide are 
explanatory (Kaeding and Selck 2005). Besides that, coalition building is 
cross-cutting (different alliances for different dossiers) which complicates 
the building of coalitions that last longer than one particular issue. At a 
micro-level, the EU is known for its ‘text negotiations’ (Elgström 2004, 
113). Below the micro-level of particular dossiers, coalitions can vary 
constantly as every article or particular wording can bring about new 
alliances. Insiders’ accounts of Council level negotiations have noted that in 
these text negotiations normally, two coalitions appear at each end of the 
spectrum with the large majority of delegations indifferent as regards to the 
issue under discussion (Bal 2004, 131).  
 The ability of a national government to build coalitions is dependent on 
the strategic use of resources: knowledge about procedures and positions and 
negotiating skills. Here we come onto the fourth category of variables 
distinguished in the framework. 
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§3.4 Resources  
A last group of variables falls under the heading of resources, the short-term 
capabilities of a government to influence EU level developments. From 
policy and practitioners’ studies on EU-affairs, we may distinguish a number 
of resources that are deemed particularly relevant for national governments 
to invest in. There often is a direct relation with the contents and intensity of 
national ambitions, preferences and capabilities – which underlines the large 
degree of interrelatedness of the all variables discussed in this chapter.  
 At the EU level, negotiation is the dominant mode of decision-making. 
The use of bargaining tactics and strategies may thus affect shaping capacity 
positively, although too shrewd negotiators may only be regarded with 
suspicion. Negotiating textbooks proscribe that one essential requirement for 
EU negotiators is to have sufficient knowledge about the positions and 
mandates of (at least a selected group of) the other actors (supranational 
institutions; central and subnational governments; NGO’s) deemed relevant 
(see Meerts and Cede 2004). Positions are only the surface, however, 
underlying is a web of ambitions and preferences ideally known by the 
negotiator in order to be able to use them during the negotiations. The 
fieldwork necessary for finding this information is one large part of the daily 
work of the people active in EU level negotiations. A related category of 
resources concerns the use of bargaining tactics and strategies. Much 
attention is devoted to this topic in the training of diplomats and officials to 
be active at the EU level. 
 
For negotiators at different levels and locations, actively operating in an EU 
context implies a sound knowledge of procedures applying, linguistic skills 
and familiarity with ‘Euro-jargon’. Although it is tempting to focus only on 
those active at the EU level, EU-related knowledge is particularly relevant 
also at the national level, in order to secure the aforementioned ‘link’ 
between processes at different levels. The degree of ‘EU-awareness’ of 
national politics and administration is particularly relevant for adequate 
‘process management’ of dossiers with an EU dimension (Schreurs 2002). If 
government officials involved in these topics are sufficiently aware of this 
EU-link in order to asses the potential consequences, such as for the EU-
related actions deemed necessary, problems at a later stage, such as 
implementation problems, may be prevented. This holds the same for early 
involvement of the political level in EU-dossiers, so that potential problems 
arise at the ministerial level are prevented in the stage of administrative 
discussions. This is the reason why studies focus on the ‘taking’ of EU 
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legislation by member states now tentatively takes the ‘shaping’ side into 
account.  
 
Does size matter in this respect? Obviously, the capacity and size of the 
administration may enhance the human resources to ‘be present’ in Brussels. 
A government may be determined to direct actions at the EU level, but 
sufficient resources should be allocated for that particular action. Minimally, 
this presence concerns those groups and committees where relevant issues 
are discussed. More ambitiously, active presence is ensured in meetings or 
institutions where new legislation can be anticipated (Wright 1996) and 
opportunities to promote national interests can be foreseen (Spence 1995). 
At first sight, it would seem rather obvious that larger member states have 
more resources at their disposal – although even then, the sheer size of the 
EU playing field makes it impossible to be present everywhere or to control 
all developments. One may also argue that efficiency and strategic use of 
resources are more important than sheer size or volume. Simply investing in 
the size of the Permanent Representation, in order to deal with an expanded 
workload, would increase the danger of ‘the development of specialized 
filieres, prone to pursue their sectoral interests’ (Menon 2001, 89). Because 
of the complexities of the EU decision-making system in which national 
governments are deprived of specific resources that they possess at the 
national level (authority; agenda control; established networks; 
administrative traditions), it could be even more important to invest in the 
right capabilities at the right time (Kassim 2001, 12).  
 
As far as the issue of timing is concerned: when discussing relevant 
resources related to EU level-actions are concerned, anticipation capacity is 
often explicitly mentioned (Peters and Wright 2001, Nugent 2004): a pro-
active approach of the issues that will dominate the European agenda in the 
near future with the aim of agenda-setting or issue-manipulation. Peters and 
Wright (2001, 171) claim that although almost all member states are weak in 
this respect, ‘governments are increasingly aware that anticipation is an 
important policy weapon’. As the number of issues and actors has increased, 
a government should possess the anticipatory ability to foresee new EU 
regulation and be involved in the crucial, Commission-led phase of pre-
negotiation. Especially the United Kingdom is reputedly highly pro-active in 
tapping Brussels’ resources at a very early stage: when the responsible ‘chef 
de dossier’ still works with a white paper sheet. The link between 
anticipation and coordination capacity is obvious: in order to prevent 
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inconsistencies and make the most of presence and influence in this early 
phase, preparations should start in articulating a clear and coherent national 
position.  
 
Table 4.2 A framework for analysis of a national government’s shaping capacity 
Shaping 
capacity 
Will Potential 
Stable 
variables 
AMBITIONS 
 
‘Core values’ and policy constants; 
political and economic ‘clout’, including 
relative development and political 
constellation, public support for active 
EU membership; length of 
membership; ‘Image’; ‘goodness of fit’ 
as regards to ambitions and objectives 
CAPABILITIES 
 
Policy style; degree of fragmentation, 
co-ordination capacity; size and EU 
awareness of the political and 
administrative system; strategic 
capacity; coalition building capacity; 
quality and use of organisational/ 
personal EU-national linkage 
mechanisms  
Situational 
variables 
PREFERENCES 
 
Relative salience of the issue; interest 
configuration; particular institutional 
coditions, incl. EU Council Presidency; 
relative fit and extremity of preferences 
and negotiagting position 
RESOURCES 
 
Interest configuration; knowledge, 
skills and competencies; ability to 
anticipate and act pro-actively; ability 
to use nationals within the system; 
flexibility of negotiating position; use of 
negotiating strategy and -tactics 
 
 
§4. Discussion 
 
It is clear from the previous sections that governments willing to become 
involved in EU policy-making are confronted with an immense challenge. 
The number of actors, levels and players is staggering, probably one prime 
reason why the notion of government shaping capacity, however relevant for 
the functioning of the EU, has thus far been largely unexplored. It is an 
important issue, however in light of the opportunity-structure governments 
are confronted with at the EU level. As governments are assumed to function 
in a multi-level context where they are circumvented by sub-national actors 
and organised interests, threatened to be outvoted by Council colleagues and 
forced to cooperate which supranational institutions in all stages of the 
policy chain, including those of decision making, governments are forced to 
actively invest into their capacity to be active and influence at the EU level. 
But which variables matter in this respect? 
 
Overseeing the results from the previous sections and keeping in mind that 
this is merely a constructed categorisation of a complex reality, it is easy to 
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conclude that everything is interrelated. To quote one particularly relevant 
academic contribution, that of Peters and Wright (2001, 173): ‘the 
effectiveness of a country’s domestic EU co-ordination capacity must be 
judged according to the issue, the policy type, the policy requirements and 
the policy objectives’ … To be able to frame the following country study of 
how a government deals with the shaping, however, it is important to group 
and select those variables, which are expected to be relevant. Which, now, 
are the variables deemed relevant for what may be roughly called the 
‘national EU-related lobby’?  
 
For a start, all national governments have to work with a context determined 
by a number of ‘constants’ largely determined by their history, 
characteristics or context such as the relative level of economic 
development; the degree of domestic political support for integration; and its 
relative political clout. However, public opinion in an allegedly pro-EU 
government may turn out to be reluctant to further integration; political clout 
may be diluted by external factors and a member state may adapt its 
constitutional structures and processes to EU realities. At the EU level, treaty 
reform negotiations are organised with increasing frequency in order to 
adapt the EU’s institutional and policy framework to changing 
circumstances. Although stable variables may thus be subject to change in 
the long term, for an analysis of national shaping capacity, they can be 
considered ‘exogenous’, as they are difficult to adapt during the course of 
shaping activity. In contrast, ‘endogenous’ variables can be used and adapted 
during the shaping process.  
 
This distinction notwithstanding, for analytical reasons, a selection should be 
made of the plethora of factors discussed in the previous sections. The 
assumption behind this selection is derived from the insights discussed in the 
previous chapters, which have examined how the challenges to governments 
have led to a different playing field or ‘opportunity structure’. The ‘paradox 
of integration’ (see Hoffmann 1996) is that governments strive to cooperate 
to increase their grip upon cross-border developments, whereby the saliency 
of what happens at the EU level increases. As more is at stake for 
governments, the relevance of national claims increases and they are 
pressured to perform in the ‘struggle for a say’ (Beyers and Trondal 2002). 
At the same time, the traditional possibilities for successful performance 
have been seriously limited. For governments wishing to be active at the EU 
level, at a larger playing field with many more relevant actors, the quality of 
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interest representation is much more important than sheer political clout. For 
any EU-lobby, it holds that if it is not set up properly, it may be that those 
interests will ‘lose’ in the policy-shaping arena and thus be outvoted or 
irrelevant for the final outcomes. Those governments wishing to be relevant 
in EU policy-shaping will have to invest actively in getting their act together. 
 
With this in mind, the following categories are identified as particularly 
relevant for national shaping capacity. First, the degree of ‘fit’ or congruence 
of national and EU level policies and ambitions; second, a number of 
variables associated with the potential of governments to be active (co-
ordination anticipation and strategic capacity), third, the quality and quantity 
of resources made available for EU-related actions and, last but not least, the 
relative salience of the issue, as a strong ‘will’ may remedy scarce capacities 
or resources.  
 These variables will be highlighted in the next sections and 
subsequently serve as a guiding line for the empirical analysis in the next 
chapters. 
 
The notion ‘goodness of fit’ has been very prominent with in 
Europeanisation studies concerned with the ‘taking’ of EU policies by 
governments roughly since the mid-1990s. But only in a remarkably late 
stage has the link to the ‘shaping’ been (re-) established. The concept, which 
is essentially about the degree of congruence between national and EU level 
arrangements, has become (perhaps too closely) related to explanatory 
studies concerned with national implementation performance. Misfit is 
assumed to increase the chance that problems will occur in the 
implementation stages, as adaptation costs are higher. However, Treib 
(2003) has convincingly argued that governments may also use what 
happens at the EU level as a political leverage to change existing legislation 
at home. Misfit may hence work as an incentive to be more active in the 
shaping stages. Thus, ‘goodness of fit’ is directly related to anticipation 
capacity. If existing national legislation is similar to new EU legislation, 
there is not much to shape. The prospect of misfit, in contrast, may inspire 
governments for timely contacts with, for example, the relevant units at the 
European Commission charged with elaborating the proposal. However, 
governments need not be passive when there is a relatively high degree of 
fit, as proposals are often subject to change during the negotiation and 
decision-making.  
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Then, at the macro level, governments’ structure and practices may not 
correspond to the way things are being done at the EU level or in partner 
member states. This ‘constitutional’ misfit increases the chance of 
conflicting ambitions, organisation or policy styles between a member state 
and common policy-making.  
 
A next group of relevant variables is concerned with the strategic capacity 
of a government at the domestic level. A strategy can be defined as a 
systematic action plan aimed at achieving a coherent set of goals and 
objectives for the middle-long and long term. A national EU strategy ideally 
includes an idea on the development of the European integration and the 
country’s position and role within this process. This grand design may 
subsequently be translated into short-term priorities between competing 
interests and preferences for individual dossiers.  
 
Strategic capacity may be considered the ‘macro-level’ variant of co-
ordination capacity. Where the latter served to organise the national system 
of EU policy-making, in a way that negotiating positions mirror preferences 
formulated by different groups, the former serves to ensure that preferences 
are consistent with ambitions and long-term vision. Strategic capacity can be 
sub-divided into a number of elements. The ability to set priorities and 
recognise possible pitfalls is one condition. Moreover, it includes the ability 
to link ‘macro’, ‘meso’ and ‘micro’ level developments, in order to have a 
coherent EU policy, in other words, a strategy goes beyond particular 
dossiers and policy areas.  
 
As described in the previous chapter, through the ongoing process of 
Europeanisation (to the effect that domestic policy, politics and the polity are 
increasingly subject to common policy-making) EU-awareness and 
engagement of domestic actors have increased. Another effect is more 
competition over EU policy-making at the national level, because there are 
more interested stakeholders to fight for a say in the national position. Third, 
Europeanisation has led to organisational adaptation in national 
administrative systems, aimed at increasing efficiency of the processes in 
which national EU policies are shaped (Knill 2002). Either way, 
governments need to invest in timely and efficient procedures for the 
formulation and consistent representation of coherent negotiating positions 
at different levels in the national capital and in Brussels.  
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It is to be analysed which direction of change induced by Europeanisation 
processes (increased competition; more awareness or more efficient 
arrangements) will dominate the outcomes for national shaping capacity. 
Any way, a government must be motivated and ambitious and ready to 
invest valuable resources to be active at the EU level. No member state 
government can be present and active on all fields touched by European 
integration. A government must thus be able to select the objectives of EU-
related actions and the preferred outcomes as well as to assess the degree of 
realism and the pitfalls and opportunities to reach desired outcomes. Ideally, 
a government is able to select and prioritise between all possible actions. At 
least, selection implies a critical assessment and prioritisation of the other 
actors: possible partners and counterparts as well as adversaries. This 
presumes a combination of the aforementioned resources: knowledge of the 
agenda and the important moments in the policy cycle; a network of actors at 
the national and international level that can be mobilised for shaping 
attempts; co-ordination capacity to get the preferences into the system at the 
right time and the capacity to link expected or upcoming issues to national 
ambitions.  
 
Strategic capacity is often linked to coordination capacity. The assumption 
is that timely and centrally organised action, for example directed at the 
European Commission drafting new policy proposals or at members of the 
European Parliament preparing amendments for the legislative process, may 
increase the chance that national positions are heard and taken into account 
in the shaping process. If so, fragmented governments are clearly at a 
disadvantage. It should be noted, however, that the impact of the variable 
‘fragmentation’ on national shaping capacity is less clear-cut than accounts 
of EU coordination lead us to believe. If one departs from the assumption 
that national government representatives should voice a unitary position 
coherent and consistently in Brussels in order to successfully shape polices, 
fragmentation obviously complicates this process. But according to two-
level game theories, by reference to an intricate domestic playing field with a 
relatively high number of veto points, negotiators can attempt to tie the 
hands of their counterparts in Brussels. They may use techniques of 
‘scapegoating’ or remain fixed to a particular negotiating position as if 
‘forced’ by powerful domestic opposition. Second, too much centralisation 
risks endangering the legitimacy of policies decided at the EU level, which 
may cause problems with the implementation of European legislation at a 
later stage. Third, a fragmented system with a low co-ordination capacity 
Chapter 4   Designing a Framework for Analysis 
 
 
 
 
91 
may lead to different negotiation positions. But if a government succeeds in 
mobilising different groups for a common cause, shaping capacity may 
actually be increased. This argument is presented by Derlien (2000, 73) who 
argues in a description of Germany’s EU policy (‘failing successfully’) that 
‘hundred of arrows may be more effective than one shot with Big Bertha’. 
This assumes, however, that all arrows are fired in one direction!  
 
For designing and executing an EU-directed national strategy as described in 
the previous section, the quantity and quality of resources are vital. The 
knowledge, skills and competencies that national representatives hold about 
the contents and procedures of EU policy-making are considered to be 
valuable both for setting and organising EU policy at the national level; for 
securing a timely and procedurally correct link to Brussels and for 
instructing EU level negotiators or negotiate ‘smartly’ in the policy-shaping 
process. One particular category of resources is bargaining tactics and 
strategies.  
 There is a direct link between resources and all previously mentioned 
variables. To increase their anticipation capacity, governments could invest 
in network building at the level of the European Commission, the Parliament 
as wells the Council Secretariat. At the very least, this involves getting 
informed of policy initiatives, key positions, players and people. Using this 
information implies working differently than is demanded by the re-active 
nature of the decision making process, according to which member states 
wait for policy proposals to be developed from the side of the Commission.  
 Even more active is the quality of an EU staffing policy in order to be 
nationally represented with quality staff across the policy chain. This implies 
a focus on the European Commission and the Parliament, but also the 
Council secretariat and the expert committees advising the Commission. 
Although staff of the supranational institutions is supposed to be serving 
‘European’ interests and function without a national mandate, the reality is 
much more complex. Analysis has highlighted the dependence of the 
European Commission, but also the Parliament on individuals or groups of 
experts because of a shortage of in-house staff and expertise. Information is 
actively sought not only from consultants, academics and professional 
experts, but also from representatives from national government 
bureaucracies. These consultations of ‘knowledge-based’ epistemic 
communities’ (Sebenius 1992 as quoted in Richardson: 15) serve not only to 
design and optimally fine-tune technical and legal details, but also to 
investigate the legitimacy of new ideas and initiatives. In practice, European 
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Commissioners, Members of the European Parliament, and staff of the 
institutions, including the Council Secretariat, are willing to lend an ear to 
information, expertise and well-built arguments. For practical or ideological 
reasons, EU officials will not completely divest themselves of their national 
loyalties and information originating in the national capital may be 
particularly well received. Governments may thus invest actively in tapping 
the resources available. This does not simply mean sending people to 
Brussels – as the number of representatives is limited, it is important to 
invest in the quality of personnel considering leaving for Brussels or 
Strasbourg. 
 
The relative salience or relevance of the issue impacts positively on shaping 
capacity. In a way, this variable is the link between ‘will’ and ‘potential’. 
Strong motivation of a member state to influence EU level proceedings may 
remedy low capabilities or resources. If a member state assigns a low 
priority to EU affairs, the management of EU affairs can be very efficient, 
but shaping capacity will not benefit. Within national systems of EU policy-
making, issues that do not attract much attention are generally dealt with at 
the administrative level, where specialist officials are responsible for tracing 
the issue throughout the policy chain (Van den Bos 1991). As soon as a 
proposal gets ‘politicised’, governments are more willing to make resources 
available. Moreover, higher issue salience makes it more probable that 
priorities are set and a long-term vision is developed, which may benefit the 
strategic capacity of a government.  
 
Although the previous selection of relevant variables is needed to structure 
the following analysis, a number of caveats should be voiced. First, it is 
important to stress that an identification of the ‘building blocks’ of shaping 
capacity does not pre-determine the outcomes. Consistent with neo-
institutional reasoning, this book sketches a picture of EU policy-making in 
which actors which different, sometimes competing interact in an 
environment filled with ‘institutions’: formal and informal rules, norms and 
practices which affect outcomes both at the domestic and the EU level and in 
their interaction. The outcomes of EU level negations are dependent on a 
wealth of different factors including the total interest configuration; relations 
with other actors; political circumstances, global pressures, coalition 
formation, of which national shaping capacity is only one particular element. 
But, although the institutional context of the negotiations and the conditions 
and circumstances will be similar to a large extent for all interested parties, it 
Chapter 4   Designing a Framework for Analysis 
 
 
 
 
93 
has been described in this chapter how member state governments may deal 
with these institutions in different ways, dependent on a complex mix of 
ambitions and capabilities, preferences and resources described in previous 
sections. How this mix works in practice can only be discerned through 
detailed case-study analysis.  
 
A second challenge is that the variables discussed are difficult to 
‘operationalise’: to be translated into ‘measurable’ units for the sake of the 
analysis. However, it is important to underline that the framework does not 
present fully-fledged hypotheses as to, for example, whether size dilutes co-
ordination problems or whether ambition may overcome constitutional 
misfit. This is a particularly interesting topic to follow-up, which requires 
much more time and space than available in an explorative dissertation. 
What has been presented is rather a checklist of relevant factors. A next step 
is to analyse to what extent these particular factors are recognisable in the 
realities of EU-policy-making. The next chapters form the empirical part of 
this book, which focuses on the case of the Netherlands. The shaping 
capacity of this particular member state is explored with the help of a single-
country review (chapter 5) and two case-studies (chapter 6). It is analysed 
which ambitions, objectives, capabilities and resources can be identified in 
Dutch EU policy. Moreover, two case studies concerning the negotiations 
over recent EU legislation and policy are examined in order to determine 
which variables and mechanisms have played a role in the shaping process 
by the Dutch government. 
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Chapter 5 
How the Netherlands Shapes 
EU-policies  
 
§1. Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the shaping capacity for EU-policy-making of one 
particular long-standing EU member state: the Netherlands. The analysis is 
based upon a review of the ongoing debate amongst academics and 
practitioners on the European ambitions of the Dutch government and its 
potential to influence European policy-making processes. By applying the 
conceptual framework for governments’ shaping capacity, long-standing and 
less stable shaping ambitions of the Dutch government (§2 and 3) as well as 
its potential to realize these objectives (§4) will be discussed.1  
 
The discussion, in the 1990s, on Dutch EU policy and its organisation 
comprises two remarkable ‘stereotypes’ (Van Keulen 2004). First, analysts 
have pointed at the supposed ‘watershed’ between the traditional core values 
of Dutch foreign and more specifically EU-policy, and the recent trends 
towards more reluctance and ambiguity in the Dutch stance towards EU 
developments. The alleged result would be a growing uncertainty and unease 
about the Dutch position in the enlarged EU, which would explain why the 
central government lacks a broad strategy regarding the country’s integration 
ambitions. Discussions on the EU and on national positions for EU level 
negotiations are claimed to be focused on incidents and ‘hot potatoes’, such 
 
                                                 
1) Consistent with the empirical part of this study, the analysis is limited to the 
period up to the end of the 1990s. For a short review of more recent changes in 
Dutch EU policy objectives and positioning, see chapter 9.  
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as the costs and risks associated with European integration (see Court of 
Auditors 2004, Pijpers 2003, Rood 2004).  
 
The second stereotype concerns the supposedly weak potential of the Dutch 
government to actively shape EU policies. This would be due to a number of 
structural conditions and characteristics, such as the relatively high degree of 
fragmentation of the national political system and administration and the 
strive for consensus that has characterised the renowned Dutch ‘polder 
model’. This would negatively impact upon the co-ordination and 
anticipation capacity of the government, so that some observers even speak 
of the ‘poorly organised preparation’ of Dutch negotiation positions 
(Andeweg and Irwin 2001, 170).  
 These two stereotypes merit more systematic analysis, to examine 
whether and to what extent the Dutch government is ‘well placed’ or, in 
contrast, ‘ill suited’ to influence Brussels. 
 
 
§2. Stable core values in the Netherlands’ EU policy  
 
§2.1 Three constants in post-war foreign policy 
From 1945 up to the early 1990s, the integration ambitions of the Dutch 
government have been characterised by a long-term continuity and 
consensus (Harryvan 2001, 17). Three constants have been distinguished: a 
strong transatlantic orientation in terms of foreign and security policy; a push 
for ‘instrumental supranationalism’ as regards to the modes of EU policy-
making; and a traditional preference for economic integration over political 
cooperation initiatives (see Brinkhorst 1978, Harryvan and Van der Harst 
1994).  
 
The preference for transatlantic relations in post-war Dutch foreign policy 
was manifest in an emphasis on the role of NATO. This security 
organisation was traditionally considered as a primary vehicle for 
international co-operation (Van Staden 1974), which explains why the Dutch 
government was rather hesitant towards the first initiatives for a common 
European foreign and security policy. One key motivation was fear for 
dominance of political cooperation by the larger member states (Tonra 
2001). An example is Dutch Prime Minister Luns’ outspoken and hostile 
‘no’ to the Fouchet plan for an EUropean political Union in 1961-2, to 
which all other member states agreed (see Griffiths 1980, 280, Silj 1980). 
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But remnants are also visible in the contents of the draft treaty for European 
Union, which the Dutch Presidency proposed for the Intergovernmental 
Conference to be concluded in Maastricht in 1991 and which allowed a 
common security policy only as complementary to NATO.  
 
Dutch EU-politics, it is argued, have been consistently pragmatically driven, 
instead of embedded in an ideology or pushed by a strive for power. This 
‘balancing act’ is also visible in the strive for economic cooperation rather 
than political integration. The Dutch focus on trade rather than on power 
politics has been defined as ‘… a reluctance to accept changes in the status 
quo, or downright conservatism’ (Andeweg and Irwin 1993, 213). 
Participation in European integration initiatives was primarily considered 
instrumental to secure national economic benefits, not in the least securing 
access to European export markets. A hilarious quote in this respect is that of 
Robert S. Wood (1978, 285): ‘A well-known expression inside the European 
Communities is: “the Dutch speak of supranationalism but what they really 
mean is cheese”.’ And still, the economic dependence of the EU member 
states is huge,2 while active membership of the EU gives the Netherlands 
easy access to other trade blocs and organisations.  
 
This push for supranationalism has often been mistaken for a ‘federalist 
ideology’. See for instance the quote by Hans Daalder (1991, 8): ‘Dutch 
politicians were traditionally amongst the most active proponents of 
“federalism”.’ In an article about the 1981 national Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers, Jansen (1985, 209) describes the then-prevailing view 
of the majority of government officials as follows: ‘the European 
Community is devised as a supranational organisation – therefore we must 
support all initiatives to strengthen its supranational character and resist all 
attempts to upgrade intergovernmental aspects’. And Wolters (1992, 20, own 
translation) claims that ‘the Dutch government traditionally takes the view 
that European integration in the future should become a federation of its 
member states’.  
 The preference of successive Dutch governments for the Community 
method of common policy-making should, however, rather be understood as 
instrumental for enhancing the position of the Netherlands vis-à-vis the 
larger states, most notably Germany and France. Fear for a ‘directorate’ of 
 
                                                 
2) Centraal Planbureau, Macro Economische Verkenning 2006, hoofdstuk 6. 
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the large member states was indeed a key reason for the successful plea, of 
the Dutch government for the insertion of an ‘intergovernmental’ Council of 
Ministers to provide a check on the independence of the European 
Commission (then: High Authority) within the emerging Community 
decision-making structure.3 For this reason, the Dutch stance towards the 
design of European co-operation has been adequately described as 
‘pragmatic’ or ‘instrumental supranationalism’ (Harryvan et al. 1996, 109). 
In past and present, Dutch coalition cabinets have never been very 
enthusiastic for the idea of ‘ever closer union’ and have carefully refrained 
from proclaiming any, let alone any federal visions of a future united 
Europe.4 It has been argued that this pragmatic attitude of the Dutch 
government regarding initiatives for further co-operation has been enforced 
by successive treaty changes and EU enlargement in the 1990s.5  
 
§2.2 The conditions: a strive for consensus and unity 
These three relatively stable ambitions should be understood in the context 
of two particular country-characteristics: the long-standing ‘permissive 
consensus’ over European integration and the strong degree of 
constitutional, political and administrative fragmentation of the Netherlands. 
 
The first background variable is the large degree of ‘permissive consensus’ 
that characterises EU policy-making (Hix 1999). Public opinion was 
consistently of the highest pro-EU in the Union, which has led Van Herpen 
(1981, 79) to claim that the average Dutch citizen could be considered a 
‘homo supranationalis’. At the same time, foreign policy-making was 
reserved to an exclusive elite of politicians, senior civil servants, diplomats 
and academia (Baehr 1978). With the development towards an European 
 
                                                 
3) See Van der Stoel 1975, 8: ‘The thought of a “inner circle” or, even, a 
directorate of the larger member states should be dismissed’ (Lecture on 20 
November 1975, Royal Institute of International Relations, Brussels). 
4) See Spinelli (1966, 112) on the position of the Dutch within the EC: ‘In the 
abstract they are generally favourable to solutions which imply real transfers of 
authority to united European organizations. But in the concrete they always 
demand long and minute preliminary intergovernmental negotiations, which 
invariably help to strengthen that very Europe of the nations which, as a matter 
of principle, they say they abhor’.  
5) See chapter 9 for related developments towards more Euro-pragmatism in the 
2000s.  
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single market, membership of this elite club was gradually extended to 
representatives of the private sector; sub-national levels of government and 
other groups of organised interests. However, until the mid-1990s, public 
debates on the merits and pitfalls of EU membership did not occur. This 
should be understood in the more general perspective of the particular 
politico-administrative and cultural traditions of the Netherlands as a 
‘consensual democracy’ (Lijphart 1998). As a result of a tradition of political 
pacification through de-politicisation of controversial issues in a system of 
dependent minorities, different groups in Dutch society for long were rather 
passive in expressing their political choices. Although after the 
‘depillarisation’ of society in the late sixties, the political system has become 
less stable, Dutch society has for long been regarded as extremely 
permissive (Thomassen and Van Deth 1999). This rather passive stance of 
politicians and the general public as regards to European integration has 
been compared to that related to the weather: ‘sometimes it is fine and 
sometimes it is inclement, but little can be done to change it’ (Andeweg and 
Irwin 2002, 171). Publicly questioning the benefits and merits of the 
European integration country was considered ‘not done’ – a tacit convention 
for the first time publicly breached in the mid-1990s by liberal party leader 
Frits Bolkestein. 
 
Second, the Dutch government policy towards European integration and the 
EU should be regarded in light of the particular constitutional structure of 
the Netherlands. The country is organised as a ‘decentralised unitary state’ 
of twelve provinces and around 470 municipalities. The once sovereign 
provinces, which dominated the Republic of the Netherlands, have 
developed into what has been called ‘the most impotent layer of 
government’ (ibid. 160). Provinces are much too small to be treated on equal 
footing with the German Lander or Spanish Communidades. However, in 
particular in the field of implementation of environmental and regional 
policy, Dutch provinces and municipalities have exclusive competencies. 
For that reason, their interest organisations are formally engaged in EU-
policy-making at the central government level, both in the preparatory and 
implementation phases. At the EU level, Dutch provinces and municipalities 
operate through their respective lobby organisations. The provinces and the 
urban region of the Randstad operate in geographical entities, having their 
own lobby office in Brussels and there are also bilateral ties in the 
Euregions.  
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The Netherlands is traditionally governed by coalition cabinets, in which 
government policy is a collective ministerial responsibility and all ministers 
have equal constitutional status. This necessitates much co-ordination, both 
between departments and their interests and between governing parties and 
their ideologies (Soetendorp and Andeweg 2001, 219). And also 
administratively, the Dutch system is known for a strong degree of 
departmental autonomy and strong policy networks. The government 
departments have developed strong policy-making structures and this 
departmental segmentation is mirrored in the policy-making processes both 
regarding domestic and foreign, including EU-policy-making. The tacit rule 
of non-intervention makes that individual governments have much leeway to 
pursue their own policy goals. Only at the level of Cabinet, conflicts of 
interest may come out in the open. The position of the Prime Minister is one 
of primus inter pares (first amongst equals) and also this position lacks the 
formal competencies to arbitrate and set binding decisions.  
 
 
§3. The growing doubts of a founding father 
 
In the course of the 1990s, Dutch EU policy has become less attached to its 
original core values. The consequences of the 1992 ‘Maastricht’ treaty on 
European Union constituted a ‘rude awakening to the realities of the Europe 
of the 1990s’ (Hoetjes 2002, 217). Slowly but gradually, Dutch policy 
towards the EU has shown a more variable course, influenced, amongst 
others, by the personal perspectives held by politicians most involved. This 
development has been described as the new ‘pragmatism’ of successive 
Dutch governments towards the EU (Langendoen and Pijpers 2002) or ‘the 
growing doubts of a loyal member’ (Soetendorp 1998). Three causes for 
change may be identified: the growing concerns on the costs of membership; 
the effects of Europeanisation and the consequences of EU enlargement (Sie 
Dhian Ho and Van Keulen 2004).  
 
One key element in Dutch EU policy in the 1990s that is hard to neglect is 
the dominance, in political discourse, of the issue of the presumed ‘costs’ of 
EU membership and the financial contribution of the Dutch government to 
the EU’s budget. Up to the 1990s, the Netherlands received more from the 
EU funds than its national contribution (Griffiths 1980, 294-5). The rapid 
deterioration in the early 1990s of the national ‘net position’ (the sum of 
revenues and expenditure to the common budget) resulted from an increase 
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of the national contribution to the EU’s agricultural policies and structural 
funds, and a parallel (but downward) trend in return payments from Brussels. 
This negative balance further deteriorated well into the 2000s, but the first 
effects of the debate were visible in the time period central to this study.  
 In the mid-1990s, the realisation of this budgetary disproportionality 
compared to more prosperous member states made the Dutch government 
very aware of possible budgetary consequences of imminent EU 
enlargement.6 Then-liberal leader (and later European Commissioner) Frits 
Bolkestein fuelled the debate during the two successive coalition 
governments Kok-I and II (1994-2002). Bolkestein claimed that the 
Netherlands has ‘[…] played the accommodating, self-effacing, mealy-
mouthed goody-goody for too long and to little effect’.7  
 
The gradual shift, in the course of the 1990s, of EU integration initiatives 
from the field of market liberalisation towards those policy fields formerly 
under national control, most notably those of justice and home affairs and 
foreign policy co-ordination, has been a related cause for growing ‘EU-
awareness’ of the Dutch government. In particular as regards to foreign 
policy, initiatives at the EU level for policy co-ordination forced the 
government to reconsider its traditional preference for transatlantic co-
operation. A major 1995 Foreign Policy Brief, (Herijkingsnota) stated that 
‘... a combination of factors points our country in the direction of a stronger 
continental commitment: the reunification of the two Europe’s, shifts in the 
power balance within the Union and the more distant American leadership. It 
is clear that the Netherlands can not turn its back on the continent.’ (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 1995, 8).  
 On the question how to realise this new European commitment, there 
was less agreement, however. In 1991, the government explicitly pursued a 
strategy for embedding the EU’s new Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) within the then-EC’s legal order. This ambition was reflected in the 
unitary structure of the new draft treaty, tabled by the 1991 Netherlands EU 
Council Presidency. This proposal was met with downright hostility and in 
 
                                                 
6) Quoting State Secretary for European Affairs Atzo Nicolaï, in an interview 
issued on the eve of the Dutch 2004 EU Council Presidency: ‘Dutch citizens 
still consider peace important (...), but they do not understand why they have to 
pay 500% more for it than the Danish fellow Europeans’ (Nicolaï 2004). 
7) Quoted in The Economist, 2 May 1998. 
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the course of the negotiations; the Presidency was forced to return to an 
alternative draft that had been proposed by the preceding Luxembourg 
Presidency. According to analyses, this event on ‘Black Monday’ in 
September 1991 has contributed to a more pragmatic stance of the 
Netherlands towards the European Union (Van Hulten 1996, Pijpers and 
Vanhoonacker 1997, Langendoen and Pijpers 2002). 
 
The increase of EU level involvement in sensitive policy area’s, which has 
taken a high course due to successive treaty changes and a very active 
European Commission policy in the field,8 has negatively impacted upon the 
degree of acceptation that common policies enjoy, both at the political level 
and in public opinion. Here, the effect of five successive enlargement rounds 
of the EU should not be underestimated. Within the inner circle of six 
founding member states, the Dutch played a ‘surprisingly large role’ 
(Griffiths 1980, 298). This has been attributed to a number of preponderant, 
but temporary factors, including the post-war economic and political 
weakness of the large member states; the need for a mediator between 
adversaries France and Germany and the dual position of the US over 
European unity, which offered the Dutch government a large degree of 
action capacity (Brinkhorst 1978). Gradual enlargement of the EU diluted 
the ‘special status’ of the Netherlands to that of the largest of the small 
member states. The enlargement from 6, to 12, to 15 and the prospect of an 
EU of more than 25 member states impacted upon the working methods in 
common policy-making, increasing the need for early involvement and 
coalition building. Enlargements are also related to changes in the relative 
weight of individual policy areas. The accession of relatively poor ‘Club 
Med’-member states (Greece, Portugal and Spain) in the 1980s impacted 
upon the regional and cohesion policies and contributed indirectly to the net 
payer position of the Netherlands towards the common EU budget. The 
accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden as relatively well-developmed and 
green member states gave a boost to EU environment policy and gave the 
Dutch government more possibilities for coalition formation in this 
particular policy field.  
 
 
                                                 
8) This holds especially for the area Justice and Home Affairs (De Zwaan and 
Bultena 2002). 
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A related cause for increased pragmatism is, perhaps rather paradoxically, 
the ongoing Europeanisation of Dutch central administration. In the course 
of the 1990s, all government ministries (in particular those of Agriculture, 
Environment, Transport and Economic Affairs) have become active in 
voicing their preferences, both domestically and at EU level meetings, on 
new policy initiatives from Brussels. Departmental EU units have been set 
up and continuously upgraded in terms of resources and staff. Individual 
government departments have come to invest in (inter-) ministerial training 
programmes offering advice on ‘how to lobby the EU’, they regularly send 
their personnel to Brussels for temporary postings and attempt to 
institutionalise international expert -networks, for instance by drafting 
special ‘Who’s who’-guides. There is a parallel increase of attention for EU 
affairs among the management and political leadership of government 
departments. Generally speaking, experience has shown that the position of 
expert officials from individual government departments frequently turns out 
to be less progressive and more reluctant when it comes to further policy 
integration, than those of the more ideologically driven rationale dominant at 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Combined with their relative autonomy and 
low coordination capacity of the system, this leads to more difficulty in 
pursuing a coherent and consistent national EU policy. 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is actually rather surprising that the domestic 
debate on the merits of an active Dutch EU-membership took so long to 
develop. It was in this relative silence that a small circle of government 
officials continiously formulated and represented the negotiating positions 
for EU level negotiations. This process is described in the following section. 
 
 
§4. The shaping potential of the Dutch government  
 
Referring to the framework for analysis on shaping capacity, this section 
discusses variables that impact upon the potential of the Dutch government 
to shape EU policy-making.  
 
The first factor that cannot go unnoticed in this respect is fragmentation. It 
has been claimed that: ‘nowhere (…) the fragmentation of Dutch policy-
making [becomes] more visible than in comparison with the unified political 
systems of other West European countries’ (Andeweg and Irwin 2002, 169). 
Dutch administrative and political structure and culture are characterised by 
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a strong tradition of departmental autonomy. The Prime Minister formally 
still depends on a Foreign Ministry mandate to discuss matters with his EU 
colleagues in European Council settings (Harmsen 2000). This makes it 
more difficult for the coordinating authority to decide upon conflicting 
preferences, than is the case in member states with a more centralised 
government organisation.  
 
How fragmentation of the government organisation impacts upon its co-
ordination capacity has been discussed, in more general terms, in the 
previous chapter. In the Netherlands, the organisation of the national co-
ordination system for dealing with EU affairs has not been fundamentally 
changed since its design in 1958 (see the annex). It is relatively 
decentralised, its structured are designed to focus on the Council phases of 
EU policy-making and the ‘co-ordination capacity’ of the system, i.e. the 
potential to set binding and authoritative decisions on the course and 
contents of EU policy has been the subject of discussion amongst academics 
and practitioners. As to shaping potential variables, this has two particular 
effects.  
 First, the fact that procedures are focused on the Council-level of 
negotiations makes that the anticipation capacity of the system is 
endangered. The risk is that proposals are only reviewed at the moment 
when much of its contents and format have already been decided during the 
agenda setting and drafting phases. Moreover, the legislative competencies 
of the European Parliament risks to be neglected so that the Dutch 
government may miss out a relatively new but important venue for access 
and influence in the law-making system.  
 Second, the focus on the Council makes that the opportunities to ‘get’ 
nationals into the supranational institutions have long been less co-ordinated 
than in other member states. This should be understood by the alleged ‘esprit 
communautaire’ of the Netherlands which made these influence attempts 
politically ‘not done’. This explains why a co-ordinated government strategy 
was lacking and for long, seconding officials to the EU institutions was left 
to individual government departments.  
 
Then, about size and resources. A conclusion in the previous chapter was 
that ‘size matters’ to a certain degree for shaping capacity. In comparison 
with other EU member states, the Dutch bureaucracy is relatively small and 
expert-oriented. New recruits tend to be specialists, rather than generalists 
and there is no uniform training system, such as the Fast Stream programme 
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for government officials in the United Kingdom, in which EU courses as 
well as a traineeship at the EU level institutions are included (Andeweg and 
Irwin 2002, 150). This may be remedied, on the one hand, by the expertise 
Dutch negotiators bring into EU level meetings, by the fact that the same 
representatives are often present throughout the policy chain (expert 
committees; Council working groups and comitology committees) and by 
the positive effects of the experience with EU policy-making both at the 
national and the EU level that has been built after fifty years of active 
membership.  
 
On the other hand, this experience may actually hamper EU awareness and 
adaptation, as EU membership and its consequenes is largely ‘taken for 
granted’ and consequently seldomly subject to political attention. This may 
be one explanation for the low involvement of the Dutch parliament (First 
and Second Chamber) as regards to EU policies and EU policy-making. The 
legislative is generally acknowledged to be amongst the latecomers in EU-
affairs in many member states (Wessels 2003), but the Second Chamber 
(‘Tweede Kamer’) was amongst the last to set up a parliamentary Europe 
Committee (in 1986). Formally, a summary of all new European 
Commission proposals is sent to parliament, in order to inform MP’s about 
the negotiating position to be taken by representatives of the executive. 
However, parliamentary involvement in the negotiations, let alone 
interventions, seldomly occur during the negotiations. This implies that the 
stage of implementation of binding rules and directives is often the first 
stage for the parliament to get involved in EU dossiers and that the 
discussions then emanating may cause costly implementation delays.9  
 There is one exception: the Second Chamber does possess limited 
mandatory powers confined to Justice and Home affairs. This necessitates 
the relevant government minister to inform parliament of the government 
position to be taken in the Council of Ministers meeting for Justice and 
Home Affairs (Andeweg and Irwin 2002, 174). However, compared to the 
way Danish parliament ‘controls’ all government actions in the Council, this 
mandatory power is not often used in practice. Explanations may be found in 
the time pressure inflicted by the EU’s rolling agenda; the workload of 
domestic dossiers (with a higher direct political salience) and lacking 
 
                                                 
9) See also the reconstruction of national debate in one of the case-studies in this 
study, the Biopatent Directive 98/44/EC, see chapter 8. 
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knowledge of the EU policy process and the binding character of EU laws.10 
Individual efforts by a handful of members specialised in European dossiers 
in the largest political factions notwithstanding, parliamentary discussion of 
EU affairs is rather ad hoc, focusing on political incidents (such as 
appointment) and, a particularly prominent issue: the Dutch contribution to 
the EU budget. The situation has been called a ‘vicious circle’: European 
affairs are not the subject of domestic political and public debates and just 
because the issue is politically uncontroversial, there is no incentive for 
individual politicians to ‘score’ with bringing up European dossiers in the 
domestic political debate (see Del Grosso 2000, Hoetjes 2001).  
 
Another relevant variable for national shaping capacity is the ability to form 
coalitions. The Netherlands has a number of ‘traditional allies’ (Meerts 
1995, 14, see also Pijpers 1997) that include the United States and Great 
Britain (as for transatlantic orientation and security policy), Germany (due to 
close economic ties and a shared preference for economical integration) and 
Belgium and Luxembourg as direct neighbours and partners in the Benelux. 
The latter organisation was founded in 1948 as a predecessor of wider forms 
of economic co-operation. Over the decades, it has served as a forum for 
regular consultations at ministerial or administrative level, for example 
before European Council meetings. It has been argued, however, that 
individual members of the Benelux coalition have not much in common in 
their foreign policy orientation, shared ideas on the ‘finalité’ of integration 
and national policy styles, which makes the future of this sub-group 
debatable (Brower 2003). 
 
The widening and deepening of the EU playing field requires more in terms 
of flexible coalitions, as new ‘coalitions patterns are fluid, rather than stable’ 
(Elgström 2001, 86). This was one driving factor for the initiative of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1998, to attach more value to bilateral 
relations with the EU’s capitals. Based on an intricate set of criteria 
including geographical closeness; position in international organizations; 
affinity towards Dutch point of view; historical relations and particular 
policy issues with a relative importance for sectoral government ministries 
 
                                                 
10) In the run-up to the ‘big’ enlargement of the EU, only a few MP’s were able to 
correctly indicate more than five of the EU’s new member states (De 
Volkskrant, 12 December 2002). 
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(Pijpers 1999, 204), a list of ‘preferential partners’ was drafted: Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Spain and the United Kingdom. It is 
not clear, however, whether these partners have indeed proven to be 
preferential in Dutch EU policy since then. What is clear is that considering 
the large number of possible coalition partners and issue areas, the ability of 
the Dutch government to build coalitions requires much in terms of 
knowledge on positions and procedures. As the next section will show, a 
number of procedural innovations have served to improve the capacity of the 
system to respond to these needs. 
 
 
§5. Relevant developments in the 1990s 
 
In the course of the 1990s, discussions about the ways to ‘organise Europe’ 
developed in many long-standing member states (Kassim 2000). Also in the 
Netherlands, many initatives and reform suggestions have been proposed 
and partly implemented, with the aim to increase national expertise and 
knowledge about EU developments and to strengthen inter-ministerial 
procedures. Two such initiatives are highlighted in this section: first, the 
efforts to centralise the management of EU affairs, both at home and in 
relation with Brussels, second, a co-ordinated policy to strengthen relations 
with other Brussels actors: the European Commission; the European 
Parliament and bilaterally with other member states. 
 
In response to the criticism earlier mentioned, from the mid-1990s onwards, 
it has become a customary practice that coordination procedures are 
tightened as soon as large politically salient or cross-sectoral negotiation 
rounds appear on the EU agenda. A first example were the preparations of 
decision-making on the multi-annual financial package Agenda 2000, which 
was set at the Berlin European Council in 1997. In this particular case study 
of negotiations, the co-ordinating authority was strengthened and the 
political level was explicitly committed to the dossier at stake (Van Keulen 
2000). With the benefit of hindsight, Agenda 2000 has been claimed to be an 
example of a particularly coherent and consistent Dutch negotiation strategy 
(IOB 2002). According to academics, however, the strategy aimed at 
securing financial benefit from the EU’s common budget has turned out 
considerably less valuable, when placed in the longer term considerations of 
coalition-formation and networking (Van Schendelen 2002).  
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In the run-up to the 1997 Dutch EU Council Presidency, inter-ministerial co-
ordination procedures were centralised and strengthened, in order to manage 
the risk of turf battles between government departments over priorities, 
negotiating tactics and strategy. For this particular Presidency, the 
Agricultural Ministry introduced special inter-ministerial ‘dossier-teams’, 
which were charged with the monitoring of particular files. Working with 
these teams aims to enable, more than with the routine co-ordination 
structure, a focused and co-ordinated approach to EU level negotiations. 
Their mere introduction implied a strategic prioritising between particular 
topics as it had to be decided for which dossiers teams would be set up. 
Although these measures, aimed at improving inter-ministerial dealing with 
EU affairs during intensive negotiating periods, were explicitly intended to 
be temporary, they have proved worthy to be continued in successive ‘grand’ 
dossiers such as accession negotiations and the 2004 Council Presidency.11  
 
The preparations for EU policy-shaping in The Hague were for long 
predominantly focused on the Council-level of decision making. Attempts to 
influencing what happens within the supranational institutions (European 
Commission, let alone Parliament) were traditionally considered ‘not done’. 
When, in the post-Maastricht years, government departments became rapidly 
more Europeanised, this ‘honest’ way of dealing with the original 
community method of decision making was considered outdated. As to the 
European Commission bureaucracy, the Netherlands has long lagged behind 
in filling its share in postings that it could claim on the basis of (informal and 
disputed) overviews national representation. Already in 1991, it was argued 
that key reasons are the lack of practice with entry examinations in the 
Netherlands and the mismatch of national administrative culture with that 
prevalent in Brussels (Daalder 1991, 13-14). Relatively late compared to 
other member states, i.e. only in 2000, driven by worries about under-
representation in Brussels and decreasing Dutch influence after EU-
enlargement, the Cabinet has initiated a special training programme for the 
EU entry exams, aimed at getting more Dutch officials into the EU 
institutions. 
 
 
                                                 
11) The debate on strengthening co-ordination capacity at the level of central 
government has further developed after the period under examination in this 
study – see chapter 9 for a review. 
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With the engagement of government departments in the management of EU 
affairs, departmental EU units have been upgraded, ministries have invested 
in EU training programmes, they regularly send their personnel to Brussels 
for temporary postings and there are attempt to institutionalise expert EU-
networks – for example by drafting special ‘who-is-who’ guides. Since the 
early 1990s, individual government departments have actively worked on 
strengthening relations with the European Commission. This has been done 
by facilitating secondments and traineeships of national officials within EU 
institutions and increasing awareness of civil servants, through training 
courses, about the useful work being done by their ‘European’ colleagues. 
The regular Council Presidency, which the Netherlands held in 1991 and 
1997, has played a crucial role in this respect. But recent initiatives for 
strengthening the network in Brussels have not exclusively focused on the 
European Commission. Since the mid-1990s, in parallel with the increase in 
competencies for co-legislating new EU policies in collaboration with the 
Council, the European Parliament has also been at the centre of influence 
attempts. One example is the Ministry of Transport, which is responsible for 
many co-decision dossiers and therefore makes use of a semi-permanent 
posting of one official in the Parliament’s staff (Boerboom 2002). At the 
Permanent Representation, which traditionally focused on co-ordinating 
Council activities, two staff members are now charged with managing 
relations with the European Parliament. And the national parliament has also 
considered its processes and procedures related to EU policy-making which 
has led to reform proposals aimed, amongst others, to realise early 
parliamentary engagement in discussions about new European Commission 
proposals (Van Baalen 2002). In 2001, the First Chamber (‘Eerste Kamer’) 
set up an European Bureau, which co-ordinates (input for) European 
legislation for the parliamentary members, an innovation that is planned to 
be followed by the Second Chamber. 
 
Relatedly, mention should be made of the Foreign Affairs Ministry initiative 
to strengthen bilateral relations with the capitals of the member states. 
Although this initiative has been discussed as contrary to earlier emphasis on 
the community method of Brussels decision-making, it has led to a 
strengthening of bilateral relations and more structured contacts, not only at 
a diplomatic level but also between government ministries and their EU 
counterparts. It should be noted however, that consistent with Dutch 
politico-administrative traditions, these innovations, such as structured 
relations with the European Commission and the European Parliament; EU 
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training programmes and bilateral initiatives – have been dispersed over 
different parts of the central government organisation, instead of co-
ordinated by one undisputed authority.  
 
 
§6. Discussion 
 
A government’s shaping capacity is considered a complex interplay between 
stable, long-term factors determining ambition and capabilities and 
situational variables related to preferences and resources, as summarised in 
table 5.1. What, then, is the starting position of the Dutch government when 
it comes to shaping EU policies? 
 
In the previous chapter, a number of variables have been identified to ‘matter 
more’ in an examination of national shaping capacity. To begin with, the 
‘goodness of fit’ between the EU and the national level has been discussed. 
This degree of congruence would be relevant both at the macro-level, that of 
constitutional structure; practices and policy style, but also as regards to 
preferences and resources concerning particular dossiers. At first sight, the 
length of membership of the Netherlands decreases possible problems with 
constitutional misfit. Its relatively long experience with EU participation 
may overcome initial problems with new policies, as one would assume that 
Dutch negotiators have learnt their way around in the EU level venues. From 
the findings, we may argue that in terms of potential, notwithstanding long 
experience, this is still administrative mismatch. For example, in the field of 
water policy, a competency of the Transport Ministry, which at the EU level 
deals with the Commission’s DG Environment. The fact that the Netherlands 
is a long-standing member may rather paradoxically actually hamper EU 
awareness and adaptation as the EU is taken for granted and no subject of 
special attention at the political and administrative level, such as is the case 
in newer member states. In terms of ‘policy fit’, the Dutch government has 
always been very active in terms of ‘first pillar’ economic and related 
policies. This ‘fore-runner’ position may at first sight increase shaping 
capacity. However, getting to a coherent and consistent negotiating position 
is increasingly difficult due to the active involvement of different 
government departments and sectoral interests. This holds the same for the 
newer fields of European co-operation, those related to internal and external 
security policy and foreign policy. Here, the relative salience of issues is 
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often considered higher as these issues are closer to what is considered the 
‘core’ of national sovereignty.  
 
Table 5.1 A Framework for analysis of the Dutch government’s shaping capacity 
Shaping 
capacity 
Will  Potential  
Stable 
variables 
AMBITIONS 
 
Founding member; traditional Trans-
Atlantic orientation; well-developed, 
open economy; fore-runner as 
regards to liberalisation; 
‘instrumental’ supranationalism;  
Tacit public and political support for 
integration; relative ‘fit’ of national 
and EU policy ambitions in the first 
pillar 
CAPABILITIES  
 
High political and administrative 
fragmentation; co-ordination capacity 
contested; consensual policy style misfits 
with French administrative style EU; long-
time experienced in international 
relations; small, expert oriented 
administration; medium-size political 
clout; fixed coalitions: focus on Benelux / 
liberal members alliance  
Situational 
variables 
PREFERENCES  
 
Emerging debate on financial 
implications membership; more 
fragmented preference configuration 
due to more stakeholders; growing 
concerns over the merits of political 
integration causes misfit of 
positions; experiences with EU 
Presidency in 1991, 1997, 2004 
 
RESOURCES 
 
Ongoing discussion on strategic and co-
ordination capacity; decentralised linkage 
mechanisms capital-BRX; flexibility of 
negotiating position debated; political and 
administrative awareness and expertise 
EU affairs gradually increases; emerging 
staffing policy towards EU institutions; 
ability to anticipate and act pro-actively 
questioned; use of bargaining tactics 
debated 
 
This issue salience matters as regards to the ways in which an EU-related 
dossier is managed in the interplay between The Hague and Brussels (Van 
den Bos 1991). Routinised dossiers related to the internal market are 
generally dealt with at the administrative level, to be finally hammered off at 
the ministerial Council level. Politicised dossiers, including those related to 
the second and third pillars of the EU, generally attract more attention. For 
example, following a mandatory procedure, the parliament is more involved 
in setting negotiating instructions for justice and home affairs.  
 
If the issue salience of a dossier is considered to increase, more ‘co-
ordination capacity’ is made available. But co-ordination is always difficult 
in the Dutch setting, as the fragmentation of the system is relatively high, 
which is visible not only through the departmental autonomy within the 
administration, but also within the Cabinet diverging views may be voiced. 
Thus, also with more regular policy dossiers, continuous efforts are 
necessary to ensure that departments are not ‘going alone’ in determining 
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negotiating strategies and all relevant parties, including the political level, 
are being sufficiently informed and committed. For this reason, the 
provinces and municipalities participate in initial discussions on new 
European Commission proposals and the division over different government 
department. If all goes well, many relevant stakeholders are prepared for 
new EU policies since they have been involved in the ‘uploading’ of 
preferences and the subsequent ‘down-loading’ process (transposition, 
implementation and enforcement) of binding decisions may be considerably 
facilitated. Consistent with academic contributions to the debate on 
Europeanisation, also in practitioners accounts of Dutch EU policy-making, 
the implementation gap as regards to EU directives to be transposed into 
national law, which became prominent in the 1990s, was directly associated 
with lacking potential for timely and correct transposition of EU directives 
and less efficient co-ordination in preparatory stages of EU negotiations 
(Van Haersolte and Van Den Oosterkamp 2003). 
 
However, in case these stakeholders are not satisfied with the negotiating 
position decided upon in intricate consultation procedures at central 
government level, they may turn to EU level venues in order to make their 
voice heard and thereby undermine the efforts to present a ‘national 
position’. The previous chapters have described the opportunity-structure, 
which offers multiple venues for access and influence in this respect. An 
example of such a ‘bypass’ were discussions over the reform of the EU’s 
structural and regional funds, money flows which the central government 
wished to cut back due to concerns over the national ‘net payer’ position, but 
which the decentralised levels of government had an interest to retain.  
 These and related experiences invariably initiate discussions to 
strengthen national EU procedures for dealing with EU policy preparations 
in The Hague.  
 
Until the mid-1990s, the Dutch government was hardly ever confronted with 
parliamentary or public debate on EU rules, legislation or treaty change. This 
is not common to all small and longer-standing member states – for example, 
Danish Council delegations often have to express ‘parliamentary 
reservations’ due to delays in the mandatory procedure in the national 
parliament. This characteristic of the Dutch system may at first sight 
positively impact upon the shaping capacity of the national government, as 
no delays occur during the negotiations. But the fact that EU policy is 
generally not considered controversial – in fact, it is generally not considered 
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at all by national parliament – threatens its democratic legitimacy and makes 
for incomplete control upon its effects upon national structures and 
legislation. Although procedures ensure that national parliament can make 
use of an ‘early-warning’ system, because it is informed of every new 
European Commission proposal, the policy-specialists within the legislative 
are not sufficiently aware of the EU-dimension to their domain which is 
dealt with by foreign policy specialists. As the parliament is responsible for 
agreeing upon the transposition of binding EU decisions at a later stage, this 
may account for implementation problems.  
 
The strategic, co-ordination and anticipation capacity of the system by 
which the Dutch government deals with the demands of membership has 
been the subject of much discussion, including criticism from influential 
advisory councils (Social Economic Council 2003, 4, the Council of State 
2003, 20-3, 2005 and the Council for Public administration ROB 2004). It is 
remarkable that while criticism comes from national EU watchers, foreign 
observes tend to judge rather positively about the capacity of the Dutch 
system (see Beyers 2000, 60). By lack of clear standards, it remains difficult 
to weigh the clear disadvantages of a fragmented system, including the 
potential lack of coherency and consistency of national positions and thereby 
the difficulties of realising a long-term strategic capacity, against the 
potential advantage of increased legitimacy of EU decisions making ‘at 
home’ and the level of expertise that a decentralised system guarantees. For 
example, a positive side-effect of a less tightly run co-ordination system is 
that expert and working groups are followed by specialist officials from the 
responsible government ministries, instead of by less well-informed co-
ordinating authorities. This is important as comparative research has shown 
that participants in committee meetings value expertise more than nationality 
(Egeberg et al. 2004, see also chapter 2). In fact, expertise is generally also 
valued by the European Commission and the Parliament – although it must 
be acknowledged that due to the traditional focus on the Council, these ways 
for access and influence were, in the period under discussion, not 
consistently sought by Dutch government departments.  
 
Given the context of Dutch EU-policy-making sketched in this chapter, two 
case-studies will be examined in order to analyse to what extent the 
framework for analysis and the variables highlighted in the previous sectoins 
do ‘match’ with the empirical realities. Chapter 6 introduce the research 
design, the Gas and Biopatent directive are reconstructed in chapters 7 and 8. 
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Chapter 6 
Research Design for the Case-Studies 
 
§1. Introduction 
 
For the collection, analysis and interpretation of data for the case-studies in 
the next chapters, a case-study methodology is used (Yin 1991, Swanborn 
1999). Case studies are a methodological design prone to pitfalls and their 
validity and reliability of studies making use of cases depend largely on the 
research method applied. This study applies a particular process tracing 
technique: intensive process analysis. This method has been designed and 
applied with the purpose of analysing political decision-making at the 
national level (Huberts 1988, Peters 1995, Arts 1998). To be of use in a 
study on EU policy-shaping, the method needs to be adapted. The next 
sections are concerned with elaborating the central concepts of the study, 
(§2), introducing the research method (§3) and explaining the case study 
selection (§4). 
 
 
§2. In search of a research method  
 
The central notion of this book is shaping capacity, defined as a 
government’s ability to perform in the process of formulating new EU 
policies. Elements of shaping capacity are a national government’s 
ambitions, preferences, potential and resources for EU-policy-making. For 
applying this framework to a reconstruction of day-to-day EU policy-
making procesess, insights can be borrowed from a particular branch in 
political science, concerned with influence analysis.  
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Influence is amongst the most contested concepts in political science. For 
the adherents of Realism, the most prominent International Relations (IR) 
theory, state actions are said to be understandable through their power 
structure and, as EU studies rooted within IR, it is not surprising that power, 
influence and related concepts such as ‘persuasion’, ‘lobbying’, 
‘manipulation’ and ‘authority’ are particularly widespread. Most authors 
seem to agree on what power and influence have in common: both concern a 
relation between at least two actors; both are related to the use of capacities 
or resources, be it knowledge; finances; skills; ideas or competencies; and 
there is always a causal relation: the presence, thoughts or actions of one 
actor lead to different decisions of another actor. However, many authors 
seek recourse from a difficult debate by simply not defining influence or 
power1 as, as regards to their precise distinction, opinions diverge. In Robert 
Dahls’ famous writings on power in political science, power, influence and 
related notions such as ‘authority’ and ‘control’, are lumped together. Others 
relate power to a capacity, and influence as its effect.2 This is reflected in the 
legal use of power in the sense of ‘competencies’ – particularly relevant in 
the EU context, where any action of the institutions should always rest upon 
a competency attributed by the treaties: the ‘legal base’. Influence, then, has 
to do with working practice reality – the ‘flesh and blood’ of the policy 
process (Van Schendelen 1996, 28). A related definition of ‘influence’ is 
offered by Huberts (1994, 39): an actor exercises influence if his presence, 
thoughts or actions causes a decision-maker to meet his preferences more 
than would have been the case had this actor been absent.  
 
This book is focused on the process of shaping, instead of the performance 
or influence achieved, but the study of power and influence may yield 
relevant methods. This does not mean that assessing influence is an easy 
task, especially in the complex politico-administrative setting of EU policy-
making. Results are not quantifiable and in a social, i.e. non-experimental 
 
                                                 
1) See for instance: Arter, D. (2000): Small state influence within the EU: the case 
of Finland’s ‘Northern dimension, initiative’, in: JCMS, 38(5), p. 677. 
2) “Political power is a psychological relation between those who exercise it and 
those over which it is exercised. It gives the former control over certain actions 
of the latter through the influence which the former exert over the latter’s 
minds. That influence may be exerted through orders, threats, persuasion, or a 
combination of any of those.” (Morgenthau 1948, 14) 
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research context, conditions cannot be adapted and there is thus no question 
of ‘ceteris paribus’ clauses. In the end, the fact that an individual 
government succesfully influences the outcomes of a negotiating process 
may just as well be attributed to other variables: the decision context; the 
position and actions of other actors or external conditions. Influence analysis 
is thus limited to thoroughly assessing, first, to what extent the outcome 
mirrors the preferences of the actor under examination and second, which 
activities have possibly increased this ‘fit’ of preferences and outcomes 
(Everts 1990, 81). The second question is obviously relevant for this book, 
as from these findings, insights into the shaping capacity of one particular 
government can be distracted.  
 
How, then, to assess shaping capacity? Two central problems each social 
scientist is confronted with are the validity and the reliability of the research 
outcomes (see also Babbie 1998). Validity refers to the degree to which a 
study accurately reflects or assesses the specific concept that the researcher 
is attempting to measure. In this study: the question whether shaping 
capacity is indeed under study. Reliability is the extent to which an 
experiment, test, or any measuring procedure yields the same result on 
repeated trials and is concerned with the accuracy of the research method. To 
ensure validity and reliability, much depends of the choice of the research 
method for collecting case data and how to structure and analyse a story 
about the results.  
 
Particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, assessing political power was a popular 
subject and different methods were developed (Hunter 1953, Dahl 1961, Van 
den Bos 1991). The three ‘traditional’ methods are the position (-al) method, 
the reputation method and the method of decision (Huberts and 
Kleinnijenhuis 1994). 
 
In the position method, influence is based on a singular power resource, 
namely the position of an actor in a political constellation. The position 
method is thus very much based on assessing formal power instead of 
influence, i.e. the different possible ways these actors handle their position 
or ‘office’ are not taken into consideration.  
 The reputation method is based on the assumption that an actor is 
deemed influential; he or she will be treated as such and thus become 
influential. The answer of actors involved to the question who holds 
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influence or which actor has been influential may thus become a prime 
example of a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’.  
 
Problematic with the reputation and position methods is the validity of the 
outcomes, as both are essentially indirect and rather subjective. Even more 
so because they are based on interviews as a primary source, which is 
problematic for the validity because of the inherent bias of respondents as to 
their own role in the process. 
 
An alternative method is the method of decision, as used by Robert Dahl in 
the 1960s and 1970s and applied in the ‘process method’ (Braam 1973). 
Central to the latter is the analysis of particular political decisions, in order 
to determine the extent to which participation and interventions were 
‘successful’. A key characteristic of this method and – according to 
commentators – its main flaw is that ‘goal attainment’ is equalled to 
influence, which is a rather one-dimensional view on policy processes 
(Peters 1999, 67). The finding that the preferences of the actor under study 
are mirrored in the outcomes may also be caused by external conditions or 
the intervention of another or multiple other actors. A second limitation 
concerns the fact that ‘non decisions’ are not taken into account, i.e. the 
possibility that actor y does not take a decision because of actor x’s 
successful influence attempts. Finally, in its focus on one particular actor or 
category of actors, the process method should be adapted to make it suitable 
for analyses of complex decision-making processes with many actors and 
interests involved (Huberts 1988, 41). 
 
A newer method, ‘intensive process analysis’, pretends to repair these flaws, 
although its principles are firmly rooted in the process method. The aim of 
this research method, designed and applied by a number of Dutch policy 
analysts in the late 1980s and 1990s, is to come to valid conclusions about 
the influence of either one particular actor or a group of actors in a political 
decision making process about public policy (Huberts 1988 and 1994, Peters 
1999, Arts 2000). In process analysis, a single decision making process is 
studied intensively with the help of a precise reconstruction (hence its 
name), in order to determine which actors influenced the shaping of the final 
decision at which moment and to what effect. This method has been applied 
in this study. 
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Table 6.1 Intensive process analysis reconstruction phases 
1. Selection of a decision context 
2. Selection of cases 
3. Determining the central actor A 
4. Determining the actors B-Z and their relations 
5. Determining the ‘key issues’ 
6. Reconstructing the decision process 
7. Reconstructing the shaping attempts of actor A 
8. Assessing shaping capacity of actor A 
 
 
§3. Intensive process tracing and analysis  
 
As process analysis is designed to answer questions about which actors 
influence certain policy fields or a certain decision making process, the 
basics of this method have been applied in this study. Two disclaimers are 
relevant however. First, the focus is not on determining a (most) relevant 
actor, but on relevant variables. Second, process analysis has been designed 
for assessing decision-making processes at the national level with two 
players: one NGO influencing a decision maker (Huberts 1988). The EU 
policymaking process is explicitly multilateral, text negotiations include to 
many sub-decisions and the end result is generally not a choice between a 
selected number of alternatives but a multiple-sum game. Third, the original 
method was designed for one level of policymaking, that of the central level 
of government in the Netherlands. In the EU context influence is not only 
exercised through bilateral contacts, but through a multi-level negotiation 
system. Many actors and locations are involved, which seriously complicates 
the possibility of methodological analysis. Therefore, in the following, we 
will dissect the method into successive steps and analyse how these can be 
adapted to be used for analysis of decision making in an EU setting. 
 
Step 1. Selection of a decision context 
Case-study analysis starts with the selection of a context and a decision-
making process to be examined. At the same time, the delineations and 
limitations should be clear. This study deals with EU-policy-making and its 
context is the pattern of EU-member state interaction within that process. EU 
legislation is shaped according to cumbersome institutional rules and 
procedures. Policy-making competencies are divided in an intricate interplay 
amongst the EU’s institutions (Council; Parliament and the European 
Commission). The reconstruction is limited to the phases in the policy cycle 
of agenda setting, negotiations and decision-making. As for the decision 
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type, the focus is on specialised and sectoral policies over ‘bread and butter’ 
topics. In contrast to the political, ‘history-making’ (Peterson 2000) 
decisions over ‘horizontal’ issues such as treaty reform or budgetary 
frameworks, which have been the focus of impressive analyses (e.g. 
Moravcsik 1999), this category of policies does not attract much public and 
media attention. However, they constitute the bulk of the EU’s regulatory 
output and it may be argued that their impact upon national governments is 
even more direct.  
 
The empirical research is limited to one particular area of regulation in the 
‘first pillar’ of the EU, which concerns economic, social, monetary and 
related policies. Between and within the three pillars, a different balance is 
struck between ‘supranational’ and ‘intergovernmental’ modes co-operation. 
With a few exceptions, most policies in the first pillar are decided conform 
the Community method of policy-shaping. Governments must share the 
initiative and legislative competencies with the European European 
Commission and the European Parliament. The vast majority of decisions 
are made under the ‘majority-voting’ procedure. This implies that member 
states can be overruled by a winning or blocking coalition of member states 
according to an intricate voting procedure. In the more intergovernmental 
pillars, concerned with foreign, security justice and home affairs 
cooperation, governments can act relatively autonomously. Governments are 
thus confronted with different ‘opportunity-structures’ for shaping EU-
policies, dependent on the relevant policy area. As the supposedly 
constraining effects of EU policy-making upon national governments’ 
shaping capacity are by far largest in the first pillar, this has been chosen as 
the focus of attention. 
 
For reasons of temporal distortion, as well as for practical reasons, it helps to 
analyse relatively recent processes. As the changes described in newer EU 
studies perspectives are closely associated with a number of procedural 
changes and policy developments in the course of the 1990s, this has been 
chosen as the time frame of this book. In 2000, the Council and the 
Parliament issued 11.414 legal acts (Alesina 2001, 61), two of which are 
being examined in the cases.  
 
The object of study is the shaping capacity of one particular government: the 
Netherlands. This limitation to a singly country, which has been inspired by 
practical reasons (including the limited time frame and easy accessibility of 
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data sources), makes ‘thick’ case-studies and a detailed country study 
possible. The choice for the Netherlands is even more interesting, as chapter 
5 has described how both the European ambitions of the Dutch government 
and its potential to influence EU level developments are questioned in an 
ongoing debate amongst academics and practitioners, to which this book 
aims to contribute. Although King et al. (1994) claim boldly that no valid 
conclusions can be drawn from a single case-study (‘with only one 
implication of the causal theory observed, we have no basis on which to 
decide whether the observation confirms or disconfirms a theory, or is the 
result of some unknown factor’ (p. 211)) Moravcsik (1998) has convincingly 
argued that a single case may comprise a ‘structured set of (…) 
observations’, i.e. a collection of observations so that there are multiple 
points for measurement. The two cases of Dutch government shaping EU 
policies will provide a plethora of such observations.  
 
Step 2. Selection of cases 
The two case studies of recent legislative dossiers have been selected 
according to a ‘most-similar’-systems design (Przeworski and Teune 1970, 
32-34). The two cases are highly similar as regards to a large number of 
characteristics and conditions. They differ regarding one particular 
characteristic: voting behaviour, which makes it possible that possible 
effects on shaping capacity can be tested in relative isolation. The first case 
study is the directive regulating the natural gas market, the Gas Directive 
(98/30/EC).3 In 1995, at the EU level, the governments of the member states 
started discussing the European Commission proposal for a new European 
Gas directive, regulating a gradual opening of the national markets for 
natural gas. The second case study concerns a reconstruction of the shaping 
of what became known as the Biopatent Directive (98/44/EC),4 dealing with 
the complex and controversial matter of patenting biotechnological 
inventions. The negotiations on shaping this piece of legislation, which 
 
                                                 
3) European Parliament and Council directive concerning common rules for the 
internal market in natural gas, Official Journal L/1998/204/1, Bulletin 
1998/6/1.3.93.  
4) European Parliament and Council Directive on the legal protection of 
biotechnological Inventions, Official Journal L 1998/213/13, Bulletin 1998/7/-8 
1.3.36. 
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resulted in heated political debates over the implementation at the national 
level, are reconstructed and analysed.  
 
The directives are similar as to the following characteristics. First, their 
origins and objectives: both the Biopatent and Gas directive aim at a 
harmonisation of national policies in order to realise a common European 
internal market. Both originate from the desire of the European Commission 
to get involved in a new policy area and are thus strongly ‘Commission-
driven’. Also, their legal-institutional characteristics are highly similar. Both 
directives were decided under the procedures of co-decision and majority 
voting.5 The intricate co-decision procedure, introduced in the Maastricht 
Treaty on European Union extended the competencies of the European 
Parliament, making it an equal partner of the member states, united in the 
Council. Essentially, the Council and the European Parliament agree jointly 
upon legislative proposals in a negotiating process, with the possibility of 
two separate readings in which amendments can be submitted followed by a 
direct dialogue (‘conciliation’) between the institutions. The scope of the co-
decision procedure has been considerably enlarged since the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. This had led to emerging inter-institutional practice of intensive 
contacts in the process of discussing amendments both at Council and 
Parliamentary level.6 
 
At the domestic level: the Dutch government department for Economic 
Affairs and, at the EU level, the European Commission DG Internal Market, 
Competition and (for the Gas Directive) Energy were involved in shaping 
both directives. Decision-making took place in the Council formation of 
Internal Market and with a co-legislative role of the European Parliament. 
Decision-making on both directives coincided partly with the Dutch 1997 
 
                                                 
5) Under the system of qualified majority voting (QMV), at the time of 
negotiations on both case-studies, voting weights of the member states differed 
between 2 and 10 votes for small and larger countries. For a qualified majority 
at least 62 out of 87 votes should be in favour. A ‘blocking minority’ should 
have 26 votes at the minimum. 
6) ‘On the whole, the co-decision procedure has been found to work well, with a 
significant increase in the proportion of matters going to conciliation (now 
nearly half of all cases)’, see: general report of the Commission, 1998, Chapter 
VIII: Institutional matters, Section 3: Legislative role of the European 
Parliament (1/2), no 1077. 
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Council EU Presidency. This is important, as opinions differ as regards the 
impact of holding the chair on the shaping capacity of that particular 
member state. The functions of the Council chair include that of organiser, 
broker, political leader and national representative (see O’Nuallain 1985, 
Elgström 2004, Schout et al. 2004). These roles will sometimes be balanced, 
but they may also conflict, in particular when it comes to organisational 
control and providing political impetus for the Council business. Once in the 
chair, a government representative can hardly ignore national negotiating 
positions and function as a completely neutral arbitrator (Dinan 1999, 240). 
However the degree to which governments use the Council Presidency as a 
vehicle for advancing national preferences differs, depending on, amongst 
others, the relative size of the country and external and domestic conditions 
and circumstances.  
 
Another reason for choosing internal market directives is that this is one of 
the Council formations in which voting occurs most frequently (Mattila and 
Lane 2000, 42).7 This is a relevant consideration in respect to the variable as 
regard to which the two directives under consideration differ: the voting 
behaviour of the Dutch government.  
 The Gas Directive was agreed in the Council meeting of December 
1997 with all member state delegations voting in favour. However, in the 
case of the Biopatent Directive, the Netherlands delegation voted against the 
political agreement in the Council meeting of 27 November 1997. As a 
qualified majority was reached, the directive was passed.  
 The fact that the Biopatent directive was voted upon is special. As 
outlined in chapter 3, the Council is characterized by a clear preference for 
unanimity. In the words of the European Commission: ‘the Council 
Presidency normally seeks as broad a consensus as possible on Commission 
proposals, resorting to the majority rule only where consensus proves 
impossible’ (European Commission 1999, section 2). Interestingly enough, 
from voting records, it appears that the Netherlands, though middle-range 
 
                                                 
7) The authors suggest that an explanation may lie in the relatively high level of 
integration reached in these long-standing policy sectors, which would 
complicate the building of consensus. However, it may just as well be argued 
that the high degree of integration facilitates interstate bargaining, for instance 
because of socialisation effects between Council members (the Agriculture 
Council meets most frequently of all Council formations).  
Going Europe or Going Dutch 
 
 
 
 
124 
when it comes to abstentions, ranks as the third-most frequent ‘no-voter’ in 
the period of the negotiations on both case-studies. 
 If voting is so uncommon, how can its occurrence be explained? It is 
intuitively appealing to assume that diverging preferences – (dis-) agreement 
with the contents or the legal form of the dossier on the table – explain 
voting behaviour. However, the previous chapters have explained how the 
EU’s policy-shaping process provides multiple opportunities for getting a 
possibly extreme policy position in line with the others and finding a 
consensus ‘in the middle’. Obviously, delegations with ‘extreme’ policy 
preferences on certain issues are generally more difficult to be 
accommodated. If a government cannot be accommodated it may choose to 
take its loss or abstain from voting, or to resist openly. However, a no-vote 
that does not lead to the rejection of the text is largely symbolic. It may serve 
as an indicator to a domestic constituency that the government 
representatives have acted as ‘tough negotiators’. Mattila and Lane (2001) 
pose that certain governments, due to their policy style, put a low value on 
unanimity. Interestingly, large countries turn out to be more often in the 
category of ‘no-voters’ that contradicts the image of EU policy-making as 
power politics in which size matters. But no-votes can also be related to 
broader concerns. Member states that worry about the financial aspects of 
membership, for example net contributors to the EU budget, are often 
reluctant when it comes to the financial aspects of particular proposals. This 
could explain the outstanding position of the Netherlands in voting records 
since the mid-1990s.8 Although the purpose of the case-studies is to offer a 
detailed descriptive analysis of the process of how one government attempts 
to influence the making of two directives, attention will be paid to the 
differing voting behaviour of the Dutch government in the case of the 
Biopatent directive and possible explanatory factors. 
 
Step 3. Determining the central actor A 
Intensive process analysis departs from a detailed reconstruction of the 
policy process. All actors and the relations between them, these will have to 
be charted into a ‘case record’ which pulls together and organises 
voluminous case data and (…) includes all the information that will be used 
 
                                                 
8) Actually, the intermediary variable was suggested to be support for the EU, 
which can be expected to be highter in countries benefiting from membership. 
Mattila: 24. 
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in doing the case analysis and case study’ (Patten 1987, 148). The study is 
confined to the Dutch government: the central government level of the 
Netherlands: the Rijksoverheid, including Cabinet and all ministries. But this 
notion hides a variety of actors and preferences, amongst which the key actor 
in both case studies: the lead government department of Economic Affairs. 
The actions of representatives of this department will be traced throughout 
the negotiations. 
 
Step 4. Selecting other actors and their relations 
Subsequently, all influence attempts and their direction, timing and results 
should be mapped, including the actions and position of all actors involved, 
from the moment at which the preferences were formed up, to the point at 
which the decision was taken. It is in this requirement that lays one of the 
potential flaws of process analysis, as it demands that the preferences, 
thoughts, objectives and demands from each actor are clear from the outset 
and that it is possible to reconstruct all activities (Huberts 1988, 45). 
Obviously, this is virtually impossible in complex politico-administrative 
settings. Things become even more difficult when the influence of a certain 
type of actor in international or European level policy processes is assessed. 
Not only is an immense range of actors involved, the international level is 
characterised by ‘positive sum’ games (decisions are compromises between 
the demands of a range of actors involved), and multi-level games (the 
outcomes of decision making at one level affect those elsewhere). For the 
sake of simplicity, a selection and elimination is necessary. This excludes: 
 
• actors not involved in the decision making process and those which see 
none of there position reflected in the outcomes. Although in theory, all 
then-fifteen member states were involved in the decision making around 
the two case studies certain member states had only minimal interests as 
regards to particular text proposals and these can be more easily 
disregarded. 
• decisions made autonomously by the European Commission (as 
influence analysis is rather senseless). 
• actor without any access to the actor making the final decision-making 
in a particular policy phase. 
 
In applying process analysis to the complicated European context, it is even 
more necessary to select very carefully the relevant decisions and actors and 
consequently eliminate less relevant factors from the start. It is obvious that, 
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regardless of the exact decision making procedure applying, the EU 
institutions at the European level (the European Commission, the Parliament 
and the Council) should be taken into account. Moreover, in line with the 
pluralist theories argued for in previous chapters, these actors should not be 
seen in their entirety (‘the European Commission’) but according to the 
relevant sub-unit (DG Environment; members of European Parliament of a 
particular group or a sectorised Council working group).  
 
Step 5. Determining the key issues 
As the EU is known for its ‘text negotiations’, the directives concern 
numerous pages of legal texts, which can be subdivided into smaller or 
‘partial’ decisions. Since it would be impossible to analyse all aspects, both 
dossiers have been subdivided into partial decisions. These key issues have 
been determined by document analysis and semi-structured interviews, 
resulting in five particular ‘hot potatoes’ which were most prominently 
discussed during the negotiations. This selection has been based on two 
criteria: whether and to what extent the decision was to be considered 
radical, i.e. with large consequences for those actors involved, be it 
financially, organisationally or otherwise; and second, whether the 
discussion was controversial, i.e. many conflicting interests were at stake. 
These criteria indicate that actors attach a certain importance to the issue at 
stake and influence relations may be particularly visible in that respect. The 
dissection of each dossier will be checked with the actors involved. 
 
Step 6. Reconstructing the decision making process 
Analyses of the EU policy-making process risk to have a too narrow focus 
on the Council-dominated phases of decision-making. However, what 
happens in other phases of the policy chain (agenda setting, formulation, 
negotiation and implementation) may have a crucial impact on the final 
outcome of the policy process. For applying process analysis as a method, 
this means that the reconstruction will have to be ‘stretched’ across these 
phases, instead of taking a ‘political decision making process’ as the unit of 
analysis.  
 
Step 7. Reconstructing the influence attempts 
Influence attempts by the Dutch government in the three successive stages of 
the policy cycle: agenda setting; negotiations and decision-making, will be 
meticulously reconstructed. Subsequently, a critical evaluation is presented 
of the influence attempts of the Dutch government in these stages. The 
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possibility of intertwined domestic and EU level policy preferences, pointed 
at by multi-level approaches, leads to another difficult analytic point. 
Although the analysis will be focused on national governments, it is not 
possible to isolate this actor. If actors, consistent with governance analysis, 
define their preferences within the context of the continuous EU process, and 
if we then observe a shift in policy position, is that to be classified as a 
change of preferences? In order to find out more about the supposed 
‘intertwined-ness’ of preference formation, it is thus important to reconstruct 
the ways by which and the moments at which preferences are constructed, 
formulated, translated into negotiating positions, articulated and (re-) 
formulated both at the level of national government and at the EU level. 
When comparing different positions taken at different instances, a certain 
development in the process of preference formation can be reconstructed. 
 
Step 8. Assessing shaping capacity 
The last section of chapters 7 and 8 is concerned with a critical assessment 
and evaluation of the ways in which the Dutch government delegation has 
attempted to influence the proceedings. It focuses on the variables that have 
been identified and defined into the framework for analysis from chapter 4 in 
order to single out which elements or variables can be highlighted an which 
have not been relevant for the analysis.  
 
 
§4. Sources and methods of data collection 
 
There are several ways of increasing both the validity and the reliability of 
research outcomes. For this purpose, this study has made use of 
triangulation; ‘member checks’ as well as ‘peer reviews’.  
Triangulation means that a variety of data sources has been consulted: 
people and papers. The data source ‘papers’ refers to the written academic 
analysis and policy documents that have been consulted and analysed. 
Document analysis involved the archives of the Dutch Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs and Economic Affairs. Examples of the official documents that have 
been examined are negotiating instructions for the case studies, minutes of 
co-ordination meetings in The Hague, as well as the official minutes of 
Council-level meetings collected with the help of the Council Secretariat. 
With the personal assistance of helpful officials, also less formal accounts, 
letters, e-mails and notes of phone conversations could be used in the 
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reconstruction. The case report to be constructed from this documentation 
could lead to a detailed chronological description of the policy process, with 
the help of a time line, which has served as the basis for the influence 
analysis presented in the next chapters.  
 
Table 6.2 Respondents interviewed for the case-studies 
• Second Chamber of Parliament: MP’s (PvdA, VVD) 
• Netherlands Ministry for Economic Affairs 
• Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
• Clingendael International Energy Programme 
• Vrijhandels Organisatie voor Elektriciteit en Gas VOEG 
• European Commission, DG internal market 
• Gasunie  
• European Parliament 
• Netherlands Patent Office  
• Netherlands’ Biotech Industry Association NIABA 
• Dierenbescherming 
 
Using people as a data source refers to the interviews that have been carried 
out with a number of respondents.9 These respondents are government 
officials, politicians, and lobbyists for particular interests and non-
governmental origanisations, which have been involved in the shaping of 
both case studies and Dutch EU policy-making in general. The interviews 
have been ‘semi-structured’ (Weiss 1995), in the sense that questionnaires 
were developed in advance, including variable questions depending on the 
knowledge and experience of the actor involved. The purpose of interviews 
has been to select and structure the information obtained from written 
sources.  
 
Especially the conversations with directly involved policy-makers provided 
a personal and – inevitably – selective view of events. To remedy this, 
additional methods applied for corroborating the findings were ‘peer 
reviews’ and member checks. The latter refers to the process by which the 
interpretation of data is discussed between the researcher and those who 
provided the data. As to peer reviews, the author has profited from field 
research in Council working groups and training and research projects. 
These would be not directly related to this study, but nonetheless involve 
 
                                                 
9) Data for the case-studies have been collected in close collaboration with Ellen 
Mastenbroek, for a related analysis on the ‘goodness of fit’ thesis. See 
Mastenbroek and Van Keulen 2006. 
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regular contacts and interviews with officials from different government 
ministries, directly involved in EU policy-shaping at the domestic and EU 
level. Through consultation of relevant academics in the field in working 
environment, conferences and workshops, the impressions from the literature 
review have been thoroughly discussed. This and the numerous 
conversations on the subject of this study have suggested that the country 
study in chapter 5 and the following case studies do sketch an adequate 
picture of the way the Dutch government deals with the EU. 
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Chapter 7 
Shaping the Gas Directive 
 
§1. Introduction 
 
The two case-studies discussed in this study are the directive regulating the 
natural gas market, the Gas directive1 (98/30/EC) and the directive 
regulating the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, hereafter 
referred to as the Biopatent directive2 (98/44/EC, see chapter 8). The purpose 
is to analyse how the Dutch government has attempted to shape these 
directives and which variables have determined its shaping capacity. The 
cases are reconstructed with the help of a policy tracing technique, ‘intensive 
process analysis’, the successive phases of which determine the organisation 
of this chapter.  
 
After a brief introduction of the backgrounds of EU involvement in the 
subject matter, the key actors in the negotiations are identified (§3). Then, 
the focus is on what happened in the shaping process concerning the Gas 
directive as regards to the subsequent phases of agenda setting and initiation; 
negotiations; decision-making and implementation (§4), followed by a 
reconstruction of the negotiations focusing on five contested issues (§5). The 
analystical phase consists of a review of the attempts, by Dutch government 
 
                                                 
1) European Parliament and Council directive concerning common rules for the 
internal market in natural gas, Official Journal L/1998/204/1, Bulletin 
1998/6/1.3.93.  
2) European Parliament and Council Directive on the legal protection of 
biotechnological Inventions, Official Journal L 1998/213/13, Bulletin 1998/7/-8 
1.3.36. 
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representatives, to influence the stages of agenda setting, negotiations and 
decision making over the directive text concerning the five key issues (§6). 
 
 
§2. The decision context: backgrounds 
 
Until the end of the 1980s, the responsibility for developing national energy 
policy rested firmly in the hands of national governments. Large differences 
have characterised the then-twelve EC-member states as regards their 
national energy markets. After the initiative to complete the single internal 
market in 1988, then-DG XVII (now DG Energy) of the European 
Commission wanted to increase competition and to discourage state 
regulation and monopolies within the member states. Driving factors for 
introducing competition into the EU’s energy sector included the growing 
share of natural gas in the demand for energy, increased competition that EU 
suppliers encountered on the international gas markets (for example by 
Russia and Norway) and the general trend towards a more liberal perspective 
on government regulation in the energy sector (Van Oostvoorn and Boots 
1999).  
 
Member state governments, however, feared that as a result of market 
opening, they might lose important policy steering instruments and revenues. 
Indeed, because of the strong degree of interwovenness of the industry and 
national governments (George 1985, 100),3 first attempts to develop a 
common European energy policy were a ‘spectacular failure’: ‘(S)o 
successfully did the Continental European gas industries enlist the support of 
their governments, that nearly a decade passed before an EU directive 
dealing with the opening up of gas industries to competition and liberalised 
access to networks was agreed’ (Stern 1998, 7).  
 
Despite opposition, the idea to create an internal market for energy was kept 
alive by the European Commission, in particular by the DG’s Internal 
 
                                                 
3) The proposal for liberalisation of the internal gas market, that DG Internal 
Market of the European Commission issued in 1990 only had support from the 
Britishs government delegation. It is one of the few examples where the 
Council has refused to handle a Commission proposal according to the (two-
hearing, qualified majority) procedure.  
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Market and DG Energy. After issuing two directives concerning price 
transparency (1990) and pipeline transit (1991), DG Energy issued two 
proposals for liberalisation of the internal market for electricity and (natural) 
gas.4 Discussions at administrative and political level between the member 
state governments on these texts continued to mirror disagreement. The 
Dutch government actively participated in consultations with a group of 
‘like-minded’ member states, in which the European Commission approach 
was criticised for not taking the national differences and the particular 
distinction of the gas and electricity markets into account.5  
 
In November 1994 Energy Council conclusions,6 the then-twelve national 
governments acknowledged that action at the EU level could generate 
additional value as regards to research and technology policy, environmental 
protection, competition and security of energy supply. At the same time, a 
majority of delegations (with the exception of the United Kingdom) voiced 
objections against a too large degree of market opening as far as natural gas 
was concerned and negotiations initially focused on the electricity market.7 
 
The European Commission continued to push for common action, for 
example in political discussions about an energy chapter in the revised 
(Amsterdam) Treaty. In the meantime, officials at DG Energy submitted a 
White Paper on Energy Policy and drafted a text proposal for a directive 
proposal for the liberalisation of the natural gas market.8 The text was 
discussed at the administrative level of the Council working group for 
Energy from December 1996 to October 1997. Coreper-I9 discussed the 
directive in November 1996 and June and October 1997. The Council of 
 
                                                 
4) COM (1991)548 def. and COM (1993)/643 def. 
5) 10 Febr 1992, internal paper on like-minded consultations, E/EG/92012623. 
6) Doc. 11700/94 RV/CONS 80 ENER 149. 
7) See: Common Position of the Council of 25.07.1996 (see doc.8811/2/96 REV 2 
ENER 105 CODEC 441). The Directive on the electricity market was adopted 
in December 1996 (1996/92/EC) It has been argued that part of the change in 
national positions was motivated by threats, from DG Competition, with Court 
cases for violating competition law. 
8) White Paper COM (1995)682. Note that Austria, Sweden and Finland acceded 
to the EU on 1 January 1995. 
9) COREPER-I consists of Deputy Permanent Representatives of the member 
states. See the appendix on EU-policy-making. 
Going Europe or Going Dutch 
 
 
 
 
134 
Energy ministers discussed the issue four times. In the spring of 1997, the 
Dutch EU Council Presidency discovered that, although there was agreement 
on principles, a small number of crucial issues remained as regard which 
government preferences were still far apart. Under the Luxembourg 
Presidency, the Council managed to agree upon a common position in 
December 1997, which was endorsed by the European Parliament’s plenary 
in May 1998. 
 
Table 7.1 Key dates in the shaping of the Gas directive 98/30/EC 
1991  February: DG Energy forwards proposals for Electricity and Gas directives 
Negotiations in the Council working party for Energy stalled in 1994 
1995  European Commission issues White paper on Energy  
1996  Irish Presidency revives Directive: negotiations in working party continue  
1997  November: Common position in Council  
1998  February: European Parliament accepts common position in second reading 
May: signature Council and European Parliament 
2000  May: Deadline for implementation 
 
 
§3. Identifying key actors 
 
This section highlights the major actors in the shaping of directive 98/30 at 
the domestic level in the Netherlands and at the EU level. 
 
§3.1 Key actors at the national level 
The key actor on which the reconstruction will be focused is the Directorate-
General for Energy (DGE) at the Ministry of Economic Affairs, in charge of 
national energy policy. The Dutch government’s policy as regards to natural 
gas has been developed from the 1960s, after the discovery of huge gas 
stocks in the northern province of Groningen.10 The assumption that these 
huge stocks could not be marketed without public control inspired the 
construction of a centrally co-ordinated national gas policy (the 
‘Gasgebouw’).11 The objectives of national policy as regards to natural gas 
were to market supply on the basis of ‘market value’.12 Through this key 
 
                                                 
10) The Dutch natural gas reserves constitute 25% of the total reserves in the 
European Union + Norway and add up to 1,2% of the world gas reserve (2003). 
11) As outlined in the report De Pous (1962). 
12) Market value principle implies that the natural gas price follows the price of 
substitute fuels, e.g. gasoil or fuel oil. This way customers are sure that they do 
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principle, the government could secure supply to consumers for reasonable 
prices and obtain revenues on sales profits and dividends.13 Gas production 
and supply were to be regulated by a contract between gas utilities and the 
government – Shell and Exxon, united in the Netherlands Oil Company 
(NAM), were granted a concession to produce the gas offered to Gasunie, 
the private company for supply and transport.14 At the same time, the 
Netherlands is a country with many energy-intensive economic sectors (glass 
horticulture, chemical industry; transit transport), for which energy is an 
important cost. This dilemma between the ‘consumer perspective’ and the 
‘producer perspective’ was reflected in the Dutch stance as regards to gas 
liberalisation (Arentsen 1999, 34). 
 
The Ministry for Economic Affairs is not considered as a ‘unitary actor’ or 
monolith. Within this organisation, different (groups of) actors advanced 
preferences in sometimes-heated discussions over the contents and direction 
of national economic policy. For understanding the way in which the Dutch 
government responded to the European Commission initiatives, it is 
important to know that this first-responsible DG was widely regarded as ‘the 
odd man out’ in the Ministry. Although the Ministry of Economic Affairs is 
generally known for its liberal stance as regards to market regulation and in 
favour of enhancing competition (Schout 1998, 142), DG Energy has up 
until the mid-1990s been ‘amongst the staunchest defenders of the controlled 
market’ (Correljé 2003, 133). The Netherlands delegation at EU level 
negotiations, composed of representatives of DGE, was vehemently opposed 
to Commission-led attempts to discuss proposals for energy liberalisation, as 
these would endanger the supply functions of the Groningen field and the 
principle of ‘market value’.15 In mid-1995, when the electricity directive was 
 
                                                 
not pay more than they would have to pay for substitute fuels, while the gas 
producer gets no less than the price for the substitute fuel. 
13) In the late 1990s, the gas revenues (aardgasbaten) were estimated 5% of Gross 
Domestic Product (see: Correljé et al. 2003). 
14) Gasunie was a 25/25/50% venture of Shell/Exxon and the national state, 
represented by the Ministry of Economic Affairs/DG Energy. 
15) The Commission proposal on what would become Directive 91/296/EEC of 31 
May 1991 on the transit of natural gas through grids [Official Journal L 147 of 
12.06.1991] was strongly opposed by the gas companies. It has been described 
how Gasunie and Ruhrgas were very active in the no-camp and were backed by 
the Dutch and German governments. The gas industry was not united, however, 
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discussed, the Dutch preference for the French proposal for a ‘single buyers 
system’ (instead of the European Commission proposal for negotiated 
access) was not so much a matter of principle, but the negotiating instruction 
explicitly took into account the consideration that in future discussions about 
gas about similar issues, the gas building could be sustained.16  
 
Within DGE, Commission initiatives towards an internal market for energy 
were generally regarded with suspicion. It was feared that an emphasis on 
competition could lead to a fall in gas prices and forced reduction of 
overcapacities, which were considered necessary for absorbing peak 
demands. Internally, the objective of the Dutch government strategy was 
bluntly formulated as ‘frustrating further plans of the Commission’.17 For 
discussions with EU partners, this objective was translated into a negotiating 
strategy aimed at coalition-formation with a group of likeminded 
government delegations. When the UK Presidency took over in mid-1992, 
the Dutch position was clearly outlined and discussed with member states 
that – for various reasons – voiced a similar critical stance, including France, 
Germany and Spain. In sum: although DGE was principally reluctant as 
regards to possible consequences of energy liberalisation, at leastformally, it 
declared to wish to be involved in the discussions at the EU level in a 
constructive way.  
 
As the responsibility in Dutch EU-policymaking lies with the individual 
departments and departmental autonomy prevails,18 DGE was for long able 
to put its mark on national energy policy. However, its conservative stance 
did not match the Ministry’s generally supportive approach to European 
integration (Schout 1998, 144). That the state monopoly on natural gas 
should inevitably be relaxed due to international developments was the 
conviction prominent at the prominent DG for international and EU affairs at 
the Ministry for Economic Affairs, the Department for External Economic 
 
                                                 
and periphery member states were anxious for the infrastructure support this 
directive could give. The directive was adopted in 1991 under Luxembourg 
Presidency, Germany and the Netherlands voting against (Stern 1993, 189). 
16) Letter to the Minister about Energy Council 1 June 1995, doc E/EB/95040685, 
8 June 1995. 
17) Internal paper E/EG/92007017, 23 January 1992. 
18) See the annex for an overview of the EU-policy co-ordination procedure. 
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Relations (BEB) which traditionally holds strong ties with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. It is interesting to see how this watershed has impacted 
upon the shaping of the directive. 
 
Political impetus for a change of national energy policy came from the 
coming to power of a ‘purple’ coalition cabinet in 1994, which actively 
pursued a liberalisation strategy. Minister of Economic Affairs Hans Wijers 
held a long career in the private sector. From the beginning, Hans Wijers put 
his mark on national energy policy. The Third Energy White Paper, issued in 
December 1995, was the written proof of change. This paper has ‘affected 
(…) the harmony of the Dutch gas market in the second half of the 1990s 
and beyond’ (Arentsen 1993, 109).19 The Third Energy Paper argued how 
national energy policy should adapt to international market developments 
and how the role of the Netherlands in the international gas market could be 
improved. The paper discussed possibilities for moderate forms of access for 
third parties and a stepwise opening of the gas market (ibid. 111). For this, 
the European Gas directive, which after a long period of standstill of 
negotiations between the member states was revived by the Irish Presidency 
in early 1996, was identified a key dossier: ‘the Gas directive will be leading 
and decisive for the precise determination of measures related to the gas 
market’.20 Considering the state of play of the negotiations, if pressured by 
the upcoming Dutch EU Council Presidency, these could be brought to a 
conclusion in the first half of 1997.21  
 
A discussion of relevant actors cannot be complete without discussion the 
role of Gasunie, the private company assigned with natural gas supply and 
storage under the aforementioned ‘gas edifice’. Although analysts have 
claimed that Gasunie did not actively anticipate the upcoming changes in the 
European gas scene ‘until late 1998’ (Arentsen 1999, 334); the board noted 
in its 1996 annual report that competitive pressures on the market position 
 
                                                 
19) Third White paper on energy, second chamber of parliament, 1995-6, 24 525 
nrs 1-2. 
20) Ministry of Economic Affairs document BEB/DEI/IM 96066134, sent to 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 October 1996. 
21) Letter of BEB/DEI 96082135 to Parliament, 23 December 1996 and an 
interview with the DG Energy policy, published on the Internet at 
www.profundo.nl. 
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were increasing.22 But Gasunie apparently for long not openly voiced 
concerns over the policy shift towards liberalisation at the Ministry (Correljé 
1997, 171). It was clear, though, that the new paradigm would diminish the 
traditionally high degree of interwovenness of Gasunie and the Economic 
Affairs Ministry, which could be seen in the strong personal links and 
regular contacts between the Ministry and Gasunie. Interestingly, Gasunie 
did act pro-actively on Commission plans to revive plans for a Gas directive. 
As soon as the Irish Presidency tabled new text proposals in 1996, Gasunie 
set up an EU level oriented company lobby, with the aim to influence EU 
decision-making. These lobby efforts were directed both individually at the 
European Commission and through the European industry association 
Eurogas.  
 
As for relevant organised interests and lobbies, in the mid-1997, a strong 
lobby of large consumers and small and medium enterprises was gradually 
emerging, in favour of a more liberal national gas policy. From 
documentation and interviews, the following organisations were identified as 
having contacted DGE about the shaping process of the Gas directive: 
EnergieNed; Gasunie and others. At the same time, large consumer and 
industry associations directed their influence attempts co-ordinated at the EU 
level. 
 
§3.2 Key actors at the EU level 
At the EU level, the European Commission has proven to be a strong actor in 
the drive to liberalise EU energy policy and has been called ‘remarkably 
successful’ in this respect (Newbery 2004, 70). In particular DG IV 
(Competition) pressed hard to convince DG Energy to realise an EU 
regulatory policy in these sensitive policy fields. However, the ‘deep 
mistrust’ by governments and companies led the European Commission to 
design a step-by-step approach, whilst pushing for new legislation in the 
field (Stern 1993, 188).  
 
At the EU level negotiations on energy policy, expert officials represented 
member state governments from central government departments, mostly 
those of Economic Affairs, of permanent representatives and the relevant 
government ministers. As an overview provided by the European 
 
                                                 
22) Press release, Gasunie, Groningen: 8 April 1997. 
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Commission early in the negotiations shows, there were much differences 
between the member states at the start of the negotiations on liberalisation of 
the gas market. Roughly, four groups of member states positions can be 
identified.  
 Firstly, the UK and the Irish delegations, as well as the Netherlands and 
Germany generally sustained the push for liberalisation.23 The position of the 
government of the UK towards gas market liberalisation was ideologically 
and practically inspired. An important supplier of natural gas, the British gas 
market had been liberalised in the mid-1980s, a move motivated and 
legitimated by a revival of liberal ideology in economic policy 
(Thatcherism). A system of short-term natural gas sales has been introduced. 
It has been argued that the United Kingdom ‘initiated the EU reform, but 
knew that it would take time, and in the meantime the national market could 
be protected and developed’ (Andersen 1999, 18).  
 Ireland is geographically dependent upon these developments and 
mirrored the liberal position taken by the United Kingdom. The Netherlands 
and Germany were characterised by a highly organised state-owned gas 
sector but driven by a liberal ideology. The Dutch government regarded 
energy as an industry of primary national importance and interest (Correljé 
1997, 165).24 In Germany, the dominant position of Ruhrgas prevented rapid 
political changes.  
Upon their accession to the EU in 1995, Finland and Sweden also generally 
favoured liberalisation, although these member states were not particularly 
active during EU level discussions. 
 The second group of member states included France, Austria and 
Belgium. These member states were very active in the deliberations on 
public service obligations and market access. From the first meetings 
onwards, the French delegation expressed a reservation due to concerns 
regarding the preservation of existing regulation of security of supply and 
public service obligations. A third group of actors are the ‘developing’ or 
 
                                                 
23) In the working group meeting, a reservation was made because one particular 
formulation deemed ‘not to be sufficiently pro-competitive’ (Interinstitutional 
file nr 5097/97, 9 januari 1997). 
24) The Netherlands natural gas reserve contains 1,2% of the world gas reserve and 
supplies almost 20% of the 4000 billion m3 that the EU uses on a yearly basis 
(2000). Moreover, the country hosts energy-consuming market sectors 
(greenhouse horticulture; chemical industry; transport). 
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‘emerging’ markets and regions. This issue was not originally in the 
Commission proposal but tabled by Denmark, Greece and Portugal during 
the first working group meetings, pressing for a consideration introducing a 
special regime for less mature gas markets or developing markets, as was 
stressed by Spain and Luxembourg. Spain, however, was like the 
Netherlands characterised by a pronounced change in attitude to the new 
directive. In both countries governments decided to move towards opening 
up market more quickly than dictated by the directive (Andersen 1999, 19). 
Finally, a group of member states was hardly present in the Council 
discussion and served as fence sitters. These included Finland,25 Sweden and 
Luxembourg. As large gas supplier and member of the European Free Trade 
Area, the Norwegian government followed the discussion closely but was 
not directly involved in the negotiations between the member states.26  
 
The European Parliament’s first reading of the combined proposal on 
electricity and gas was co-ordinated by its internal Committee on Research, 
Technological Development and Energy. This standing committee, 
composed of representatives of all different political groups, appointed 
Claude Desama (Belgium; PES) as the rapporteur for this directive in 
February 1992. He was charged with assembling the amendments to the 
draft directive in order to prepare for proceeding in the plenary. In 
November 1993, the plenary delivered its opinion at first reading on the 
common position established by the Council, issuing 38 amendments.27 
Immediately, DG Energy drafted an amended proposal.28 Then, a period of 
 
                                                 
25) During the Irish presidency, Finland suggested adding an paragraph about 
member states with a national gas market not connected with any other gas 
market within the EU to be able to apply for transitional regime with 
derogations from access to the system. The Greek delegation supported this 
proposal but it was not included in the final text.  
26) Through the 1994 European Economic Area Agreement, Norway, Liechtenstein 
and Iceland are committed to take over EU legislation relevant to the 
functioning of the internal market. Norwegian officials are present with 
observer status at relevant preparatory meetins where new relevant EU 
regulation is discussed. 
27) Legislative report, 1st reading OJ C 296 01-NOV-93, 8 October 2003, nr PE 
A3-0281/1993. 
28) OJ C 329, 6.12.1993, p. 182. 
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deadlock occurred, until the revival of the directive by the European 
Commission and the Irish Presidency at the end of 1995.  
 In February 1998, the President announced that it had received the 
common position reached at political level of the Council and considered at 
its plenary meetings of March and April 1998. At the latter meeting it 
adopted the draft decision unanimously with 3 abstentions,29 considering 
upon the advice of its rapporteur that the Council text mirrored many of the 
amendments made in its first reading, five years earlier. 
 
The most active and directly involved organised interests were those of the 
industry and consumer organisations. On the one hand, there was Eurogas, 
representing the European gas industry. Although the positions of the 
national industry representatives differed, as was shown during the 
consultation phases of the directive, industry generally was very reluctant as 
regards to because of vested interests in national infrastructure – for example 
pipelines –, which the European Commission wanted to open up for 
competitive use. A second group of industrial interests that however, 
supported the Commission’s initiative and lobbied for extension were large 
industrial customers (like the chemical industry). Organised interests (e.g. 
the chemical industry, the international federation of industrial energy 
consumers) issued several position papers to the Commission, members of 
European Parliament in relevant committees and member state delegations. 
These delegations pressed hard for ensuring further market access, regulated 
instead of negotiated access, as well as a limitation of derogations for long-
term contracts and emerging markets. 
 
 
§4. A bird’s eye view on the decision-making process  
 
§4.1 Agenda setting  
The first discussions on the Gas directive had been taken place in the 
working group on Energy since 1994 where, due to diverging national 
situations, national government positions differed considerably. In 1994, 
deadlock was proclaimed. One staunch opponent of the Commission plans 
was the Dutch delegation, whose main critique focused on (the risks for) 
security of supply and the proposed separation of supply, transport and 
 
                                                 
29) Legislative report, 2nd reading PE A4-0140/1998, OJ C 152 18 May 1998. 
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distribution, which it opposed. For the time being, DG Energy of the 
European Commission took the proposal back, although the Italian Ministry 
of Energy worked on a revised draft in the second half of 1995, about which 
some bilateral discussions were held.30 
 
Upon a co-ordinated initiative of the European Commission and the Irish 
Presidency, the Gas directive proposal was ‘revived’ six month later.31 On 
16 July 1996, the working group on energy had an information exchange 
with responsible Commission officials based upon delegations’ positions as 
formulated in 1994. The Presidency explained that EU level organisation 
Eurogas had failed to reach agreement in the ‘consultation phase’ with 
national gas companies. There was strong disagreement between the national 
representatives, although a majority had argued that, due to the particular 
market structure for national gas, resembling an oligopoly, and the 
investments needed for developing new gas fields and ensuring continuous 
storage and supply, it was impossible to introduce an obligation for holding 
separate accounts for production and distribution.32  
 During the working group meeting, some government delegations 
argued for more flexible EU level regulation, whereas others claimed that for 
developing an internal energy market, existing Treaty provisions would 
suffice and no new proposals were deemed necessary. In order to take stock 
of the particular country situations, DG Energy issued a short questionnaire, 
on the structure of the national energy market in the member states, the 
nature of existing public service obligations and existing regulations and 
contracts.33  
 
In September (3, 10) and October (21, 22 and 28), the Working Group 
discussed a text including delegations’ remarks in footnotes. On the basis of 
the Presidency compromise proposal and the four key questions 
 
                                                 
30) Letter to DG Energy, Rome from Dutch DG Energy, 28 November 1995 about 
provisional remarks to the Italian draft proposal for the natural Gas directive. 
31) Document 5653/94 ENER 19 - COM(93) 643 def. COD 385. 
32) Document 9325/96 overview of proceedings working group Energy 31 July 
1996. 
33) The Dutch reply was sent to the Commission at 21 October 1996. It stresses 
that information on long-term contracts is considered confidential, it gives a 
general overview of existing contracts. 
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subsequently identified,34 on November 5, the High Level Working Party on 
Energy, composed of senior officials from all member states, debated the 
different issues raised. Subsequently, COREPER considered the state of 
affairs on 19 November 1996, concluding that on four key questions, 
‘guidance by the Council will be welcomed’. In the first week of December 
1996, the Energy Council debated a Presidency compromise proposal and 
adopted Council conclusions.35 These recognized the compromise proposal 
as a ‘basis for progress in further discussions’ but noted a considerable 
convergence of views on a number of issues.36  
 
§4.2 Shaping the text: negotiations during the Dutch Council Presidency 
In January 1997, the Netherlands took over the Council Presidency. 
Consistent with the principle of ministerial autonomy, government 
departments were largely responsible for setting priorities in various policy 
sectors for the Dutch stint at the helm.37 As for the Economic Affairs 
Department, the Gas directive was identified a key dossier on which 
progress could be made. In fact, in national parliament, the Economic 
Affairs Minister claimed that the text was supported by a majority of the 
member states and a decision was near.38 The Presidency organised an 
informal High Level meeting in The Hague in February 1997 and drafted a 
compromise on the basis of the outcome of these discussions, the Dutch 
Presidency. In April 1997, the working group reached agreement on the 
issues of emerging markets and market access. Because several issues were 
discussed in parallel, however, it was difficult to estimate whether there was 
a majority in favour of the integral final text. On April 29, a second High 
Level meeting discussed a possible common position, to be reached on 24 
June during an extra Energy Council meeting. Member states were invited to 
address primarily the questions on market opening and long-term contracts.  
 
                                                 
34) Doc. 11140/1/96 ENER 146 CODEC 619.  
35) See doc. 12381/96 PV/CONS 79 ENER 180, Annex I. 
36) The Council conclusions noted, inter alia, a considerable convergence of views 
on five key issues (Public Service Obligations; Unbundling/Transparency of 
Accounts; Access to the System; and Take-or-Pay Contracts and Market 
Opening). See doc. 12381/96 PV/CONS 79 ENER 180, Annex I. 
37) Clingendael Report on the 1997 Presidency, Clingendael Institute The Hague 
1998. 
38) Sources: letter of BEB/DEI 96082135 to Parliament, 23 December 1996 and 
interviews. 
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In May 1997, a new Presidency proposal was examined in COREPER.39 The 
discussion during the Council of the 27th May 1997 focused on three 
particular issues: market opening, take-or-pay contracts and emergent 
markets and regions. The Presidency indicated to decide within a few weeks 
whether the progress made justified one extra Energy Council in June. 
However, due to the French elections in June, the French were not able to 
move their position and the June Council was cancelled. 
 
§4.3 Final negotiations and decision-making 
On 22 July 1997, the Luxembourg Presidency presented a compromise 
proposal40 based upon the Dutch compromise proposals, but including less 
ambitious targets for market opening and new unbundling provisions. The 
negotiations at working group level proceeded and in October and the file 
was sent upwards to Coreper in order to settle unresolved issues. A Council 
meeting on 27 October was exclusively devoted to the Gas directive. In 
December, the member state government representatives meeting in 
Luxembourg reached an agreement on a common position, including 
statements to be entered in the Council’s minutes. A Council common 
position reached in December 1997 was adopted in February 1998.  
 
In May, the European Parliament discussed the common position reached by 
the member state delegations. Considering that it represented a delicate 
compromise, which embodied much of the Parliament’s first reading. The 
rapporteur, Mr Desama (PSE-B), recommended that it be adopted without 
the one amendment submitted by the Committee on Research, Technological 
Development and Energy. This amendment related to the insertion of a 
three-year period for the review clause provided for in art. 28.41 The 
 
                                                 
39) The Presidency considered it appropriate to focus the debate in the Energy 
Council on some of the key issues: market opening, take-or-pay contracts and 
emergent markets/regions. This approach was contested. An annex to the 
Council conclusion stated that the French delegation would point out that the 
Presidency conclusions are binding only on the Presidency and that there has 
been no agreement on their contents. (draft minutes of the 2007th Council 
meeting, 8306/97, 3 June 1997). 
40) Doc. SN 3267/97. 
41) See recommendation for secion reading on the common position established by 
the Council with a view to the adoption of a European Parliament and Council 
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rapporteur also recommended rejecting the three amendments that related to 
the eligibility of combined heat and power producers, presented by the PSE 
and ELDR Groups. All political groups expressed support for the 
rapporteur’s conclusions, although a number of members of the PSE and the 
ELDR Group endorsed the amendments presented. Although the European 
Commission could accept amendment 1, the plenary session rejected the four 
amendments put to the vote and approved the Council’s common position.42 
Thus agreed upon by both Council and Parliament, the final text of the 
directive was signed by the Presidents of both Council and Parliament on 22 
June 1998.43 
 
§4.4 Implementation and evaluation  
The final directive, aimed at a gradual liberalisation of the European gas 
market, has been called a rather ‘open’ directive, cautious in its scope and in 
any case far less reaching than the electricity directive. Although the 
provisions provide an alternative to the pre-existing monopolised system, the 
direct and immediate requirements as to market access are limited. The 
directive has been called weak on unbundling, access and regulatory 
supervision. Even in 2008 member countries can refuse small customer the 
choice of supplier as long as 43 per cent is covered by liberalised system. 
Systems for regulating third party to pipelines are still to be developed on the 
national level. Companies may apply for exception from the third party 
access article, if serious economic and financial problems should arise.  
 The directive contains very few supranational regulations, and the more 
protectionist member countries have achieved considerable freedom to 
regulate national markets in the future. ‘The value of the directive, therefore, 
lies not so much in its specific provisions, which are likely to be rapidly 
overtaken by events, but rather in the fact that it established both the 
principle of access to (pipeline) networks, and the assurance that opponents 
of competition and liberalisation cannot indefinitely procrastinate in the 
opening up of their gas markets’ (Stern 1998, 18). 
 
                                                 
Directive concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas (C4-
0103/98 - 00/0385(COD)). 
42) Decision on the common position adopted by the Council with a view to 
adopting a European Parliament and Council Directive concerning common 
rules for the internal market in natural gas (C4-0103/98 - 00/0385(COD)). 
43) Official Journal L 204, 21.07.1998. 
Going Europe or Going Dutch 
 
 
 
 
146 
§5. Reconstructing negotiations around key issues 
 
This section focuses on the main issues during the negotiations on the text of 
the directive at Council level. During these negotiations, several types of 
comments can be identified, which are registered in footnotes at the bottom 
of a text proposal.  
 
• First, there are the proposals for clarification of the text proposed by the 
European Commission or to align the text with other articles.  
• Second, national delegations can voice a scrutiny reservation over (parts 
of) the text, because new proposals have to be closely examined at the 
domestic administrative or political level before a position can be taken.  
• Third, delegations can express a reservation as regards to the contents of 
the text proposed, but not advance alternatives.  
• Finally, delegations, including the Presidency can forward specific text 
proposals.  
 
The analysis of the shaping process has focused primarily on the latter, as 
these interventions are most related to the advancement of national 
preferences into the negotiation process. 
 
Table 7.2 Controversies in the Gas directive 
Issue Article original proposal Article in final text: 
Public service obligations Art. 3.2 Art. 3 and 4 
Regulated or negotiated 
market access and 
Degree of market opening 
Art. 17 
Art. 18 
Art. 14-16 
Art. 18 
Unbundling and transparency 
of accounts 
Art. 13 Art. 12 and 13 
Derogations for long-term, 
‘take or pay’ contracts 
Art. 20 Art. 25 
Derogations for emergent 
regions / markets 
– Art. 26 
 
A close reading of the minutes of successive meetings of delegations at the 
administrative and political level reveals that the key issues during the 
shaping of the directive included the following five issues.44  
 
                                                 
44) Selection is based upon interviews and paper texts, incl. Internal paper on the 
Dutch position concerning the directive proposals for the realization of internal 
markets for electricity and gas, E/EB/960187, 9 August 1996. 
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§5.1 The imposition of ‘public service obligations’ (art. 3 and 4) 
The original commission Proposal had included an article 3.2, stating that 
governments can impose public service obligations on gas companies as 
regards to the security, regularity and prices of supplies. France and 
Denmark stressed from the first meetings of the group that this provision 
should be extended to include considerations related to security of supply 
and environmental protection, for which a related provision (art 3.3) in the 
electricity directive would be taken over. This proposal was supported by the 
Austrian, Belgian, Spanish, Greek, Luxembourg and (from January 1997) 
the Portuguese delegation, in successive working group sessions. The 
German and the Netherlands delegations argue instead that there is no need 
for public service obligations in the gas market, as other fuels could easily 
substitute gas. The United Kingdom suggests that any obligations should not 
hamper the development of a competitive market. The Irish Presidency 
initially forwarded a compromise proposal for 3.2, which introduced a text 
similar but more limited as compared with the Electricity Directive.45 This 
was included in the final text, but the issue whether to include a new 
paragraph similar to art. 3.3 of that directive, excluding the provisions to 
grant licences if public service obligations would be necessary for the 
general economic interest. This was a proposal of Belgian, French and 
Austrian delegations, opposed by Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands 
that had been effectively downplayed during the Irish and Netherlands 
Presidencies but only came up again in the negotiations on Luxembourg 
presidency draft. The opponents argued that the treaty regulations would 
have prevalence and that such a paragraph would add nothing to that. This 
issue was only solved at the political level, the Council common position 
including a paragraph 3.3 into the final text of the common position and 
included in the final text.46 
 
Another bone of content focused upon the issue of granting licences and 
setting criteria for companies applying to operate gas facilities, storage and 
transmission and distribution lines. Some delegations argued that the issue of 
granting licences should be optional, according to German and Netherlands 
delegation, others that criteria should be determined by the member state 
 
                                                 
45) Art. 3.3 of the electricity directive is not taken over, see 11839/96, COREPER 
to Council, Interinstitutional file 93/365 COD, 7 October 1996. 
46) See 13347/97 common position, 12 February 1998. 
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governments (French and Danish delegations). The Irish presidency proposal 
included a more flexible formulation, limited to ‘in circumstances where 
authorisation is required’ and leaving the criteria to the member states. 
 
§5.2 Market access: regulated or negotiated and degrees of market opening 
(art. 14) 
To provide for access to the market for third parties (Third Party Access, 
TPA) is the central aim of the directive. Before the directive, a company with 
pipelines transmitted its own gas. According to the proposal, it would be 
possible for competitors to gain access to this network. The infrastructure 
also concerns the storage facilities and those for quality conversion. Because 
the national situations diverged, there was much discussion about the 
degrees and modalities of regulating market access. 
 
Third party access was considered a very sensitive topic in a highly 
regulated market. As regards to access to the market, The Commission 
proposal of summer 1996 only included two articles (art. 17 and 18) based 
upon ‘voluntary commercial agreement’, i.e. negotiated access of third 
parties to the network. Traders must negotiate with the supplier about tariffs 
and conditions. As becomes clear from the notes, Sweden, Denmark, Italy 
and the Netherlands expressed their support for this formulation (the Dutch 
delegation suggesting simplification). However, the United Kingdom 
delegation suggested that national experience had shown that the alternative, 
regulated third-party access, would give better results. The draft Irish 
Presidency compromise proposal, issued in October 1996 introduced a 
choice for governments to be made between negotiated third party access or 
regulated access. All delegations agreed on the need for dispute settlement 
bodies. The discussion focused on two elements: the possibility for exclusion 
in the case of public service obligations (a proposal of the Belgian and 
French delegations) and the obligation to publish tariffs (which was opposed 
by the government representatives of Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany 
Italy and Austria). The first was discarded during the Irish Presidency, the 
latter issue was only included in the final text of the common position at 
political level in December 1997. 
 
Discussion about the minimum threshold for market opening proved 
particularly difficult. A quantitative approach would lead to uneven market 
opening because of uneven starting conditions. In September 1996, most 
delegations agreed with the Irish (Presidency) approach on a once-off 
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opening (‘all producers and suppliers able to produce and supply by means 
of a direct line’),47 leaving the eligible customers to the member states. The 
French delegation however, preferred a gradual approach in line with that for 
Electricity. In October, the Commission delegation proposed an approach for 
market opening ‘at least up to a significant level’ – the minimum percentage 
resting upon the share of the annual average Community consumption taken 
up by a type of consumers consuming more than … annually, to be 
calculated by the Commission. It took some time before delegations 
expressed themselves on this proposal, as it was linked with the data on 
market structure to be composed by the European Commission on the basis 
of a questionnaire to be filled out by the member states. Then there were 
derogations proposed, for example by the Portuguese delegation pleading for 
emergent markets, which did not make it in the final text.  
 
In May 1997, the Dutch Presidency in a brief concluded that ‘the criteria of 
the present Presidency proposal have not been completely satisfactory to all 
member states, in particular with respect to thresholds, percentages and the 
consequences’.48 It forwarded a new compromise solution, eligible 
customers being at least power generations and those consuming more than 
25 m3 annually.49 This provision (in art. 18.2) should lead to a 
‘progressively increasing’ market opening, ranging from 30% up to 40 and 
50% after, respectively, 5 and 10 years (art. 18.3). It should result in market 
opening for those consuming more than 10 m3 after 5 years and more than 1 
m3 after ten years (art. 18.4). For the government delegations of Belgium, 
France, Luxembourg, Austria and Denmark, these criteria were far too 
ambitious, for Germany, Finland and the United Kingdom delegations too 
restrictive.  
 
                                                 
47) See art. 18 of the original proposal. 
48) See 7547/97, Presidency to HLWP, 22 April 1997. 
49) The compromise opens the market for all customers consuming more than 25 
million m3 of gas. Five years after implementation of the directive, the 
customers using more than 10 millioun cubic meters will follow and after ten 
years, those from 1 million cubic meters. The text sets a minimum degree of 
market opning at 30% and a maximum of 50% after ten years, in order to take 
account of the differences in the market structures within the Community. Most 
delegations could support the Presidency’s proposed approach. However, the 
Luxembourg proposal cut back these volumes to less ambitious quantities.  
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Not surprisingly, the Luxembourg Presidency text proposal for the directive 
cut back the volumes to less ambitious quantities, setting the percentages at 
respectively 15 and 5 m3/annually (art. 18.5) and relaxing the percentages 
for market opening to a gradual approach ranging from 28% to 35% up to 
40% after ten years (art. 18.5).50 At a political level, the thresholds and 
percentages were discussed in November and December 1997 and finally 
fixed at 33, 38 and 44%.  
 
§5.3 ‘Unbundling’ and transparency of accounts (art. 12 and 13) 
In order to harmonize the conditions under which gas undertakings operate 
and to ensure a neutral management of the different functions within 
vertically integrated undertakings, measures were proposed by the European 
Commission to separate the internal accounts for production, transmission, 
storage and distribution activities.  
 
First, the question was whether there should be unbundling at all. At the first 
open deliberation in July 1997, the German and Netherlands delegations 
explicitly expressed reservations, on the grounds that the confidentiality of 
commercial data is crucial for the negotiating position of gas companies in 
dealings with third country suppliers. Greece, on the other hand, explicitly 
supported the idea of unbundling. The Commission delegation argued that 
some degree of access to information is necessary to obtain transparency of 
competition. Many vertically integrated gas companies do also have a 
production component, and some of their transmission costs could otherwise 
be hidden in the production costs. In December 1996, the Irish Presidency 
compromise proposal suggests a stringent unbundling of accounts, combined 
with the possibility of safeguarding commercially sensitive information. This 
was the basis for the final text. 
 
 
                                                 
50) The final text (art 14-23) of the directive sets the quantitative standards for 
market opening as follows: eligible customers including gas-fired power 
generators and those consuming more than 25 million cubic meters gas per year 
should result in market opening of at least 20% of the total annual consumption 
of the national gas market. After five years this increased to 28% and after 10 
years to 33%. In 2005, the customers using more than 15 million cubic meters 
will follow and in 2010 those from 5 million cubic meters. 
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As to article 13, there was consensus over keeping separate accounts as to 
transmission and distribution (i.e. the natural monopoly activities). A first 
disagreement arose as to the activities to be included in art. 13(3). The 
French, British and Dutch delegations argued for the deletion of production 
in this respect, which the European Commission opposed for reasons of 
transparency. Not surprisingly, the Netherlands presidency compromise 
proposal issued in April took out the reference to non-gas activities and 
production. All delegations but the United Kingdom pressed to re-include 
non-gas activities. Eight delegations argued to add production in art. 13(3), 
which was opposed by the Dutch and British delegations and the 
Luxembourg Presidency drafted a new article 13, similar to the original text. 
This was the basis for the common position.  
 
There was also disagreement on the question whether these separate 
accounts should be published, the French, German, Greek and Irish 
delegations arguing that control by designated authorities would be 
sufficient. Although the Austrian, Spanish, Swedish and British delegations 
suggested including it, it was not taken up in the final text. 
 
§5.4 Derogations for long-term contracts (art. 25) 
One important characteristic of the existing natural gas market before the 
Gas directive was the use of long term ‘take-or-pay’ contracts. For a period 
of 10 to 20 years, these contracts oblige clients of suppliers to take and pay 
minimally up to 90% of the contracted volume, notwithstanding the amount 
that is actually used. The use of these contracts provides sales security to the 
producer and the pipeline investor, upon which they can invest in gas 
production, transport and undertakings. However, long-term contracts could 
also (be invoked in order to) hamper the development of third party access. 
During the negotiations on the Gas directive, three issues were relevant: 
which contracts are eligible for derogations from the market opening that the 
directive proposed, which institution determines this and what the derogation 
would entail.  
 
As to the contents of the derogation, article 20 of the original proposal stated 
that a reason for refusing access would be serious economic difficulties of 
natural gas undertakings resulting from take-or-pay commitments. In that 
case, the member state government should announce the measures to be 
taken to the European Commission. This Commission proposal was actively 
supported by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Instead, France, 
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Spain Greece and Italy, concerned about possible market disorder, argued 
for a ‘preventive’ approach, whereas Germany argued that this is a case for 
the member states and the article should be deleted. According to the Irish 
presidency proposal, member states can apply for a transitional regime if 
sales fall below a level agreed upon in a contract signed before a certain 
date. The Commission could then grant this regime on the basis of certain 
criteria. The Netherlands compromise proposed that the derogation would 
apply to past and future contracts whereas the UK and Irish delegations 
protested that it could not accept any protection for future contracts, as this 
would limit market opening.51  
 As to the lead institution to decide upon derogation the French 
delegation, supported by Belgian, Danish and Austrian government 
delegations proposed that it should be up to the member state to decide. In 
July 1997, the Luxembourg Presidency introduced a more extensive 
procedure, in which it is in first instance the company can refuse access 
when economic problems are encountered. In the final provision, both the 
member state and the European Commission are involved. 
 
§5.5 Derogations for emergent markets and regions (art. 26) 
Some parts of the EU have a lesser-developed market for natural gas. The 
issue of ‘emerging markets’ was not included in the Commission proposal. 
During working group examinations in September, Denmark, Spain, Greece 
and Portugal suggested to include a special consideration in the clauses to 
the directive concerning the specific situation in emerging, in contrast to 
mature, national natural gas markets. The Irish Presidency text included a 
new provision that member states which could demonstrate that problems 
would arise for the operation of their emergent markets would also apply for 
transitional regimes (art. 24(2)). However, several member states stressed 
that the derogations for these markets and regions should be limited in time 
and in scope.  
 
The discussion then focused on the definition of ‘emerging markets’ and 
how these could be protected. The Irish Presidency in a recital defined an 
‘emergent market’ as a Member State in which the first long-term gas supply 
contract is in effect for less than ten years on 2000. Member states could also 
 
                                                 
51) Art 23 and footnotes, Presidency to high level working group, 7547/97, 25 
April 1997. 
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take measures to protect pipeline construction in emerging markets (new art. 
20). This text was redrafted by the Dutch Presidency in a new article 23a, 
which also included a new provision about derogations for member states 
not directly connected to the system of any other member state and having 
only one main external supplier, taking over a request by Finland and 
Greece.52 The Spanish delegation wondered whether it would be possible to 
have similar provisions for ‘developing markets’ and Luxembourg was 
sympathetic to this proposal, including a new provision 23a(3) on emergent 
regions, the latter being defined in the final text as a ‘geographically limited 
area’.53 
 
The issue was dealt with by an informal High Level Working Party meeting 
in The Hague on 20-21 February 1997. Two alternatives were proposed: 
adding an annex to the Directive, listing emergent regions, and leaving the 
qualifications as an emergent region to the Commission as a part of the 
procedure for granting derogations. The idea of an Annex to the Directive 
was widely supported and member states were invited to put forward the 
regions they want to be included in the Annex. However, in the successive 
working group meetings it turned out that designing the annex was very 
complicated. Consequently, attention turned again to the definition. Finally, 
it was decided to mark the whole of Portugal and Greece as emerging 
markets and to add a list to the directive of the regions considered immature. 
 
 
§6. A reconstruction of Dutch shaping attempts 
 
This section sets out by reconstructing influence attempts by the Dutch 
government in the three successive stages of the policy cycle: agenda setting; 
negotiations and decision-making. Subsequently, upon the basis of this 
reconstruction, a critical evaluation is made of the influence attempts of the 
Dutch government in these stages. 
 
 
                                                 
52) See footnote 69, p 16 doc 11839/96, 21 November 1996. 
53) See doc. 11839/96, COREPER to council, 21 November 1996 
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§6.1 Reconstruction of the shaping process 
 
Agenda-setting 
In §3.1 reference has been made to studies estimating how much text 
proposals would resemble final decisions. However, in the case of the Gas 
directive, the text has been considerably adapted and reformed in the course 
of the negotiations, to the extent that only a small number of provisions are 
still recognisable in the final text.54 This can be explained by the differing 
positions of the member state delegations, only a minority (the UK, Irish, 
Netherlands and (to a lesser extent) German government delegations) 
sharing the Commission’s drive for liberalisation.  
 
From interviews, it appears that there were no regular contacts with the 
relevant European Commission services (DG Internal Market; Competition) 
aimed at influencing the internal processes of drafting the proposal, during 
the period when the directive proposal was drafted (1994-1996). This can 
mostly be due to the fact that at that time, the Dutch government was in the 
middle of a mind shift towards liberalisation of the energy sector and was 
preoccupied by intensive internal discussions about the conditions for 
liberalisation. The revival of the negotiations by the Irish presidency in the 
spring of 1996 paralleled an internal reorganisation of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, in which, as one respondent puts it, ‘a number of the 
share holder protagonists were replaced by more liberally minded officials’.  
 
From internal documents, it becomes clear that the apparent shift in position 
towards a more liberal energy policy causes internal discussions well into 
1996. In May, the Cabinet of the Dutch Euro-Commissioner demands 
clarification of the negotiating position taken, arguing that this can be 
detrimental to national economic interests. A special brief was drafted in 
order to explain the Dutch position during a high-level meeting.55 Although 
the initiative for liberalisation can be supported, not all elements of the 
proposal are deemed acceptable, such as the issue of cost transparency, 
which should be ‘avoided’, and the issue of unbundling, an alternative for 
which could be the introduction of a regulatory agency. In the internal 
 
                                                 
54) Upon the basis of a limited comparison of the proposal and the final decision. 
55) Document E/EOG/G/96035245, 30 May 1996, letter from coordinating official 
to DGE. 
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preparations for its 1997 Council Presidency, starting in Spring 1996, the 
Ministry of Economic affairs tabled the Gas directive as one of the key 
dossiers. It was decided that a common position should be reached during 
the Dutch Presidency, although the government minister warned that this 
would be not an easy task.  
 
During a high level meeting in November 1996, the key elements of the 
Dutch negotiating position were set. The most important issues were market 
access, long-term contracts and emerging markets. The first and latter were 
relatively easy, but the second issue concerned a sensitive issue for the 
Dutch, which insisted on derogations for future contracts against the wish of 
a majority of the participants. The Irish draft, which had been discussed with 
the Irish representatives during bilateral meetings, was regarded as close to 
national preferences and negotiating positions. However, for tactical reasons 
the Dutch delegation voiced a number of reservations, concerning the issues 
of unbundling and public service obligations.56  
 
Negotiations  
From several sources, including a spring 1997 brief to Parliament, it can be 
concluded that the Ministry of Economic Affairs initially was rather 
optimistic over its chances to reach political agreement over the directive. ‘A 
compromise is in sight’ as regards to the issue of market opening (Van 
Gelder 1997) and the same held for the emerging markets.57 As far as these 
issues were concerned, the Netherlands held a relatively liberal position, 
which is clear from the nature and frequency of its contributions that are 
registered in the accounts of the working group meetings. Its coalition 
partners are the United Kingdom and Ireland, at the more liberal dimension. 
The main opponents were the more protectionist member states, most 
prominently France, Italy and also Germany where the market is dominated 
by strong monopolies. The Director-General of Energy visited the latter 
three member states and the EU, while his deputy visited a number of other 
member states. These visits aimed at taking stock of preferences and 
positions and getting to know key players.  
 
 
                                                 
56) See internal paper Developments Directive Internal Market Gas, to the 
Minister, E/EOG/G/96066000, 17 October 1996. 
57) See Second Chamber 1997-8, 21 501 – 14 nr 39, p. 5. 
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The issue of take-or-pay contracts proved one of the most difficult issues to 
solve during the Dutch Presidency, as this issue was particularly sensible due 
to the large economic interests of the Netherlands.58 To Parliament, the 
government minister explicitly promised to take the Dutch position into 
account and ‘not to act directly contrary to Dutch interests, even more so 
because the Netherlands is one of the most important players in this regard’. 
However, the feasibility of this promise had to be doubted, as the run-up to 
working group meetings in March 1997, the issue was formulated 
‘differently than NL would wish’.59  
 
During the Presidency, two high level meetings were organised. In February, 
the senior officials from the member states were invited in at the natural gas 
site in Slochteren, were a tour of the site was offered and informal 
deliberations on the directive proceeded. According to one anonymous 
respondent, the compromises discussed here have influenced the 
proceedings, although the mood in the industry at that time was still 
predominantly sceptical about the possibility of reaching a compromise.60  
 
During the second high-level meeting, agreement seemed possible. An 
internal note of the Ministry discusses how ‘the member states are moving 
towards each other’.61 However, some crucial issues still stood out, including 
the discussion on TOP, emerging markets and emergent regions. In June, it 
was concluded by the officials involved that even without the upcoming 
French elections, which made the French position difficult, the chance for 
success was regarded small.62 For that reason, the informal Energy Council 
scheduled for 24 June was cancelled by the Presidency. This result was 
 
                                                 
58) Note that long term contracts are important to Gasunie, although their relevance 
is limited in comparison to long distance suppliers. In 1996, Gasunie’s sold 40 
billion m3 gas to Germany, Belgium, France, Italy and Switserland under long-
term contracts. 
59) Letter to the Minister of Economic Affairs in February 1997, 
E/EOG/G/9716120, 11 March 1997. 
60) An electronic survey showed that a majority of industry representatives present 
at the meeting ‘Europen Gas Strategies’, 25-27 February 1997 in Amsterdam 
did not believe in political agreement reached before June 1998 (Gelder, J.W. 
van: A Free market without Gas? In: Profundo, April 1997). 
61) Document E/EB/97028045, 1 May 1997. 
62) E-mail letter 6 June 1997 from co/ordinating official to colleagues. 
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considered disappointing – but in a letter to all delegations, the co-ordinating 
officials indicated that they still considered the process as satisfying.63  
 
In response to a grateful letter sent out by the Dutch delegation to their 
negotiation partners upon the end of the Presidency, it is explicitly remarked 
by the French and Britisch delegations, that given the limited time and 
resources at their disposal the Dutch have done the best they could to steer 
the negotiations towards a decision acceptable to all. As a main disturbing 
factor, delegations point at the coincidence of French central government 
elections that made it virtually impossible for the Dutch delegation to reach 
political agreement in June 1998. 
 
Decision-making 
In a letter to parliament about the proceedings of the Presidency, the 
Minister estimates the chance for political agreement to be ‘larger than 50% 
but less than 90%’.64 During the final months of negotiations, three essential 
issues are highlighted in the instruction to Dutch delegation: an ambitious 
degree of market access; clear derogations for take-or-pay contracts 
including a distinction between existing and new contracts and in regard to 
unbundling, to leave production out of the final text. Other issues, including 
emerging markets and public service obligation were relevant were indicated 
to serve as ‘change money’. Several member states have particular 
objectives (Greece and Portugal: emerging regions; Netherlands: 
unbundling). At this point it is clear that if the Presidency proceeds to voting, 
a majority could be reached. The instruction signals that the constructive 
tone should be kept but reservations should be maintained ‘when France and 
affiliated parties do not show any willingness to move’.65  
 
However, due to the French elections that made the French position unclear, 
the extra Council meeting on 24 June was cancelled at the last moment. The 
Luxembourg Presidency issued a draft which became the basis for the final 
text. To the regret of Dutch negotiators, as regards to unbundling and 
Chinese walls, the Luxembourg draft was considerably more ambitious than 
the Dutch draft. 
 
                                                 
63) E/EOG/G 97037653, 18 June 1997. 
64) Second Chamber, 1997-8, 21501-14 nr 39. 
65) COREPER instruction paper, 28 November 1997. 
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§6.2 Development of positioning and influence on key issues 
Although the issue of exclusive concessions for public service operations 
was welcomed in the Italian draft discussed at the end of 1995, the more 
liberal stance of the Dutch government was clearly visible in the negotiations 
from 1996 onwards. The dominant view of the Dutch delegation was that 
public service obligations should not hamper the degree of market access. 
The main opponent in this respect was the French delegation. A bilateral 
meeting at the level of Directors-General served to clarify a few points 
related to the directive.66  
 
The Irish draft text included internal unbundling of accounts but did not 
regulate publication of tariffs. Initially, the Dutch government was reluctant 
as regards to the issue of account unbundling, considering the dominant 
position of Gasunie. The Irish proposal could serve as a compromise, but for 
tactical reasons, the Dutch delegation stressed that confidentiality of 
company data should be secured. This position was advanced during the 
Dutch presidency but the Luxembourg Presidency draft included much 
stricter provisions for ‘Chinese walls’ between the different parts of the 
company. 
During a bilateral meeting in November 1996, the French delegation makes 
it clear that it will not block progress and is open to ‘some’ liberalisation. 
However, it is opposed to gradual market opening, it rather would support 
one principal step and successive revisions. 
 
Initially, DGE was very reluctant towards the discussions on third party 
market access, as this could allegedly damage the central coordination of 
supply and demand by Gasunie and thereby the investment planning (Moor 
and Boels 1995). The Dutch position was based upon a strong preference for 
negotiated access to the market. This was in line with the preference of 
Gasunie, the major pipeline owner. The degree of market opening should be 
a rapid and uniform, in line with the Commission proposal. Because the 
United Kingdom expressed a very strong preference for a system of 
regulated access, the Irish Presidency proposal to leave the choice to the 
member states was included in the final text. As to the degrees of market 
opening, in line with their preference for a level playing field and the results 
 
                                                 
66) Document E/EB/960243.PP, visit report to Paris for EU Presidency, 27 
November 1996. 
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of the high level working group meeting, the Dutch pressed for ambitious 
levels in a draft issued early March. To their regret, these were pressed back 
by the Luxembourg presidency, the draft of which proved to be the basis for 
the final text. 
 
The Dutch delegation had a strong interest in the issue of derogations for 
existing take or pay obligations, due to the long-term contracts that Gasunie 
held throughout Europe. This was a relatively easy position as this point was 
effectively taken up by a coalition of member states. The minutes of the 
different Council-level deliberations do not show any Dutch interventions as 
regards to this issue. However, the Dutch were vehemently opposed to the 
issue of including future contracts, which became very hot during the 
Presidency and as to which the Dutch finally had to give in.  
 
The issue of emerging markets and regions unexpected proved to be one key 
difficulty in the course of the negotiations. The Dutch delegation did not 
have strong preferences at the beginning but this emerged as a key issue 
during its Presidency. This forced the Presidency delegation to come up with 
text proposals, including an annex listing the different emerging markets and 
regions. 
 
 
§7. Discussion 
 
This section is concerned with an assessment and evaluation of the ways in 
which the Dutch government delegation has attempted to influence the 
proceedings resulting in the European Gas directive 98/30/EC. For this, we 
deploy the framework for analysis that has been introduced (see table 7.3), 
according to which shaping capacity of a national government regarding EU 
policy-making is a combination of its motivation to shape policies and its 
potential to realise these ambitions and preferences.  
 
A first relevant variable in this case study was relative issue saliency, from 
which the Gas directive could benefit from the start. A respondent compared 
the proposal to a ‘rubber duck’ – largely due to the strong pusher role of the 
European Commission, assisted by subsequent Council Presidencies, it 
emerged again and again. 
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Table 7.3 Relevant variables for the Dutch’ governments shaping capacity in the case of the 
Gas directive 
Shaping 
capacity 
Will Potential 
Stable 
variables  
AMBITIONS  
 
Supplier of 25% of EU natural 
gas; economic heavyweight 
semi-monopoly of natural gas 
sector; policy shift from foot-
dragger to pace-setter 
 
CAPABILITIES  
 
High expertise as regards to energy, expert 
co-ordination; institutionalised relation with 
private sector (Gasunie); departmental 
autonomy; strategic competencies in wake 
of Presidency; member of core group of 
‘liberal’ countries; dense bilateral network, 
close contacts with DG Energy 
Situational 
variables 
PREFERENCES  
 
Initially: bad fit, adapted to 
changing domestic preferences;  
Commission initiatives for 
liberalisation ran parallel with 
domestic political impetus; role of 
personal pusher Minister; 
negotiating position not extreme; 
coincidence with Council 
Presidency 1997 impacted upon 
preferences 
RESOURCES 
 
Issue salience increased during Presidency: 
more resources allocated; dossier 
coordination at junior official level; later 
upgrading of delegation; close co-operation 
with the national Permanent Representation 
to the EU; no institutionalised contacts EU 
institutions; flexible use negotiating position; 
use of bargaining tactics disputed 
 
The influence of the Commission has thus been strong in the phases of 
initiation and agenda setting, but its impact is less visible in the negotiations, 
which were dominated by text proposals by conservative government 
delegations. That the Directive remained salient was due to disagreement 
between the member states both to the idea of liberalisation and the 
elaboration of the directive text and the divergence of national situations and 
preferences. But due to the active involvement of successive Council 
Presidencies, the issue was kept alive.  
 
The Dutch government negotiation position took some time to materialise, a 
finding that can be explained by two variables: the initial misfit between the 
directive and existing Dutch policy arrangements in combination with the 
large degree of fragmentation of the domestic playing field. First, the 
account of the shaping of the Gas directive shows that unstable political 
preferences can work wonders in overcoming ‘misfit’. Its initially reluctant 
stance is can be explained by its economic situation as a supplier country 
with a national oligopoly for natural gas production, for which the 
government was a shareholder. The draft Gas directive provided for 
liberalization of the Dutch gas market, which ran counter to the position of 
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Gasunie as a monopolist in the market. It hence implied a great policy misfit 
and also, the institutional misfit was large. Since there were no legal rules 
concerning the transport and delivery of gas, a whole new regulatory 
framework needed to be erected. 
 As to fragmentation: the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the key player 
representing the formal link between the domestic and the EU level, was 
internally divided. DGEnergy was for long able to put its mark upon the 
discussion at the EU level, by suppressing the Commission proposals and 
allying with likeminded coalition partners. Its reluctance against 
liberalisation was translated into a strategy that was aimed at frustrating 
further plans.67 The document analysis shows that for achieving this goal, 
coalitions and alliances with the likeminded were actively sought, although 
influence attempts focused on the administrative level venues in the Council. 
According to observers, the controversy surrounding the first European 
Commission initiatives towards IEM has meant that Economic Affairs has 
‘placed itself on the sidelines’ (Schout 1998, 145) during the policy initiation 
phases. In the meantime, internal discussions were ongoing between the 
more conservative departments, most notably the energy specialists with 
strong ties with the industry, and the propagandists of change within the 
Ministry and at the Foreign Affairs department. At the other side, the more 
internationally oriented DG Foreign Economic Relations pressed for the 
formulation of realistic negotiating positions. Although policy experts 
normally retain a relatively large impact upon the process in which Dutch 
negotiating positions for EU-policy are determined (Van den Bos 1991), 
DGE became convinced of the need for a new policy paradigm.  
 
Here, the variable political pressure is relevant, more specifically the 
political change initiated by the coming into office of the first ‘purple 
coalition cabinet’ (Social-Democratic, Liberal and Social-liberal parties). At 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs, it was Social-Liberal Minister Wijers who 
took up the task of getting the ministry towards liberalisation. It is not easy 
to determine whether it was indeed the political drive, personified by Wijers, 
which was responsible for the change in policy paradigm. It has been argued 
that the purple coalition was in general more internationally oriented than its 
predecessors, putting more emphasis on global developments in the field of 
liberalisation. Ideological factors would hence explain its favourable stance 
 
                                                 
67) Internal paper E/EG/92007017, 23 January 1992. 
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towards the realisation of an internal energy market. However, this political 
impetus came at a time in which already many interdepartmental discussions 
were taking place within the government between more liberally oriented 
actors and the traditional stakeholders of national energy policy. For that 
reason, it is difficult to deduce whether and to what extent the process of 
domestic political change, instigated by the coming into office of a new 
coalition government, and the continuous push, of the European 
Commission, for energy liberalisation, are to be considered as separate or 
interrelated.  
 
During the negotiations at Council level, however, the Dutch government 
ranked as an active shaper. Apart from political pressures and a resulting 
policy paradigm, this can be explained by the coincidence of the negotiations 
with the Netherlands EU Council Presidency in 1997. Probably largely due 
to the office of the Presidency, the Dutch government delegation has been 
very active in anticipating, planning and elaborating a negotiating strategy 
aimed at reaching political agreement over the text of the new Gas directive 
as soon as possible. The Presidency made the Dutch even more responsible 
for reaching results. This was very clearly formulated in negotiation 
instructions.68 This particular period in the chair offered the Dutch 
government delegation the ‘power of the pen’: the possibility to formulate 
compromise texts according to its own preferences. The ambition to 
conclude the negotiations on the directive text under their national 
Presidency led to an effective increase in resources that could be used in 
terms of human capacity and political involvement. Where, during 
negotiations under the Italian and Irish Presidencies, the Dutch position was 
represented by a junior government official with only little experience in the 
field, during the Presidency the dossier was followed by a departmental task 
force. Three officials were involved in the negotiations on a day-to-day basis 
and there was close collaboration between the delegation and the working 
group chair, a high level official from the Dutch Permanent Representation 
to the EU.  
 
 
                                                 
68) See for example preparatory documents for the High Level group meeting on 
Gas, 5 November 1996, E/EB/96069271, 1 November 1996: ‘Considering the 
Presidency, it is not wise to be bound to extreme positions’ (p. 2). 
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The focus thereby was on the Council-level of interstate negotiations, 
whereas the European Commission and – even more so – the Parliament 
were only side-players. The few contacts that materialised focused on 
providing information about the Dutch position and were channelled via the 
Permanent Representation. One relevant official notes in this respect “it was 
hard enough as it was to reach agreement in the Council, this compromise 
was so fragile, and the European Parliament should not have intervened”. In 
contrast, the Gasunie lobbyist spoke extensively with MEPs in the relevant 
committees, for example through the European Energy Foundation, a group 
hosting dinners on a monthly basis.  
 
Then, about co-ordination. Interestingly, notwithstanding the MFA’s formal 
co-ordination authority for EU affairs, which has been intensified during 
Council Presidencies (see Van Keulen and Rood 2004), the documents and 
interviews show that as regards to this particular dossier, its involvement 
was limited to their participation in the interdepartmental venues were 
progress was reported. This is interesting in view of the high issue salience 
of the topic. Apparently, the tradition of departmental autonomy is stronger 
than the push for intensified co-ordination that surrounds peak periods of 
national EU policy, such as a Presidency. 
 
Where its economic clout and position as a chairman during the last phase of 
negotiations facilitated Dutch shaping attempts, the degree of internal 
fragmentation in combination with conflicting preferences as regards to the 
desired degree of market opening have negatively impacted upon Dutch 
shaping capacity. The Dutch government position was not consistent, for 
example, the delegation pushed for market access, whereas as to the issues 
of publication of confidential company information and the push for 
derogations for long-term contracts, its position was far less progressive. The 
latter issues were motivated by the wish to preserve the strategic interests of 
the Netherlands as a supply country, or more adequately: the national gas 
building.  
 
The capacity of the Dutch government to shape the Gas directive has been 
determined by its relative economic clout in the energy sector; by the 
domestic political drive towards introducing forms of market access in the 
energy sector and thereby its capacity to overcome initial misfit of the draft 
directive with existing rules. Negatively impacting upon its shaping capacity 
was the internal fragmentation and discord about future energy policy. 
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Internal efforts to overcome initial reluctance to liberalisation impeded 
effective influence attempts at an early stage of Commission deliberations. 
However, this relatively re-active stance in the pre-negotiation phases could 
be remedied by one particular situational variable, namely the coincidence of 
the decision making process with the national EU Council Presidency which 
contributed to the resources available and strengthened the negotiating 
strategy at Council level.  
 
Finally: has the Dutch government been successful in its attempts to shape 
this directive? Although this study is about the process of government 
shaping, instead of assessing influence on the negotiation results, it should 
be noted that there is broad consensus amongst respondents that the Gas 
directive can be considered a case of successful Dutch interest 
representation. At the same time, an internal evaluation at the leading 
department has concluded that more could have been done in terms of 
strategy and prioritising at an early stage. It is interesting to compare this 
process with the negations on a largely similar EU dossier, which ran in 
parallel with deliberations on the Gas directive. The next chapter will focus 
on the shaping of the Biopatent directive. 
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Chapter 8 
Shaping the Biopatent Directive  
 
§1. Introduction  
 
The directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions (or 
Biopatent directive 98/44/EC) has been judged one of the most hotly 
contested pieces of EU legislation ever. Rapid politicisation of ethical 
concerns made the shaping of this initially rather technical directive 
particularly contentious (Earnshaw and Judge 1995, Kamstra et al. 2002). 
The Dutch government delegation initially classified as being particularly 
active in the negotiation phases. However, due to a parliamentary 
reservation, it voted against adoption of the directive in the final Council 
meeting where the text was passed with a qualified majority of delegations 
voting in favour. 
 
This chapter is concerned with a reconstruction of the negotiations over the 
draft text of this directive in the period 1995-1998. The purpose of the 
analysis is analyse how the Netherlands government shaped this particular 
piece of legislation and which of the variables identified in chapter 4 can be 
identified in this process. The reconstruction is structured according to the 
principles of ‘intensive process analysis’, a method for public policy analysis 
aimed at assessing the influence of actors within a decision-making process.1  
 
 
 
                                                 
1) See for more on the research design chapter 6. 
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§2. The decision context: backgrounds 
 
A legal patent entitles the holder to prohibit others to commercially exploit 
an invention. To be eligible for patenting, an invention should concern a new 
product or process, which is industrially applicable and sufficiently 
innovative. The key bone of contention of Biopatent legislation is the 
distinction between inventions and discoveries from nature, such as plants 
and animals, which are generally considered as non-patentable. National law 
may regulate the exploitation of inventions, according to standards such as 
safety, public heath, animal welfare and/or ethical standards.  
 Whereas all EU member states have national patenting laws, they are 
also members of the 1973 European Patent Convention.2 This convention set 
general requirements for patentability of inventions that originate in one of 
the signatory states. However, when it came to newer processes and 
products, such as those in biotechnology, this legal framework was 
considered insufficient. This at least was the opinion of DG Internal Market 
of the European Commission, which in a 1988 proposal for new legislation 
argued that this uncertainty could hamper the functioning of the internal 
market.3 EU legislation on patents was deemed indispensable in order to 
increase the global competitiveness of the biotech industry in the member 
states. The proposal for a directive regulating the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions aimed at the harmonisation of national 
legislation on biotechnology patents.  
 
The draft of the ‘first’ Biopatent directive was technical in character.4 
Government delegations in the Council voiced reservations, for example 
about patenting human gene sequences, but these could be accommodated in 
the course of two years of negotiations. However, because the Council was 
 
                                                 
2) The European Patent Office in Munich is an intergovernmental treaty 
organisation not related to the European Union. In 2000 and 2001, it published 
25024 applications concerning new patents for biotechnological products and 
processes. 10 per cent of these applications originated in Dutch companies. 
3) COM (88) 496 final – SYN 159, 17 October 1988; OJ No C 10, 13.1.1989, p. 3. 
4) Explanatory note with the new Commission draft proposal 
(COM/1995/663/final): ‘(…) not that the ethical dimension was ignored but, at 
that time, it appeared that the exclusion from patentability of inventions, the 
publication of exploitation of which would be contrary to public order or 
morality […], met the need to take into account the ethical dimension’ (p. 5).  
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unable to accept Parliament’s amendments issued in its ‘second reading’ of 
the text, a ‘conciliation procedure’ was initiated in September 1994. After 
long deliberations, this group meeting of national government 
representatives and members of the European Parliament approved a text for 
an adapted proposal and paved the way for a political solution. However, the 
absolute majority for adoption of the compromise was not reached and the 
proposal was rejected.5 This has been explained by political inexperience: it 
was the first time that the Parliament used its right to veto a directive 
according to the ‘co-decision-procedure’.6 Moreover, the Parliament’s 
delegation in this committee was internally divided, so that in the plenary 
they ‘failed to act cohesively, let alone strategically’ (Judge and Earnshaw 
2003, 261). Third, MEPs were most probably influenced by the ‘No Patent 
on Life’ campaign by Greenpeace and pro-life organisations, protests voiced 
during a 2-day public demonstration outside the plenary.7  
 
The European Commission and the member state delegations, which had 
approved the text in earlier instance, were ‘infuriated’ to go through the 
whole process again (Paterson 2003, 339). But mounting criticism on the 
ethical considerations of biopatenting notwithstanding, DG Internal market, 
led by Commissioner Mario Monti decided to draft a new proposal.8 This 
text, issued in December 1995, was to become Council and Parliament 
Directive 98/44/EC. The reconstruction of the agenda setting and 
negotiations and decision-making on this Biopatent directive is central to 
this chapter. 
 
 
                                                 
5) It has been suggested that the fact that the plenary took place in Brussels also 
contributed to the defeat of the vote of the committee, as plenary meetings in 
Brussels tend to be less well organised than those in Strasbourg (Earnshaw and 
Wood 1999, 296). 
6) The co-decision procedure was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, which 
entered into force in 1993. This suggestion is forwarded in an internal letter on 
the EP’s voting behavior to the State Secretary of Economic Affairs, 3 March 
1995. 
7) For adversaries, the Biopatent directive is known as the Life Patent Directive. 
8) COM/95/661/final 
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Table 8.1 Key dates in the shaping of the Biopatent directive 98/44/EC 
1988  December: proposal Biopatent directive issued by DG Internal Market 
1995  January: Joint text conciliation committee rejected by the European Parliament 
December: DG Internal market issues new text 
1996  WG intellectual property discusses proposal 
1997  July: First reading European Parliament 
November: Internal market Council reaches common position 
1998  May: European Parliament accepts common position 
July: signature Council and European Parliament 
2000  July: Deadline for implementation 
 
 
§3. Identifying key actors 
 
§3.1 Actors at the domestic level 
In comparison with other member states, patent law is relatively important 
for the Dutch economy, which is composed of many R&D-intensive 
company sectors. At the time of the negotiations over the Biopatent directive 
the Department of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Economic Affairs was 
responsible for co-ordinating biotechnology policy. When specific issues, 
such as human genomes or breeder’s rights came up, the government 
departments of Public Health and Agriculture were involved in the drafting 
of the Dutch negotiating position. However, central co-ordination was in the 
hands of a senior Economic Affairs official. It was this official who was 
responsible for representing the Dutch government position in the Council 
working group on Intellectual Property / Patents / Biotechnology. In order to 
ensure the link with the implementation phases, the responsible official was 
assisted by an expert from the national Patent Office (Bureau Industriële 
Eigendom),9 the office responsible for the implementation of the directive.  
 
Both delegates sat as observers on the Netherlands biotechnological 
industry’s interest organisation (NIABA: Netherlands’ Biotech Industry 
Association) Committee on Industrial Property Rights, in order to ‘facilitate 
information exchange’ between the industry and the government department 
responsible for national biotechnology regulation.10 
 
 
                                                 
9) Since 2005: Nederlands Octrooicentrum. 
10) Source: anonymous interviewee. 
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As to the organised interests, on the pro-side of the directive was the national 
biotechnology industry, organised in NIABA. This organisation represents 
the majority of the Dutch biotechnological companies in healthcare, food, 
agriculture and environment and is active in the fields of lobbying and 
advising governments as regards to biotechnology. It is a member of 
Europabio, the European Association for Bio-industries representing 25 
national associations, which deals with information exchange and interest 
representation as regards to EU biotechnology legislation. NIABA works 
through Europabio when it comes to influence attempts directed at the EU 
level, but also operates individually, for example by organising formal and 
informal discussions with Dutch MEP’s. 
 
Opponents of the subject matter were animal welfare organisations 
(Dierenbescherming) and environmental lobby groups (Alternatieve 
Konsumentenbond, Milieudefensie). The reconstruction shows that their 
shaping actions were primarily directed at the Ministry of Economic affairs, 
during the phases of agenda setting and negotiation. The main bone of 
content was the scope of protection of animals suffering from biotechnology 
and whether this provision should include a proportionality clause. Once the 
Biopatent directive was adopted, the NGO’s were quoted as being ‘deeply 
unhappy’ with the directive text11 and continued their lobbying efforts 
directed at national parliamentarians held responsible for transposition and 
implementation into national law. 
 
§3.2 Key actors at the EU level 
DG Internal Market at the European Commission was without doubt the 
main pusher behind the agenda setting and drafting of both the 1988 and the 
1995 text proposals for common Biopatent legislation. The speed by which a 
new text was drafted in 1995, just after the European Parliaments’ plenary 
rejection of the first draft, has been explained by both economic and political 
reasoning (Kamstra 2001, 215). Interest organisations uniting biotech and 
the pharmaceutical industries were furious about Parliament’s rejection. 
Large economic interests were claimed to be at stake by the legal vacuum 
between national and international patent laws and.  
 
                                                 
11) According to a spokesman for the Netherlands animal welfare group 
Dierenbescherming, quoted in Reformatorisch Dagblad, 12 May 1998. 
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The Commission argued that the uncertainty as regards to the scope of legal 
protection for biotechnological inventions had only increased since 1988. 
This view was disputed, however. Respondents question the added value by 
the new directive claiming, first, that the issue matter was actually 
sufficiently regulated by the European Patent convention and, second, that 
biotech research advances at a pace in which keeping legislation up to date is 
virtually impossible. Third, experts are of the opinion that the legal 
requirements for patenting should not be confused, in principle, with ethical 
considerations as to the effective granting of patents. The latter can always 
be regulated at the national level. Thus, political considerations played an 
important role in the Commission-drive exhibited in the agenda-setting 
phases. DG Internal Markets’ push for the directive is understood by its 
desire for EU involvement in the ‘booming’ biotechnology sector and to 
broaden the scope of its competencies.  
 
In drawing up the proposal, the Commission departments consulted with 
industry associations, relevant experts and various interest groups.12 During 
the shaping process, the ‘chef de dossier’ had frequent contacts with the 
MEP rapporteur and a number of Committee delegates as well as the 
representatives from the member states, EPO and WIPO and the industry. He 
was also heading the Commission delegation at the working group level. 
 
During the negotiations, the member state governments were represented at 
Council level by experts, permanent representatives and the relevant 
government ministers. The delegations’ positions can roughly be 
summarised in two groups. First, the Spanish, Belgian and Danish 
delegations were very active in proposing working documents including text 
amendments for specific articles in a number of instances and the French 
delegation was active in proposing rewordings of particular articles.13 
Regular comments as to the contents of the directive were put forward by the 
Italian, French, Netherlands, Austrian, German and UK delegations. Second, 
with the exception of issuing a number of scrutiny reservations, the Irish, 
Swedish, Greek, Portuguese, Luxembourg, Finnish, Belgian and Italian 
 
                                                 
12) See the proposal text for an overview of consulted parties. 
13) See the comments made in the consolidated text 21 October 1997. 
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delegations were less active in shaping the proposal text. They may have 
bandwagoned with other delegations, but seldomly put forward initiatives.14  
 
The draft text of the new Commission proposal was received by the 
European Parliament in January 1996, in order for the text to be examined in 
parallel with Council deliberations. After some initial discussion, the 
responsible committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights appointed Willi 
Rothley (GER/PES) rapporteur for the directive; an unprecedented number 
of five other committees were also charged with drafting opinions. In June 
1996, the Committee held a hearing of experts, followed by monthly 
meetings to June 1997. On 15-16 July, the plenary meeting in Strasbourg 
voted on the amendments in the first reading, of which many emanated from 
the European Parliament’s Green group, which had delivered three of the 
five draftsmen in the committees. The Legal Affairs Committee tabled 64 
amendments and 2 additional amendments by the Socialist group. The 
Commission had already signalled before the vote to take in an amended 
proposal, which it immediately issued in August 1997.  
 
The European Parliament received the common position of the Council in 
March 1998. Almost all of the EP’s amendments were taken over in this 
position although opponents fought for support for introducing only a single 
amendment, which had been adopted in first reading. This could have led to 
a ‘conciliation procedure’. However, upon advice of the rapporteur the 
directive was adopted unamended by a majority in the May plenary. Even at 
this point, the directive remained highly contentious and many MEP’s voted 
against.15 Whereas Dutch MEP Elly Plooy (ELDR) was quoted as being very 
content with the directive –fellow national MEP Maartje van Putten (PES) 
claimed that the directive gives too much freedom to ‘commercialism’.16 
 
As to organised interests and lobby groups active at the EU level, from the 
first parliamentary deliberations, the directive was targeted by interest 
 
                                                 
14) Their tacit support notwithstanding, Belgian and Italian delegations in the end 
abstained from voting in the Council meeting of November 1997. See below. 
15) Report of the EP’s plenary meeting, 12 May 1998.  
16) Quoted in: Reformatorisch Dagblad, 12 May 1998. 
Going Europe or Going Dutch 
 
 
 
 
172 
groups and patient and industry associations (Patterson 2000).17 Support 
came from the biotech and pharmaceutical industry, including the European 
Board of Chemical Industry Federations (EBCIF), from patent organisations, 
including the European Patent Office (EPO), as well as from patient’s 
organisations interested in the exploitation of inventions (under the heading 
‘no patents no cures’). On the other side of the spectrum, the moral, ethical, 
health and environmental dangers and risks associated with exploiting 
scientific knowledge were highlighted by interest groups such as 
Greenpeace, Friends of the earth and pro-life organisations. The European 
Coalition On Biotechnology Patents, including 40 NGO’s, was created in 
December specifically as a lobby-platform for the second reading in 
European Parliament.18 
 
 
§4. A bird’s eye view on the shaping process 
 
§4.1 Agenda setting 
Although the Commission underlined the similarities between the 1988 and 
1995 proposals, the latter was obviously more carefully drafted as regards to 
a number of contentious issues discussed in the European Parliament. The 
text explicitly aimed to make clear which issues were patentable and which 
were excluded from patenting. One of the main features concerned the 
principle that inventions concerning plants and animals (art. 4.2) as well as 
isolated human elements (art. 3.2) may be patentable, provided that the legal 
requirements for patentability apply. Moreover, the directive defined the 
exceptions, amongst which the exclusion of patentability of plant and animal 
varieties (art. 4.2) and inventions where exploitation is deemed conflicting 
with considerations regarding public order and morality (art. 9). The draft 
text was not subject to much controversy within the European Commission 
and was sent to the Parliament and the member states in December 1995.  
 
                                                 
17) Rapporteur W. Rothley at his address to the plenary on 15 July 1997: ‘The 
European Parliament has been under considerable pressure over the last few 
days, not only here in the House. The Protestant Church in Germany, my own 
church, allowed Greenpeace to stage a children’s crusade against this Directive 
at its General Assembly’. 
18) See for example: Press statement: Greenpeace calls on European Parliament to 
halt patenting of life, Brussels, Greenpeace, 14 July 1997. 
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§4.2 Shaping the text: 1 ½ year of negotiations 
The Working Group on Intellectual property/patents/biotechnology 
discussed the draft text during a number of (bi-) monthly meetings under 
Irish Presidency in January, March, April and June 1996. Text proposals 
were issued, inter alia, by the Spanish delegation, which suggested a number 
of reformulations of the original proposal, and by the Belgian delegation as 
regards to the incorporation of an EP amendment.19 Within the European 
Parliament, the regular processes of ‘inter-service consultation’ about the 
directive took a relatively long time, because of the complex subject matter 
and so many committees were involved. The Committee on Legal Affairs 
and Citizens’ Rights appointed Mr Willi Rothley rapporteur. In June 1996, 
the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights held a hearing of 
experts followed by meetings in January, February, April, May and June 
1997.  
 
From the beginning of the examination of the second draft proposal, MEP’s 
were actively lobbied by interest organisations. These represented 
environmental concerns, patient organisations, developing countries and 
animal welfare groups. It took until Summer 1997, when the amendments on 
the draft text, as formulated in six Committees were discussed in the plenary. 
The plenary accepted the proposal with 66 amendments. These related, inter 
alia, to the difference between discovery and invention in connection with 
the isolated elements of the human body; the exclusion from patentability of 
animal races and plant varieties; procedures for human reproductive cloning 
and processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings; 
the requirement that the ethical dimension must always be taken into account 
and the possibility that this dimension can be suitably appraised; the 
substantial medical usefulness of the inventions in question must be 
balanced with the suffering that certain inventions could inflict on animals 
and redefining the farmers’ privilege concerning the sale of breeding stock 
animals. The Parliament also requested the incorporation of a reference to a 
new Advisory committee on ethical implications (art. 7), which would assess 
biotechnological dimensions.20 
 
                                                 
19) Interinstitutional file nr 95/0350 COD, nr 6673/96, 19 April 1996. 
20) The Commission on Legal Affairs voted on the draft with 16 votes to 5, with 3 
abstentions. The plenary voted 513 MEP’s, 388 in favour (more than 75%), 110 
against (Kamstra et al, 2001, 8). OJ C 286 22 Sept 1997, p. 87. 
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The comments by member state delegations and the amendments of the first 
reading were incorporated by those responsible at the Commission’s DG 
Internal Market. The amended text, including 65 of Parliament’s 66 
amendments, was approved by the College in August 1997.21 In response to 
the comments, the draft, inter alia, made more explicit the unpatentability of 
the human body in all stages of its development.22 Moreover, it mentioned 
explicitly the non-patentability of human cloning and techniques for 
modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings and techniques 
making use of embryos and proposed a non-exhaustive list of issues deemed 
contrary to the public order and morality (art. 6(2)), including cloning, 
methods using a human embryo and methods likely to cause animal 
suffering without any substantial medical benefit. In response to the 
Parliament’s request for a particular committee, the Commission delegation 
proposed to have the ethics committee replaced by its standing group on 
biotechnology. The latter and one final amendment, concerning the 
international commitments of the Union, were contested by the Commission 
delegation.  
 
When the working group continued its examination of the amended 
proposal, it was agreed that the Luxembourg Presidency aimed for political 
agreement be during the December Internal Market Council meetings. From 
this moment, the Danish and Netherlands delegations maintained scrutiny 
reservations, because of domestic parliamentary opposition to the draft 
directive.23 The working group continued the examination of the amended 
proposal in September and October, a consolidated draft being published on 
21 October.24 Two questions regarding the reference to international 
agreements (art. 1) and a new ethics committee (art. 7) were put before a 
COREPER meeting on 31 October. Both issues were solved at the level of 
the permanent representatives, there being broad consensus with the 
 
                                                 
21) Amended proposal COM 10510/97, August 1997. 
22) From the first negotiations on the draft text, the Spanish delegation had been 
very active in proposing the use of human being instead, but this suggestion 
was discarded by the majority of delegations in September 1997 (see nr 
10893/97). 
23) Summary of proceedings of the working party meetings 10 and 11 July, 
10285/97, 31 July 1997. 
24) General Secretariat to working party: Consolidated text, 11252/97, PI 45, 
CODEC 528, 21 October 1997. 
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exception of the reservations of the Netherlands and Danish delegations 
regarded the patentability of (inventions concerning plants and) animals. For 
its meeting in November, COREPER was invited by the Presidency to see 
whether these reservations could be withdrawn, but the committee was not 
successful in this respect.  
 
§4.3 Final decision-making 
In December 1997, the internal market Council voted on the amended text of 
a common position, the result being a Luxembourg presidency compromise 
over the last remaining issued. A common position was reached with a 
qualified majority, the Netherlands delegation voted against conform its 
reservation. The Belgian and Italian delegations abstained from voting. 
Interestingly, Italy had changed its position at the last moment, due to an 
intensive lobby campaign by four NGO’s including Greenpeace and WWF 
Italy which managed to involve parliamentary committees on Biotechnology 
and thereby made the Italian government reverse its opinion.25  
 
The Council common position being sent to Parliament, the Parliamentary 
Committee on legal affairs adopted the common position without any 
amendment. In the plenary, however, 60 amendments were discussed, but all 
were rejected because the necessary majority could not be found.26 
Especially the Greens expressed their furiousness about what they 
considered the ‘weakness of the Parliament to surrender to lobbyists’.27 The 
 
                                                 
25) In October 1997, WWF Italy and Greenpeace launched an appeal against the 
‘life patent directive’ with was subscribed by dozens of NGO’s. In November, 
the government delegation abstained from voting. According to respondents, 
this change of position can be directly attributed to the domestic public unrest 
as regards the issue, as Italy had not been active in the shaping stages thus far 
(source: interviews).  
26) In its recommendation to the plenary, the Commission on Legal Affairs on 30 
April 1998 again voted divided: 17 votes to 7, with 2 abstentions. In the 
plenary, 432 members voted in favour, 78 against. Whereas in the second 
reading of the co-decision procedure, an absolute majority of 314 votes were 
needed, no amendment reached more than 221 votes. See note from GS, 11 
May 1998, nr 8400/98. 
27) The European Parliament clearly placed commercial interests over ethical 
values’ Magda Aelvoet MEP, Co-President of the Green Group in the EP said 
after the final vote. 
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Council in its meeting of 25 May adopted the directive in accordance with its 
common position as an A-item and the directive was published in the official 
journal and is referred to with number 98/44/EG. 
 
§4.4 Implementation and transposition  
Opinions diverge on the impact of the Biopatent directive on the practices of 
patenting biotechnological inventions. According to industry representatives 
in favour of harmonization of diverging national patenting practices, the 
directive is ‘merely a compilation of existing legislation and case law’ 
(source: anonymous interviewee). From interviews, it can be assessed that 
the European Commission is satisfied with the final result – the Biopatent 
directive is considered a relatively clear and consistent directive, which 
leaves little scope for interpretation to the member states. Critics have 
argued, first, that the directive confuses the practical regulation of patent 
applications with ethical considerations regarding public order and morality 
whereas the latter should be regulated at the national level. This divergence 
of opinions has led to a politicisation of an otherwise technical subject 
matter. A second critique is that because the text is a fragile compromise, its 
complex provisions can be interpreted freely (Beylevelt et al. 2000, 158).  
 
Although this analysis focuses on negotiating the directive, it is relevant to 
outline the subsequent processes of implementation and transposition in the 
member states (see also Mastenbroek and Van Keulen 2005). With 
hindsight, pushers for the directive could argue that was adopted ‘just in 
time’, considering the debates in civil society and amongst organised 
interests about the ethical dimension of biotechnology, which emerged in the 
implementation phase, for example in France. The directive, which had to be 
implemented in national legislation by January 2000 has been contested in 
eight member states, which were taken to Court by the European 
Commission in September 2003.28 This Court case included the Netherlands 
as in the eyes of a majority in the Dutch Second Chamber, the directive 
 
                                                 
28) According to the Commission: ‘Non-implementation of this Directive is putting 
the European biotechnology sector at a serious disadvantage. Despite the 
Commission’s efforts to co-operate closely with them in order to try and 
accelerate the implementation procedure, the member states concerned failed to 
reply satisfactorily to formal requests in the form of reasoned opinions – sent 
by the Commission in December 2002’, Source: Press Release 10 July 2003.  
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conflicted with the national patent law (Rijksoctrooiwet 1995). Just after the 
adoption of the text at the EU level, the Dutch Second Chamber requested 
the government to lodge legal action with the Court of Justice to have the 
directive annulled.29 The bone of contention lied in the provisions on 
patentability on genetically modified plants and animals. Most notably the 
PvdA and the CDA factions argued that the government could have done 
more to uphold the exclusion of inventions concerning plants and animals. In 
October 2001, the Court denied the request for annulment, making clear that 
the Netherlands had to implement the directive.  
 
In the following debates between government and Parliament, which focused 
on the interpretation of provisions from the directive and national patent law, 
both sides requested advice from different authoritative institutions, such as 
the University of Amsterdam.30 Most amendments, including the most 
controversial nr 11, dealing with the patentability of inventions concerning 
plants and animals, were adopted by Parliament in April 2002. The Upper 
Chamber subsequently dealt with the issue, but delay occurred due to a 
period of domestic political unrest after the murder of Pim Fortuyn in May 
2002 and the coming into office of the successive coalition governments 
Balkenende I and, shortly thereafter, Balkenende II. Finally, on the basis of a 
special novelle-procedure,31 the Upper Chamber endorsed the 
implementation in November 2004. The ECJ has withdrawn the pending 
court case from its registers in February 2005, thereby for once and for all 
taking away the fear that the Netherlands could still be penalised for 
transposition the directives five years after the deadline. 
 
 
 
                                                 
29) Lower House Parliamentary papers 19744 nr 23, ECJ Case C-377/98; October 
19, 1998. The objections were primarily ethical in nature, but the Netherlands 
primarily challenged the proposal’s legal base, claiming, inter alia, that the 
directive should have been adopted using Unanimity instead of Qualified 
Majority Voting, that it infringes upon subsidiarity provisions (Kamstra et al. 
2001, 67).  
30) Lower house parliamentary papers 26568 nr C, p. 4. 
31) A novelle is a bill correcting a bill that is pending in the Upper Chamber. 
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§5. Reconstructing negotiations around key issues 
 
This section will focus on the main issues during the negotiations on the text 
of the directive at the legislative stages of Council and Parliament 
deliberations. During these negotiations, three types of comments can be 
identified: clarification proposals, scrutiny reservations and specific text 
proposals. The analysis of the shaping process has focused primarily on the 
third category, as these interventions can be supposed to be most related to 
the advancement of national preferences into the negotiation process. The 
successive phases in the reconstruction are based on the method of process 
analysis (see for more on the research design chapter 7). 
 
A close reading of the minutes of successive meetings of delegations at the 
administrative and political level reveals that the key issues during the 
shaping of the directive included the following five issues.32 
 
Table 8.2 Controversies in the Biopatent directive 
Issue Article original proposal Article in final text: 
Scope of protection 2 and 4 2 and 4 
Relation to international 
agreements 
17 and 7 1  
Requirements biological 
material  
– 26 and 27 
Farmer’s privilege 13 11 
Ethics committee – 7 
 
§5.1 Scope of protection of biotechnological inventions (art. 2 and 4)33 
The proposal of the European Commission stated in art. 4.2 that ‘biological 
material including plants and animals (...) except plant and animal varieties 
as such shall be patentable’. During the first deliberations in the working 
group on intellectual property-patenting, several government delegations 
including that of the United Kingdom proposed to add a definition of plant 
variety to the definitions in article 2. This proposal was opposed by the 
 
                                                 
32) There were issues around which negotiations centred for some time, such as the 
order of articles which was redrafted by the Commission to include the 
definitions before the other provisions and the wish expressed by the delegation 
of the United Kingdom to provide for the possibility of a redraft, upon which 
the Commission reacted that it was entitled to send a redraft to the member 
states any time it wished.  
33) Article numbers refer to the final text. 
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Spanish, French and Commission delegation, which argued that such a 
definition is included in Regulation 2100/94/EC and it would necessitate a 
definition of animal variety. Subsequently, the Belgian and Spanish 
delegations argued to include a definition of animal variety. The 
Commission delegation argued that animal variety had never been defined 
and would lead to complications. The French delegation proposed a redraft, 
so as to avoid the need to include a definition of animal variety, but this 
imitative was opposed by the Danish delegation, which insisted on avoiding 
all possible references to a product patent for animals in the text, this issue 
was not taken over in the final text of article 2.3.  
 
When the working group at its meeting in July 1997 took up examinations of 
the amended proposal, after the ‘first reading’ by the European Parliament, 
two reservations were voiced, both related to the scope of the directive. The 
Danish delegation voiced concerns about the exclusion of processes for 
modifying the somatic genetic identity of human beings for cosmetic 
purposes. The working group did not go into this discussion, arguing that 
nothing in the directive prevented the Danish government to include its 
concerns (which it did in an unilateral statement concerning article 6(2b)). 
The Netherlands delegation indicated that, although it was ‘prepared to 
consider the proposal favourably’, it continued to oppose the issue of 
patentability of inventions concerning plants and animals.34 This reservation 
originated in national parliamentary concerns: in a June 1996 motion, 
members of parliament had warned the responsible Minister of Economic 
Affairs that it would oppose European legislation that it considered 
conflicting with relevant national legislation. In particular, reference was 
made to a provision in the national bill on patents (Rijksoctrooiwet) in which 
the possibility of patenting inventions concerning plants and animals had 
 
                                                 
34) ‘Summary of proceedings’, working party on intellectual property 
(patents/biotechnology), 31 July 1997, interinstitutional file nr 95/0350, nr 
10285/97. This position is explained to the Parliament in a letter of the state 
secretary for Economic affairs, 19744 nr 21, 26 September 1997. It states that 
‘In case the positions of the member states do not change, the possibility that a 
directive is issued including a provision that has been explicitly deemed 
undesirable by your Chamber should be taken into account’ (p. 3). 
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been explicitly excluded after long discussions between the executive and 
the legislative during debates on the new bill in 1993.35  
 
When negotiations proceeded between the member states at Council working 
group level from summer 1997 onwards, the Netherlands delegation 
expressed its reservations on art. 4 during all subsequent Council-level 
meetings. The delegation attempted in vain to have the difference between 
scientific discovery and patentable inventions, in particular as regards to art. 
5 of the amended proposal relating to human body parts, applied explicitly to 
inventions concerning plants and animals. This suggestion was rejected by 
the other delegations, which explicitly doubted the need for this provision.36 
The Netherlands Council delegation finally voted against the common 
position, which was endorsed by a qualified majority in May 1998. 
 
§5.2 Relation to international commitments (art. 17 (deleted) and art. 7) 
The relation to international commitments of the EC and the member states 
was relevant in two instances. Firstly, as regards to the provision related to 
the burden of proof. This was regulated in art. 17 of the original proposal, 
where the burden of proving that a new product is not the same as a patented 
process, lies with the producer of the new product taking into account the 
legitimate interests of the protection of the defendant’s business secrets. This 
provision was explicitly supported by a number of delegations (German, 
Spanish, Austrian, Portuguese, United Kingdom and Danish). However, the 
Italian delegation argued that the corresponding article 34 of the Agreement 
on Trade-related Aspects of International Property Rights (TRIPS) allows 
the burden of proof to be reversed also if there is a substantial likelihood that 
the identical product was made by the patented process. Supported by the 
French and Netherlands delegations, it argued that the directive proposal 
should not be confined to only one of those conditions.  
 
In a later meeting, the German delegation argued that it had received 
information that the second option in the TRIPS treaty had been included to 
 
                                                 
35) Second Chamber: Motie 18(19744), 27 June 1996. Opposition came from 
social-democratic (PvdA) and christian-democratic (CDA) parties, as the 
liberals and social-liberals were not very outspoken as to this dossier. 
36) Summary of proceedings working group meetings 10 and 11 September 1997, 
issued 25 September 1997, nr 10893/97, p. 2. 
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satisfy a third country whereas the EC had been accepting only the first 
option, that was now included in the draft proposal.37 Having considered 
these remarks, the Commission delegation decided, after the working group 
meeting in July, to delete article 17, since this would add nothing to existing 
international commitments. Second, in its first reading, the European 
Parliament proposed replacing the original reference to national and EC 
legislation in 7.2. with a reference to the rights and obligations of the 
member states pursuant to international agreements, in particular the 1992 
Biological Diversity Convention and the TRIPS Agreement.38 The Council 
legal service delegation argued that this would add nothing to the existing 
obligations in view of the case law. However, it was judged by all 
delegations in the working group and the Commission delegation that ‘given 
the sensitivity of the subject matter of this directive (…), transferring the 
content of this provision to the recitals could be interpreted negatively’ by 
the European Parliament.39 This consideration was taken over by Coreper in 
November and in its common position, the Council concurred with the 
Commission on this point. A new recital was added, stating that this group 
may be consulted only where biotechnology is to be assessed. The Council 
was motivated by the wish ‘to remove all doubt about the possibility of this 
Group being involved in the procedure for issuing a specific patent’.40 The 
TRIPS agreement was also subject of a proposal by the Belgian delegation to 
bring art. 6(1) on the concept of public policy, fully in line with the working 
of art. 27 TRIPS. This was discarded by the other delegations.41 
 
 
                                                 
37) Outcome of Proceedings, working party meeting 15/16 April 1996, doc 
8334/96, 18 June 1996, p. 5 
38) This amendment was nr 45 tabled by the rapporteur and nr 67 by the ELDR 
group. See information note on the outcome of the 1st reading, General 
Secretariat, nr 10103/97, 22 July 1997. 
39) Doc. 11559/97 presidency to CORPER 24 October 1997, interinstitutional file 
35/0350. 
40) Statement of the Council’s reasons, Common Position, nr 12882/1/97, 3 March 
1998, p. 7. 
41) Summary of proceedings of the working party meeting on 6 November, nr doc 
12688/97, 24 November 1997. 
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§5.3 Requirements concerning inventions consisting of biological material 
(recitals 26-27) 
In first reading, the European Parliament proposed a new article 8a in its 
amendment 76, requiring patent applications to indicate the geographical 
origin and to provide evidence that the material was used in accordance with 
the export provisions, and an application of human material should publish 
the name and address of the person of origin. According to the European 
Commission delegation, this amendment could not be taken over in the 
proposal, as these provisions would go beyond the international 
commitments of the member states and the Community in the 1992 
Biodiversity Convention, as well as be contrary to requirements on the 
protection of personal data. The latter were also relevant in the discussion on 
a new article proposed by the Danish government delegation, taking over 
recital 16f included by the Parliament (about the free and informed consent 
required if body material is taken from a human being). The Danish 
delegation insisted on the inclusion of a new article, the issue was submitted 
to COREPER and Council-level. This request was joined by the Belgian 
delegation including a new wording of recital 16f.42 A majority of 
delegations including that of the European Commission argued that this 
would constitute exclusion additional to the list already collected in article 
6(2). The question whether this should be a unilateral statement by the 
Danish delegation or the Council and the European Commission was put to 
the Council. 
 
These concerns were taken over by the government ministers meeting in a 
plenary Council session in December. They argued, furthermore, that the 
patent’s office would not be able to verify the compliance with foreign 
legislation or that the agreement and consent of the person involved had 
been given. However, in the recitals, features of this amendment relating to 
the opportunity of the person from whose body material is taken to express 
‘free and informed consent’ (recital 26) and the information on the 
geographical origin of the material (recital 27). 
 
§5.4 Derogations for farmers or ‘farmers’ privilege’ (art. 11) 
The Commission delegation had foreseen in the proposal an important 
agricultural derogations from patent rights: when the material is sold to a 
 
                                                 
42) See note P to Council, 21 November 1997, nr 1249397 p. 11. 
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farmer to use the product of its harvest or the protected livestock for further 
propagation or breeding purposes on his own farm. This derogation is called 
the ‘farmer’s privilege’ and was regulated in article 13 of the original 
proposal. In June, the working group took over a text proposal by the 
Committee on Agricultural Organisations and the General Committee on 
Agricultural Cooperation’s to change the wording of article 13.1 (‘the sale of 
propagation material’) to ‘the marketing of reproduction material’. This 
suggestion was explicitly supported by the Belgian, German, Irish, Austrian 
and British delegation, under the condition that the text would be agreed 
upon by the Parliament. The text proposal was taken over by the Parliament 
and included in the final text by the Commission delegation. 
 
§5.5 Reference to an Ethics Committee 
The European Parliament proposed in its amendment 78 to introduce a new 
article concerning an Ethics committee to be set up to assess all ethical 
aspects of biotechnology, for which the European Commission should 
propose a composition and terms of reference. The Commission felt it 
appropriate not to set up a new body to this aim and referred instead in a new 
article 7 to its Advisers Group on the ethical implications of biotechnology, 
which existed since 1991.43 The Council legal service argued that the 
legislative was not empowered to assign tasks to a group set up by the 
Commission and suggested to refer this new article 7 to a recital, which was 
supported by the Italian delegation, whereas the Danish delegation wished to 
keep it as an article. COREPER finally decided to take over the 
Commissions proposal but included a provision to art. 7 that the ‘group may 
be only consulted where biotechnology is to be assessed at the level of basic 
ethical principles, even where it is constituted on patent law’.  
 
 
§6. A reconstruction of Dutch shaping attempts 
 
This section sets out by reconstructing influence attempts by the Dutch 
government in the different stages of shaping of the directive, as identified in 
§3. Subsequently, upon the basis of this reconstruction, a critical evaluation 
is made of the process and results of these influence attempts. 
 
 
                                                 
43) Presidency to COREPER, 24 October 1997, nr 11559/97. 
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§6.1 Reconstruction of the shaping process Agenda setting 
The prime responsibility of the Ministry of Economic Affairs for the co-
ordination of the decision-making process and subsequent implementation of 
EU legislation concerning biotechnology and intellectual property was never 
disputed. This role was considerably facilitated, as the Dutch attitude 
towards harmonising national regulation concerning biotechnological patents 
was rather favourable. More specifically, the Economic Affairs Ministry is 
closely related to industry and favours ‘communautarisation’ of the single 
market and related initiatives for policy harmonisation at the EU level. The 
negotiating position of the officials involved in formulating and representing 
the Dutch government position was therefore rather positive as to the 
objectives of the first drafts of the Biopatent directive. It should be noted that 
these officials have close relations with the national biotechnology industry 
organisation and there is regular expert feedback between the industry 
associations and the Ministry. In the case of the Biopatent directive, during 
the negotiations, comments on text proposals for the directive have been 
regularly exchanged.  
 
With hindsight, it is remarkable to note that the first drafts of the Biopatent 
directive did not draw any attention from organised interests – with the 
exception of the (traditionally strong) agricultural lobby. The ethical 
dimension was completely absent from what was considered a largely 
technical harmonisation debate. Although some delegations had voiced some 
concerns about the application to human material, a majority of delegations, 
including that of the Netherlands, stood firmly behind the compromise 
agreed upon at a political level between European Commission and the 
Council in 1994.44 However, the first Biopatent directive failed because of 
the effective engagement of various organised interests opposed to what was 
called ‘patenting life’ (see Paterson 2000, Kamstra et al. 2001). The political 
level effectively took up these public concerns in the phase of the second 
reading by European Parliament, which ultimately led to rejection of the text 
in March 1995. However, although Dutch NGO’s were involved in this EU 
level lobby campaign, from the documents and interviews consulted it does 
not appear as if this ‘rapid politicisation’ of the draft directive in 1994-1995 
 
                                                 
44) Letter to Second Chamber, 19744 nr 15, 17 April 1996, p. 10: ‘The Netherlands 
has exercised the necessary influence as regards the draft-directive, which has 
been rejected by the European Parliament’. 
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was mirrored at the domestic level. There is no mention of contacts with the 
Dutch government and the European Commission in order to influence the 
shaping of a new text, which was the subject of discussion between the 
Commission and member state delegations from January 1996 onwards. 
 
Negotiations 
In the first six month of discussions at the administrative level, the Dutch 
delegation appears as a moderately active participant. The delegation did 
express concerns and reservations but usually bandwagoned with concerns 
voiced by other delegations. No text proposals were issued. At the domestic 
level, the debate started in April 1995, when the working group had already 
discussed the directive several times. Dutch Parliament had just passed in 
1995 a revision of the national law on patents (Rijksoctrooiwet) including 
provisions that explicitly excluded the patentability of inventions concerning 
plants and animals, articles that ran contrary to the European Patent 
Convention and the proposed directive text. During parliamentary 
deliberations on this bill, there had been important political battles over an 
amendment sustained by a majority of the House, declaring inventions 
concerning plants and animals unpatentable. This was eventually taken up in 
the bill (art. 3).  
 
During these parliamentary proceedings, no reference was made to 
proceedings at the EU level, where the European Commission had been 
drafting a directive with precisely this controversial issue as a defining 
element. This is remarkable considering the fact that the coordinating actor 
in both cases was the Economic Affairs Ministry. However, the ‘BNC-
fiche’, a summary by which parliament is informed about the consequences 
of Commission proposals, defined the main point of departure of the 
proposal: the difference between unpatentable discoveries and patentable 
inventions (if new and technological) and that plants and animals are not 
excluded from patentability. The paper explicitly did not identify 
implementation problems.45 The Dutch delegation had agreed with the 
common position on the draft directive in 1994 and the State Secretary of 
 
                                                 
45) Second Chamber Parliamentary Papers, 1995-1996: 22112, nr 60, p. 3. 
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Economic Affairs claimed not to foresee any problems with the ‘fit’ of a new 
directive.46 
 
Decision-making 
When, in spring 1996, national parliamentarians made it very clear to the 
responsible Cabinet minister that there could be no question of any 
circumvention of national patent legislation through new EU legislation, 
negotiations on the Biopatent directive had just been suspended in 
attendance of the Parliament’s second reading.47 When negotiations resumed 
in summer 1997, the Dutch negotiating instruction was explicitly adapted to 
take into account parliamentary opposition concerning the provision on plant 
and animal patenting. However, as this concerned an element considered 
‘central to the text’,48 the Dutch concerns could not be accommodated in the 
course of the negotiations. Thus, when on 27 November 1997, the 
Luxembourg presidency compromise text was approved by a majority of 
delegations in the Environment Council meeting, the Dutch delegation voted 
against, with the Belgian and Italian delegations abstaining. It should be 
noted that the document analysis reveals that the State-Secretary for 
Economic affairs initially preferred to abstain from voting during the formal 
adoption of the Biopatent directive. However, the colleague within Cabinet 
responsible for European affairs convinced her of the desirability of a no-
vote.49 
 
§6.2 Development of positions and influence on the key issues 
The proposal of the Commission stated in article 4.2 that ‘biological material 
including plants and animals (...) except plant and animal varieties as such 
shall be patentable’. The reconstruction has made clear how the discussion 
focused on the inclusion of definitions of plant and animal varieties.  
 
 
                                                 
46) Second Chamber Parliamentary Papers, 1994-1995, Parliamentary question nr 
653 appendix. 
47) ‘…We do not want to be governed by the EU’s directives’, quote MP R. Poppe, 
source: Second Chamber proceedings, nr 81-5232. 
48) Quote from fax letter Ministry of Economic Affairs, to the Netherlands 
Permanent Representation to the EU, 3 March 1997, p. 2.  
49) Internal Letter dated 12 April 2005. 
Chapter 8   Shaping the Biopatent Directive 
 
 
 
 
187 
In April 1996, when working group deliberations at the EU level were in full 
course, the State Secretary sent a letter to Parliament explaining the 
provisions in the draft directive relating to the patentability of plants and 
animals.50 The rather complex explanation deals with art. 4.2 of the draft text 
and stresses that ‘the exclusion of plant and animal varieties [from patenting] 
cannot be interpreted that inventions of which the protection extents to plants 
and animals should fall outside the scope of patent law’. In a subsequent 
legal interpretation, the state secretary claimed that the scope of protection 
would only extent to those elements, which have been changed by technical, 
human intervention. It was stressed, however, that this is a mere 
interpretation of an otherwise legal subject and may be contrary to the 
explicit inclusion of plants and animals in article 4.2. Because the state 
secretary argued that the directive provides otherwise clear provisions as 
regards to the grounds for exclusion of patentability (art. 3 and 9), including 
those related to morality and public order and included a farmers’ and live 
stock breeders privilege, ‘in broad lines’, it would merit the support of the 
Dutch government and the Ministry pleaded for a constructive position of 
the Netherlands government in the negotiations over the directive at Council 
level. This would favour the creation of a level playing field in 
biotechnological industry.  
 
In subsequent exchange of letters and a plenary debate over the congruence 
of the existing patent bill with the new directive proposal, this interpretation 
was opposed by a majority of the House. The Second Chamber requested the 
State Secretary by means of two political motions to oppose the issue of 
patenting plants and animals at Council-level.51 At that point, the state 
secretary expressed her concerns about the feasibility of this request. In 
October 1996, she avoided answering the question whether the Ministry 
would have pleaded by the European Commission for changing art. 4.2, 
stating that the deliberations at Council level were momentarily suspended 
 
                                                 
50) Second Chamber 18(19744), 27 June 1996. Opposition came from social-
democratic (PvdA) and Christian-democratic (CDA) parties, as the liberals and 
social-liberals were not very outspoken as to this dossier. 
51) Second Chamber 1995-6, 19744 nr. 17 and 18. 
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during the Parliament’s second reading.52 From the moment that 
deliberations continued over the amended proposal including parliamentary 
amendments, in July 1997, the Netherlands delegation expressed it 
reservations. This position was held during all subsequent Council-level 
meetings and voted against the common position endorsed by a qualified 
majority in May 1998. 
 
The relation to international commitments of the EC and the member states 
was an issue coming up in the course of the negotiations. From the 
documents, it can be concluded that the Dutch government delegation was 
moderately active in the discussion as regards to art. 17, related to the burden 
of proof and the relation with TRIPS. The Italian and the German 
delegations have largely dominated this discussion, the latter arguing on the 
basis of information gathered over the interpretation of this particular 
international treaty. This resulted in the European Commission withdrawing 
its proposal for an article text.  
 
There is no written proof of any intervention from the Netherlands 
delegation as regards to the amendment of the European Parliament 
proposing an explicit reference, in art. 1, to the rights and obligations of the 
member states pursuant to international agreements. There was unanimity as 
regards to the political sensitivity of the subject matter and the need to take 
over the EP’s proposal in the final text. 
 
In the first reading, the European Parliament proposed a new article 8a in its 
amendment 76, requiring patent applications to indicate the geographical 
origin and to provide evidence that the material was used in accordance with 
the export provisions, and an application of human material should publish 
the name and address of the person of origin. According to the Commission 
delegation, this amendment could not be taken over in the proposal, as these 
provisions would go beyond the international commitments of the member 
states and the Community in the 1992 Biodiversity Convention, as well as be 
contrary to requirements on the protection of personal data.  
 
 
                                                 
52) Question asked by MP’s Witteveen and Voute concerning biotechnology, sent 
31 October 1996, answered 12 November 1996, Second Chamber, 1996-1997, 
nr 283. 
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These concerns were taken over by the government ministers meeting in a 
plenary Council session in December. They argued, furthermore, that the 
patent’s office would not be able to verify the compliance with foreign 
legislation or that the agreement and consent of the person involved had 
been given. However, in the recitals, features of this amendment relating to 
the opportunity of the person from whose body material is taken to express 
‘free and informed consent’ (recital 26) and the information on the 
geographical origin of the material (recital 27). 
 
The farmers and breeders privilege was an issue explicitly welcomed by the 
Dutch government in its brief to Parliament. This can be explained by the 
traditional national economic importance of agriculture. The text proposal by 
the two agricultural interest organisations was not explicitly supported by the 
Dutch delegation but consensus was reached over inclusion of this wording 
in the amended Commission proposal. 
 
The Dutch government has not been explicitly mentioned in a summary of 
proceedings over the debate concerning European Parliament amendment 
78, to set up a new article about an ethics committee to be set up to assess all 
ethical aspects of biotechnology.  
 
 
§7. Discussion 
 
This section is concerned with a first assessment and evaluation of how 
Dutch government representatives have attempted to influence the 
proceedings leading to the adoption of the directive on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions. For this, we deploy the framework for analysis 
that has been introduced in chapter 4 is deployed (see table 8.3).  
 
At the time of the first steps of the European Commission into the field of 
biotechnology, in the late-1980s, the legal base for Commission involvement 
in this field was contested. The subject matter was considered to be regulated 
sufficiently by the European Patent Office. But when the first text proposal 
for the Biopatent directive was published in 1995, the legal base for 
community-level action was no longer a source of dispute between member 
states delegation. DG Internal Markets’ push for the directive should be 
understood in the context of its desire to increase the EU’s involvement in 
the ‘booming’ biotechnology sector. 
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Table 8.3 Relevant variables for the Dutch’ governments shaping capacity in the case of the 
Biopatent directive 
Shaping 
capacity 
Will Potential 
Stable 
variables 
AMBITIONS 
 
Signatory to of European Patent 
Organisation; strong national 
biotechnology industry supports 
harmonisation; image of ‘pusher’ for 
internal market harmonisation 
CAPABILITIES 
 
Expert co-ordination at MinEA includes 
industry interests (green lobby goes 
European); high knowledge and 
expertise; ad-hoc coordination; 
strategic competencies disputed; active 
shaper, due to economic position; 
knowledge and expertise on topic 
Situational 
variables 
PREFERENCES 
 
‘Goodness of fit’ of directive w. 
existing Rijksoctrooiwet disputed; 
difference of opinion government vs. 
parliament as regards to patentability 
plants/animals; activity NGO’s in 
lobbying govnt/parl; active shaper 
changes position resulting in rather 
extreme position as regards to 
plant/animal patentability; national 
Council Presidency  
RESOURCES  
 
Issue salience increases from expert 
topic to politicised dossier; parliament 
bound hands of government 
delegation; linkage with Brussels 
through experts; ability to anticipate 
disputed; no institutionalised contacts 
EU institutions; flexibility of negotiating 
position; use of bargaining tactics 
disputed 
 
Its activity was not limited to the stages of policy initiative, but stretched 
well into the negotiations. The Commission delegation was very active in 
pursuing agreement upon elements of the text, either helped by delegations 
of submitting own text proposals. This strong Commission involvement is 
clearly recognisable in the final text of the directive: the published text is 
largely similar to the original proposal submitted in December 1995.53  
 
The starting position of the Dutch government with respect to the new 
Biopatent directive was rather positive. Macro-level conditions that have 
impacted on its shaping ambitions include its membership of the European 
Patent organisation and the large biotechnology industry within its borders. 
Moreover, the Dutch government and the key actor in this case-study, the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs traditionally supported internal market 
 
                                                 
53) The recitals have been considerably extended and specified, mostly after the 
incorporation of the European Parliament’s 65 amendments. About half of the 
original 20 articles have been subject to only small wording changes and at 
least the original text proposals nrs. 1.1; 6; art 7; 9; 10; 11; 12; 15; 16; 18; 19; 
20 have been integrally taken over in the final text. 
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harmonisation initiatives as this was considered an important element of the 
creation of a ‘level playing field’ for industry. This ambition was mirrored in 
the preferences voiced by the Dutch government delegation, which was 
praised for its expertise on the complicated subject and can be ranked as a 
modestly active shaper. Although it did not often put forward particular text 
proposals, the minutes show how the delegation regularly commented upon 
proposals and forwarded arguments in favour or against particular elements 
of the text.  
 
Relevant variables in terms of shaping potential are the importance of 
expertise and knowledge, both at the national level as well as brought into 
the negotiations by Dutch government representatives. At the domestic level, 
the directive was the responsibility of experts at the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. In order to ensure the link with the implementation phases, the 
responsible official was assisted by an expert from the national Patent Office 
(Bureau Industriële Eigendom), the office responsible for the 
implementation of the directive. The Dutch government negotiating position 
at Council level was actually formulated and represented without any high 
level debates taking place about the form and contents of the directive. The 
formulation and representation of the Dutch position did not attract attention 
outside the small circle of national experts involved. The consulted 
documents mention regular visits of nationally-based NGO’s to the 
government department and the Second Chamber – one official even noted 
the animal welfare group Dierenbescherming directly instructing 
parliamentarians for a vote on the directive in the plenary meeting.54 
However, the reconstruction demonstrates that the supposed positive effects 
of patent harmonisation were valued, whereas relatively little attention paid 
to ‘green’ and animal welfare concerns voiced by lobby organisations in 
letters to the executive and the parliament. There is a traditionally high 
degree of interwovenness between the co-ordinating ministry for Economic 
Affairs and the industry. Respondents explained this by the specialist 
knowledge needed for insight into the intricate field of biopatenting. As one 
respondent mentioned, it is regarded as particularly useful for both sides to 
have close contacts and to exchange information about positions and 
developments. The reconstruction suggests that similarly close contacts with 
NGO’s are apparently regarded considerably less interesting. 
 
                                                 
54) Source: anonymous interviewee. 
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Notwithstanding its positive contribution to the negotiations on the basis of a 
solid expertise and interest in the subject matter, the negotiating position of 
the Netherlands has not been overly consistent over the years. In contrast 
with the case of the Gas directive, this inconsistency was not due to 
conflicting preferences within the executive, but rather to parliamentary 
reservations about a central provision in the draft directive text, which was 
considered as contrary to national legal provisions. One important variable in 
this respect is ‘goodness of fit’. During the negotiations, the fit of the legal 
text of the directive with existing national legislation in the Netherlands 
became source of hot parliamentary debates. Here, a conflict of opinion 
existed between the responsible ministry and a small number of interested 
MP’s of the Labour and Liberal parties. On the one hand, as the directive 
closely followed existing case law, and for some experts it ‘changes the 
substantive law of patentability in Europe relatively little’ (Kamstra et al. 
2002, 45). On the other hand, the subject matter was highly sensitive which 
made the directive in the course of the negotiations a symbol and a focal 
point for ethical concerns. The issue salience and thereby the political 
interest into the shaping of an initially highly technical directive increased in 
parallel.  
 
The dispute between Dutch parliament (Second Chamber) and the 
responsible ministry of Economic Affairs came to focus on one particular 
element: the exclusion from patentability of genetically modified plants and 
animals. From April 1996, members of parliament came to voice concerns 
over the alleged misfit between the infamous article 4.2 of the draft directive 
with national patent law. This issue was extremely salient to political parties 
and interest groups. Parliamentary concerns were fed by NGO’s, in 
particular patient groups and animal rights movements, such as the animal 
welfare group Dierenbescherming. The latter was prominently present in 
debates both in national parliament and the European Parliament.  
 
Although the responsible ministry tried to convince parliament about the 
supposed ‘fit’, parliament forced the executive to voice its concerns in the 
ongoing negotiations. The resulting change in position of the Netherlands 
government on the article in question was voiced for the first time at 
working group level in July 1997. At this point in time, negotiations had just 
been resumed after the European Parliament’s first reading. That the Dutch 
delegation voiced concerns about an article so crucial to the text came as a 
surprise to the European Commission and the national delegations but there 
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was general apprehension about the need to take a parliamentary reservation 
into account.  
 
Referring to the framework for analysis, this very interesting conflict 
between parliament and the responsible ministry does call into question the 
anticipation capacity, both of the executive and the MP’s themselves. In the 
‘fiche’ sent to parliament with a summary of the Biopatent proposal in 1995, 
explicitly no implementation problems were foreseen.55 From that point in 
time, there was no regular exchange of opinions between parliament and the 
ministry during the negotiations. The conflicting issue about the provision in 
question did not come up until the last stage of Council working party 
negotiations. The government delegation was bound to make a political 
reservation at Council level once the strength and impact of the 
parliamentary reservations became clear. Responsible officials from the 
Economic Affairs Ministry, all too aware of the political pressures from the 
European Commission, member state delegations and industry for agreement 
upon the Biopatent directive were from that moment stuck between a rock 
and a hard place. Already a clear majority emerged in favour of the texts as 
they had been agreed in earlier negotiations. This observation, combined 
with the favourable stance of the Dutch government delegation until then 
may explain why there are no indications both from the side of the 
government, nor from EU level sources, about representatives actively 
contacting the Commission during the stages of drafting and negotiating the 
proposal in order to influence its contents. The answer to relevant 
parliamentary questions in October 1996 does not shed more light on this 
matter.56  
 
Neither is there proof of contacts between the Dutch government and the 
European Parliament, which is remarkable as the Biopatent directive has 
later been called one of the most prominent cases of European Parliament 
 
                                                 
55) Second Chamber Parliamentary Papers, 1995-1996: 22112, nr 60, p. 3. 
56) The question to the State Secretary, sent in 31 October 1996, was formulated as 
follows: ‘Did you plea (…) at the European Commission for adaptation of the 
relevant directive so that plants and animals cannot be patented? If so, how did 
other parties react on the Dutch input?’ The answer did not mention the 
Commission, however, it referred to the proceedings in the Council working 
group, which would not convene before 1997 because of the second reading in 
parliament (Lower House Parliamentary papers, 1996-7, annex, nr 283). 
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involvement in the shaping of an EU directive (Earnshaw and Woods 1999). 
Considering the fact that the Dutch national EU Council Presidency of 1997 
coincided with the preparations for Parliament’s second reading, it would 
have been normal if contacts between Parliament and Council would have 
been intensified. The Council presidency offers member states multiple 
opportunities in this respect (Elgström 2004). The reconstruction offers no 
indication, however, that the Dutch government has specifically attempted to 
influence the voting behaviour of individual or groups of MEPs, be it in 
favour or opposed to the directive. A possible explanation is the fact that the 
controversial issue of patentability of plants and animals is so central to the 
directive text that it is not fit to serve as a basis for any amendments by the 
EP.57  
 In the plenary meeting in which the second reading of the Council 
common position was tabled, several Dutch MEPs tabled or supported at 
least one of the 60 amendments on the directive text (Maartje van Putten 
(NL/PES); Doeke Eisma (NL/ELDR); Hans Blokland (NL/EPP)). However 
all amendments were rejected because the necessary majority could not be 
found.58 Elly-Plooy (NL/ELDR) was quoted in the minutes referring to the 
‘strange position of the Netherlands, which was the only member state 
voting against’ (the directive).  
 
Having discussed two particular case studies of EU legislation and the 
shaping actions of Dutch government representatives in this process, the 
question is what these empirics learn us about national shaping capacity 
from an analytical point of view and for the shaping of EU policies in 
general and the efforts of the Dutch government in particular. This is the 
subject of the next, concluding chapter.  
 
 
 
                                                 
57) Therefore, one official was quoted by stating that ‘the Netherlands has finished 
all its options in the preparation of and the voting over the Council’s common 
position’. Letter to Permanent Representation EU, 3 March 1998. 
58) Whereas in the second reading of the co-decision procedure, an absolute 
majority of 314 votes were needed, no amendment reached more than 221 
votes. 
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Chapter 9 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
§1. Introduction 
 
Which variables are relevant for the shaping capacity of a member state 
government within the EU? This concluding chapter seeks to tentatively 
answer this question by reference to the analyses and findings presented in 
the previous sections. In the first section (§1) the empirical data from the 
country analysis and both case studies are examined. In §2, these findings 
are compared with the framework for analysis. Then, the results are 
discussed from an analytical perspective, to come to conclusions as to the 
ability of the Dutch government to influence the formulation of new EU 
policies (§3). A last section stretches these conclusions to avenues of further 
research to be explored.  
 
 
§2. Discussing the Dutch government’s shaping capacity  
 
§2.1 … According to analysts and practitioners 
Chapter 5 has presented an analysis of the ability of the Dutch government to 
influence the formulation of new EU policies. Consistent with the 
framework for analysis, the discussion included both the contents and 
direction of national EU policies and the capabilities and resources that the 
Dutch government can deploy, in order to realise these objectives. 
Interestingly, both dimensions of shaping capacity – ‘will’ and ‘potential’ –
have been subject to debate between policy analysts and practitioners.  
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As for its European ambitions, the Netherlands can be characterised as a 
‘multiple-issue’ member state. This qualification refers to the finding that 
EU-related actions by government representatives are generally not guided 
by a pre-determined selection of dossiers or policy priorities. In contrast, 
‘single-issue’ member state governments are primarily interested in the 
‘pragmatic purposes’ of co-operation, such as a fair share from the structural 
funds or EU contribution to internal democratization processes. One 
explanation for this broad-ranging involvement in EU-affairs lies in the fact 
that the Netherlands is a founding member state of the EU. The government 
has from the beginning been closely involved in the development and 
broadening of all policy domains affected by European cooperation. This 
can be an advantage: the fact that Dutch negotiators are omnipresent 
increases the action radius for coalition formation and facilitates the 
emergence of package deals and trade-offs between dossiers. On the other 
hand, investing time and energy in formulating and expressing its 
preferences on such a large variety of topics also has disadvantages. Aiming 
at the common policy-shaping process with many ‘arrows’ (Derlien 2000, 
73) requires much of a national government in terms of resources and 
capacity. For a relatively small administration, this is a considerable 
requirement.  
 
For decades, national and foreign policy-making was a matter for 
representatives of different societal groups or ‘pillars’. A small political elite 
dominated the shaping of a national EU policy and neither its actions ‘at 
home’, nor those at the EU level were ‘disturbed’ or constrained by political 
or public debates. This permissive consensus was challenged in the course of 
the 1990s, when the alleged costs of integration came to feature in gradually 
developing political debates on the merits of further EU enlargement and 
cooperation in new policy fields regarded as politically sensitive, such as 
justice and home affairs. The vigour of debates on the height of the national 
EU contribution has developed since then to a point at which the influential 
advisory Council for Social and Economic Affairs has warned that the public 
‘fixation on the financial aspects of European co-operation threatens to 
become a serious political handicap’ for EU-related actions (Sociaal-
Economische Raad 2004, 191). 
 
The prospect of enlargement, the growing political salience of policies 
decided largely at the EU level and the deterioration of the budgetary 
position of the Dutch vis-à-vis the EU’s common budget contributed to a 
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further ‘weakening’ or ‘loosening’ of the relatively stable objectives, which 
have traditionally characterised the Dutch government stance towards the 
EU. That core values have not been replaced by new ambitions or strategy 
has caused some ambiguity and uncertainty (Van Grinsven and Rood 2004, 
119). Since the mid-1990s, prominent politicians and policy-makers have 
shown doubts as regards to the role and positoin of the Netherlands in the 
enlarged EU. This unease has sometimes resulted in a rather bold and 
confrontational stance of Dutch politicians during EU level Council 
meetings, which has surprised fellow negotiators (Van Keulen 2004).  
 A review article on national EU policy-making by the former Dutch 
Permanent Representative to the EU, Bernard Bot, may serve as an 
illustration. This text comments rather critically on the presumed change 
from a ‘supranational’ and consensus-oriented EU policy to a more 
pragmatic stance in which the ‘Dutch interest’ featured more prominently 
(Bot 2002). Interestingly, Bot would later become Foreign Minister in the 
Balkenende-II government, the coalition in which the State Secretary for 
European Affairs has publicly proclaimed a departure from the traditional 
‘European evangelism’ of the Netherlands, and to take ‘the national interest’ 
as a new guiding line for EU-directed operations (Nicolaï 2004).  
 
This debate on how to deal with the increasing impact of policies jointly 
decided at the EU level is not exclusive to the Netherlands. In many long-
standing member states, authorities have been confronted with a steady 
polarisation of opinions over the merits of co-operation within an enlarged 
and deeper Union. However, due to a lacking tradition of debate on the 
direction and contents of national EU policy, in the Netherlands, this debate 
hit harder. The effects have been visible in public approval ratings: since the 
late 1990s, the percentage of Dutch citizens thinking EU membership is ‘a 
good thing’ decreased from 72 to 64%. The number of those who think that 
the Netherlands profits from membership fell from 65 to 55%.1 Although 
these are still relatively high figures, the trend is clearly decreasing.  
 
In parallel, there is discussion on the potential of the Dutch government to 
influence EU level developments. A number of serious incidents since the 
mid-1990s have reinforced the impression that the Dutch administration at 
central and decentral level has some problems in adequately meeting the 
 
                                                 
1) Source: Eurobarometer 59, European Commission, Brussels, 2002 
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demands of membership. First, the 1997 ‘Securitel’ case law of the Court of 
Justice demonstrated that the government had not taken EU policy 
implementation obligations sufficiently serious and focused political 
attention to the impact of EU laws and regulation and the need to take legal 
obligations seriously.2 Then, in 2001, the European Commission required a 
considerable amount of EU funds granted to the Dutch central and decentral 
governments to be repaid into the EU’s coffers, because of alleged financial 
mismanagement.3 And, last but not least, consistent with recent contributions 
to the growing body of Europeanisation-literature, the transposition deficit of 
the Netherlands as regards to EU directives has been related to the allegedly 
insufficient capacity at the central government level to absorb EU legislation 
adequately and in time (see Van Haersolte and Van den Oosterkamp 2003, 
Verschuuren 2004).4 
 
§2.2 … and shaping in practice 
It has been concluded in the theoretical part of this study that existing EU 
studies and Europeanisatoin-literature has thus far focused on either the 
domestic effects of EU policies making, or the ways in which national 
administrations organise their national EU-policy. The purpose of the case 
study analysis presented in chapters 7 and 8 has been to single out relevant 
variables for national shaping capacity, by means of a detailed reconstruction 
of the negotiations around two EU directives in the field of energy 
liberalisation and biotechnology patents, in order to find out how one 
particular member state attempts to influence the EU-policy-making process. 
A second purpose was to trace the motivation and actions of the Dutch 
 
                                                 
2) In 1997, it emerged that some 400 national laws and regulations concerning 
technical product specifications had not been duly notified to the European 
Commission and could thus be declared invalid. This caused much political and 
parliamentary debate, after which the ministries of Economic Affairs and 
Justices were forced to take emergency measures. The debacle became known 
as the ‘Securitel’-case (referring to Court of Justice Case C-194/94 CIA 
Security International SA v. Signalson SA and Securitel Sprl. (1996)). 
3) See Hoetjes (2001): ESF Affaire geeft burgers krachtig anti-Europees signaal, 
in: NRC Handelsblad, 1 August 2001. 
4) On an implementation scoreboard issued by DG Internal Market on 5 
November 2005, the Netherlands ranked 17th of the EU 25 as regards the 
number of directives not transposed in time.  
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government, in order to test the framework for analysis designed in chapter 
4. 
 
In the case studies, a number of ‘macro-level’ conditions have been 
identified. First, as a stable variable relevant for Dutch shaping potential, 
respondents have repeatedly referred to the relative length of membership of 
the Netherlands of the EU, which is believed to have enhanced the level of 
trust this founder member enjoys with its European partners. Second, the 
relative economic and political clout of the Netherlands, a small but 
internationally oriented member state, combined with the positive approach 
of the Dutch government towards initiatives for internal market 
harmonisation is said to have facilitated the position of Dutch government 
representatives. Third, as variables considered relevant for understanding 
national shaping potential, key words are departmental autonomy; ad-hoc 
co-ordination, expert-oriented shaping and a relatively re-active way of 
dealing with EU level developments. These particular characteristics of 
national EU policy-making have been discussed extensively in chapter 5. 
The often-assumed consequences for the day-to-day shaping are sustained 
through the empirical analysis (see table 9.1).  
 
Overseeing the empirical findings, it is interesting to examine which 
variables from the framework can be ‘highlighted’ and which variables do 
not come up in the case studies.  
 
Overseeing the reconstruction of the two directives, a factor that cannot be 
neglected is ‘goodness of fit’. Although both cases concerned ‘first-pillar’ 
issues – and were thus expected less conflictuous, considering the generally 
positive attitude of the Dutch government for this policy domain – the 
Commission plans for energy liberalisation and biotechnology regulation 
caused concerns in The Hague. In the case of Gas, there was initially strong 
policy misfit. This was overcome by ‘ambition’: the political pressures for 
opening up a former monopoly. The Biopatent Directive seemed in line with 
the ambitions, of the leading department, to increase the international level 
playing field for the Dutch biotechnology industry. The alleged legal 
incongruence between the Commission proposals and Dutch law was only 
remarked by the parliament in a relatively late stage. This misfit explained 
the Dutch no-vote and later problems with the implementation of the 
directive, once decided.  
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Table 9.1 The framework for analysis revisited 
Shaping 
capacity 
Will  Potential 
Stable 
variables 
AMBITIONS  
 
Strong economic position both as 
regards to energy and biotechnology; 
image of ‘pusher’ for internal market 
harmonisation and creation of a level 
playing field; policy fit  
CAPABILITIES  
 
Departmental and expert autonomy; 
ad-hoc coordination; strategic 
competencies disputed; linkage with 
Brussels through experts; regular 
contacts with national capitals; ability 
to anticipate disputed; no 
institutionalised contacts EU 
institutions 
Situational 
variables 
PREFERENCES 
 
‘Goodness of fit’ with national 
legislation disputed; government is an 
active shaper; relatively extreme policy 
position; EU Council Presidency 1997 
has impacted on preferences 
RESOURCES  
 
Issue salience increased from expert 
topic to politicised dossier, especially 
during the Presidency; more resources 
available; expert dominance in shaping 
stages; strategic competencies 
enhanced in wake of Presidency; 
flexibility of negotiating position; use of 
bargaining tactics disputed  
 
In line with recent academic literature, the cases also demonstrate that 
‘goodness of fit’ is not a static notion. Governments can push for misfitting 
legislation in order to accommodate domestic change, which is demonstrated 
by the case of the Gas Directive. Neither is the degree of fit always 
undisputed: in the case of the Biopatent directive, the congruence with 
existing legislation was subject to internal discord between the executive and 
the legislative. 
 
The findings about the relevance of the fit between existing and new 
legislation relate to another variable in the framework: ‘issue salience’. Both 
cases-studies suggest that the higher the relevance of the topic, and thereby: 
the motivation of a government to shape actively, the better initial 
constraints or limitations on shaping potential – such as fragmentation or 
small size – can be overcome. Although the Dutch government ranks as a 
small member state with corresponding political clout, in the two cases, 
representatives of the Dutch government acted according to their colleagues 
as particularly active ‘shapers’ of the final text. Not only in the case of the 
Biopatent directive, which was initially undisputed, but also in the case of 
the Gas Directive. In the latter case, the issue salience was disputed at first. 
The Netherlands’ position, as an international gas supplier with a carefully 
constructed national gas policy, made the lead department initially 
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particularly reluctant as regards to EU liberalisation initiatives. As a result of 
international pressures for globalisation, which were picked up by a new 
coalition government, this position became untenable. Although there was 
widespread reluctance within the government administration, due to strong 
political pressures a process of domestic change occurred, up to the point at 
which the emerging liberal stance of the Dutch government fitted with the 
Commission initiatives for keeping plans for creating an internal energy 
market alive. When the switch towards a new energy policy was made, the 
same national experts who had originally resisted European initiatives, 
became strong pushers for the Gas Directive, which was listed as a priority 
for the 1997 national EU Council Presidency. 
 
In terms of resources, the knowledge and expertise of the negotiators light 
up as particularly prominent. Both at home, i.e. in the Hague, and at the EU 
level the process of shaping has been dominated by energy specialists (Gas 
directive) and patent lawyers and biologists (in the case of the Biopatent 
directive). This is consistent with academic observations about the leading 
role of national experts both in the technical elaboration of decisions in 
intricate webs of committees, ‘comitology’, as well as in the subsequent 
phases of transposition, implementation and enforcement at the national 
level (Rhinard 2002). As expertise turns out to be so prominent in these two 
cases, it should be assessed critically from a normative perspective. 
Expertise is by no means a neutral policy instrument. Through processes of 
socialisation, experts can form ‘advocacy coalitions’ or ‘epistemic 
communities’ held together by shared values and knowledge, which can and 
will be used strategically.5 This is sustained by the case study of the 
Biopatent directive, where technical expertise collided with the ethical 
dimension associated with the sensitive topic of biopatenting.  
 
At first sight, when it comes to the shaping, national government 
representatives take the lead. In the case of the Gas directive, there been 
hardly any involvement of other stakeholders. However, before jumping to 
intergovernmentalist conclusions, the findings merit closer examination. The 
behaviour of the sole exception, Gasunie, the former, partly state-owned 
 
                                                 
5) See for more on theories of social action and the role of expertise and ideas in 
policy analysis the work of Paul Sabatier (1988), Peter Haas (1992) and 
Giandomenico Majone (1989). 
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monopolist company directly affected by new liberalisation plans pushed by 
the European Commission is consistent with governance-studies analysing 
the ‘bypass’ of the national level. Apparently, Gasunie purposely favoured 
Commission oriented venues over the traditional national route in order to 
voice its concerns over the effects of a too large degree of market opening. 
And, although the Biopatent directive was much more controversial, also in 
this case, the degree by which the national government and the parliament 
have been lobbied by interested parties has been overshadowed by the 
volume and intensity of lobbying efforts at the EU level, most notably 
directed towards the European Parliament deliberations over the proposal. 
Apparently, interest groups hold the impression that the national government 
constitutes a more indirect, secondary way to influence EU level 
proceedings, than the primary way: direct access to actors and institutions 
operating at the EU level. 
 
In both case studies, there was dissensus about the direction and contents of 
the preferences and negotiating positions to be voiced by the government 
delegations, with negative effects on anticipation capacity. Due to the 
relatively low co-ordination capacity within the Dutch government, which 
hampered the active pursuit of a coherent and consistent negotiating 
position, disagreement within the executive could sustain long into the 
negotiating phases. In the case of the Gas directive, the fact that for long, no 
coherent position could be reached internally made that the Commission-
phase was ‘missed out’ and that there could be no question of actively 
influencing the interanl process of drafting the proposal wihtin this EU-
institution. In the case of the Biopatent directive, political fragmentation and 
discord over the interpretation of the text between the lead ministry and 
parliamentarians who came to contest the Dutch negotiating position, 
explains why influence attempts have neither been directed at the European 
Commission, busy re-drafting the proposal at that stage, nor the European 
Parliament. The latter opportunity was even less suitable as different 
political parties disagreed on the stance to take. At that point in time, the 
government delegation had already come a long way in pursuing consensus 
in the EU level negotiations, before it was stopped by the national 
parliament. From the moment at which parliamentary concerns came out in 
the open, the Dutch delegation acted as if no other option was available than 
to bluntly veto the final text. This finding is consistent with the traditional 
tendency of the Dutch government delegation to focus its influence attempts 
on the member state dominated-Council phases. Although this would 
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confirm intergovernmentalist assumptions about member states focusing on 
the Council, this perspective cannot satisfactory explain why internal discord 
within the Dutch government about the national position couwas not solved 
at the domestic level.  
 
As for strategic capacity, neither of the two cases reveals a government 
strategy about the desired negotiating outcomes and the actoins to be 
pursued to achieve these objectives. As for the Gas Directive, once the 
national policy shift towards energy liberalisation had been effectuated, 
internal discussion about the Gas Directive were not so much about 
ideology, but rather concerned with the concrete design of legal articles. 
What is striking in this respect is the high degree of flexibility offered to 
individual negotiators. The reconstruction shows that if Dutch negotiating 
mandates and text instructions proved impossible to accommodate, it was in 
the hand of government representatives to decide and find solutions. As, 
dependent on issue at stake or the article under consideration, many different 
and highly flexible coalitions characterised the negotiation process, the 
Dutch delegation was able to put its mark on the discussion without needing 
extensive consultations with the home front.  
 
In the case of the Gas directive, Dutch shaping capacity was evaluated very 
positively. The Dutch government made its policy shift to liberalisation at 
the right moment to be able to put its mark on the shaping of the text of this 
directive, which proved to be an essential first step in the opening up 
formerly nationally organised energy markets. Considering the 
implementation problems that arose at a later stage, the case of the Biopatent 
directive can hardly be evaluated so successful. In this respect, the 
fragmentation and decentralisation of the Dutch system of managing EU 
affairs can be recognised as crucial for the gap between the legislative and 
executive. But these internal problems have actually had very little impact 
upon the way the Dutch government representatives operated at the EU 
level. There, expert government representatives, which did not share the 
objections raised by the parliamentarians, quickly accepted the inevitable: 
the Dutch position would be outvoted by a majority in the decision-making 
phases. No special efforts were made to influence the process through the 
venues offered by the European Commission or, even more markedly, the 
European Parliament. As the national parliament did also not press for such 
actions, the Council vote was cast accordingly in order to satisfy the 
domestic constituency. This remarkable reconstruction only sustains the 
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image of national experts charged with EU negotiations ‘moulded’ into the 
EU level context, even when strong domestic objectives arise. 
 
Overseeing this and the previous section, it can be concluded that the case 
studies sustain to a very large extent the findings of the country study. The 
largely decentralised Dutch system of preparing EU negotiations favours a 
wide responsibility for experts and specialists. This makes for relatively 
flexible negotiating positions, which facilitates a strong Dutch role in the 
making of trade-offs and package deals in the EU’s system of text 
negotiations. Due to relatively low co-ordinating and strategic capacity, 
experts are not hampered by top-down assigned priorities or strategies. What 
do these findings mean for our understanding of shaping capacity? 
 
 
§3. Confronting results with theory 
 
§3.1 Discussing suggestions from theory 
In chapters 2 and 3, divergent academic perspectives on national shaping 
capacity have been discussed. The central position and the dominant role of 
member states within ‘classical’ integration theories have been somewhat 
differentiated in more recent EU studies approaches. In the new 
‘opportunity-structure’ described by governance and Europeanisation 
studies, governments are confronted with potentially threatening conditions, 
most notably the partial autonomy of supranational institutions, the growth 
of majority voting and the ‘bypass’ of nationally based actors which are 
directly active at the EU level. Opportunities for governments emanate from 
their omnipresence at all levels of the policy process, which is consensual by 
nature, and their internal adaptation to the demands of membership that 
served to increase the effectiveness of national interest representation. It has 
been discussed in chapter 3 how these ideas have not yet been described and 
tested as well-developed hypotheses. In this early stage of theoretical 
development within the nascent ‘third wave’ of EU studies, they are best 
regarded as suggestions, which merit further elaboration, testing and 
evaluation. It is relevant at this point to link re-connect empirics with theory.  
 
To begin with, the supposedly dominant role of the supranational institutions 
in the process of shaping new EU policies– most notably, the European 
Commission and the European Parliament – is considered as having a 
negative impact on the shaping potential of governments. Looking at the 
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cases, the ‘pusher’ role of the European Commission has indeed been 
pivotal. If not for the strong incentive provided by the Commission to keep 
the issue of energy liberalisation and patent harmonisation on the Council’s 
and Parliament’s agenda, it is not clear to what extent the legislation would 
have been shaped in its current form. As both cases were subject to the co-
decision procedure, also the European Parliament has put its mark upon the 
final texts by adding many amendments to the common position reached 
between the member states in the Council. Interestingly, this impact of 
European Commission and Parliament is not mirrored in Dutch shaping 
behaviour, in which the traditional focus on the Council is strongly present. 
Nor is the supposed positive effect for governments to make use of ‘fellow 
nationals’ within the EU administration, often pictured as one way for 
governments to make up for the competencies lost to supranational 
institutions, sustained by the empirical analysis. The cases provide no traces 
of any benefit that the Dutch government may have had of having Dutch 
officials or representatives in both institutions. To be sure: this does not 
mean that ‘getting nationals inside Brussels’ is an irrelevant element of 
national shaping capacity. It cannot be concluded on the basis of these two-
case studies to what extent this finding can be explained by country-specific 
considerations, such as the earlier mentioned dominance of the Dutch 
government on the Council-phases of policy-making, by situation variables, 
or whether there is generally no impact for governments of having nationals 
within the Commission and Parliament’s staff bureaus. 
 
Another suggestion prominent in newer EU studies perspectives is 
concerned with the effects of the increasing practice of majority voting 
which would take from national governments a once-prominent instrument 
of interest representation: the national veto. Empirical analysis of voting 
records however show that voting is not a common practice. Consensus is an 
important norm in EU policymaking – a finding sustained by the two case 
studies in this study. In the case of the Gas directive, the possibility of a vote 
was mentioned not once during the negotiations. The ‘shadow of the vote’ 
can obviously not be reconstructed, however, all findings seem to indicate 
that this case-study offers a prime example of the text negotiations for which 
the EU is famous, aimed at getting every delegation on board as regards to 
the acceptance of the final text.  
 
As to the issue of voting, the case of the Biopatent directive was sharply 
different. This case study constituted one of the rare cases of a no-vote of a 
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national delegation, complemented with two abstentions (Belgium and Italy) 
– which did not impede decision-making on the final text. Interestingly, the 
data analysed for the reconstruction of this case-study do not explain why the 
latter two delegations abstained. The paper trail shows that Dutch delegation, 
once confronted with parliamentary dissensus over one prime element of the 
directive text, at a point also considered to abstain from voting. The formal 
reason is perhaps exemplary for the consensual nature of the negotiating 
process: notwithstanding domestic opposition, the government delegation 
explicitly did not want to impede the directive from being agreed. No doubt, 
this consideration can be explained by the fact that the lead ministry did not 
share parliamentary concerns. In the final Council meeting the Dutch 
government minister indeed cast the only no-vote. But, taking into account 
that no proof has been found for other influence attempts by the Dutch 
government to prevent the directive from being adopted, this vote seems 
primarily driven by the desire to make a symbolic gesture towards national 
parliament. Consistent with the analyses in chapter 6, in the EU’s consensus 
culture, the prevailing ‘shadow of the vote’ is thus a relevant variable for 
explaining national shaping behaviour.  
 
Was the central government ‘bypassed’ by other stakeholders that were not – 
or did not feel – included in preference formation processes in The Hague? 
In the two particular cases examined, the lower tier of government – 
provinces and municipalities – was not directly affected and hence not 
involved. But respondents in both cases offer confirmation of active 
involvement – albeit to a varying degree – by different categories of non-
state actors, including industry associations and lobby groups. At the 
domestic level, industry association’s views were explicitly taken into 
account when the Dutch position was being formulated. This finding can no 
doubt be explained to the traditionally strong ties of the Economic Affairs 
ministry with domestic producer and consumer groups. In case of 
environmental legislation, the lead department of the Environment would 
probably have lend a welcome ear to the ‘green’ lobby groups. In this case, 
as groups concerned about the negative effects of energy liberalisation and 
biotechnology soon found out that they could not be accommodated ‘at 
home’, they found ways to influence the policy-shaping process at the EU 
level. Organised interests in the private sector, which could rely upon strong 
– personal – ties with the Ministry, opted for a two-level strategy, directed at 
The Hague and Brussels. The latter venue was dealt with through their EU-
wide interest associations for getting their point across to decision-makers.  
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Then, the suggestion that ‘Europeanised’ governments would be better 
suited for EU-directed actions as a result of the advantageous effects of 
internal adaptation to EU demands. What is clear is that the leading 
government ministry in both cases has made the most of its discretionary 
powers. There is no proof of active involvement of the co-ordinating 
authority both within the ministry – the department for internal affairs (BEB) 
or at the inter-ministerial level – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this 
respect, the results of Europeanisation were clear: the Economic Affairs 
ministry was willing and able to deal with the Gas directive on its own. The 
actions of the lead department are to a large extent explanatory for national 
shaping capacity in both cases. The policy shift towards liberalisation and 
the resulting pusher role for the Gas Directive, which had been supported by 
the Foreign affairs ministry in earlier stage, could not be effectuated before 
the ministry itself, under political pressure, made the turn. Before and during 
that shift, the Dutch position in the energy working group was downright 
negative.  
 In the case of the Biopatent directive, although it was properly informed 
when the directive proposal was issued, parliament only awoke to the 
consequences of the directive in the final stages of decision-making. Even 
then, the lead ministry did not respond to explicit calls by a handful of 
parliamentarians to voice the Dutch concerns to the European Commission 
and the Parliament. Even when a rare national veto was imminent, there 
seems not to have been any interest in the matter from the side of the co-
ordinating authorities. Although it is difficult to say whether more 
coordination could have impeded the problems arising in later stages, it is 
interesting that such a controversial issue did not attract more 
interdepartmental or high-level involvement. One the one hand, it can be 
concluded that the Europeanisation of national government has been 
successful, to the extent that lead ministries and officials consider 
themselves able to operate at the EU level without any domestic strings 
attached. On the other hand, from an intergovernmentalist perspective of 
national interest representation under a co-ordinated domestic heading, the 
findings of both cases are rather surprising.  
 
This holds even more, considering the coincidence of both cases with a 
national EU Council Presidency, a period considered a welcome incentive 
for re-thinking national ambitions and potential as regards to EU policy-
making. For the Dutch government, this particular Council Presidency, in 
1997, has served as impetus for a temporary strengthening of national 
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coordination procedures (Rood and Van Keulen 2004). However, this effort 
is not mirrored in the two cases analysed in this study. It should be noted that 
in the case of the Gas directive, the prospect of holding the Presidency 
during the negotiations facilitated a structured approach to the decision-
making stages and Dutch input therein. In the run-up to the stint at the helm, 
‘plans of attack’ were developed by a special project-team assigned to the 
directive and a number of informal meetings at the EU level were organised 
in which some hot potatoes were discussed. At the same time, the Dutch stint 
at the helm has not reinforced contacts, about the dossiers, with the Council 
Secretariat and the European Parliament. Perhaps it is due to the pressing 
workload of the Presidency for the small central organisation, that in this 
case, the Presidency may have reinforced the tendencies – already present in 
the Dutch administration – to focus on the Council phases of decision-
making.  
 
§3.2 Evaluating national shaping capacity: a matter of differing 
perspectives 
Similar to the puzzle that Europeanisation studies are concerned with (‘to 
what extent are member states Europeanised?’), a question driving this study 
has been ‘to what extent is the EU nationalised’? Overseeing the analysis 
and findings of this study, it can be concluded that the answer to this 
question depends on the perspective of the observer regarding national 
interest representation.  
 
At first sight, the findings will appeal to an intergovernmentalist, who has a 
strong allegiance to the ‘traditional’ image of the member states purposely 
advancing national interests through interstate co-operation. To begin with, 
the cases do not sustain the much-cited estimate by Hull (1993, 83): that the 
first Commission proposal determines the final text for up to 80%. Indeed, in 
both cases, the European Commission was a strong pusher in the agenda 
setting phases and it can be debated whether there would be question of 
community involvement in the field without the strong activity of the 
European Commission. However, once negotiations between member states 
advanced, the proposed texts were considerably watered down in order for 
all delegations to be accommodated. From this perspective, the conclusion 
that in both cases, the Dutch government focuses on the Council level, is not 
very surprising. Although newer EU studies tend to highlight the 
opportunities for the shaping offered by supranational institutions, the 
Council phase remains the prime channel for influence for national 
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governments. Government representatives are omnipresent at strategic 
positions within the structures of EU policy-making and continue to hold a 
key position in both the ‘shaping’ and setting of new EU policies and the 
subsequent ‘taking’ or implementation into national legal systems (Börzel 
2003, 3). This finding is difficult to explain from the perspective offered by 
governance studies: that of continuous interaction between state and non-
state actors in self-steering networks. Notwithstanding the limited scope of 
these case studies, the findings indicate a central role of government 
representatives, who rely upon deliberations amongst equals, i.e. 
representatives of other member states. 
 
But there is more to it than meets the eye at a quick glance. The literature 
review and the case studies discussed in this study suggest that the relevance 
of domestic conditions and characteristics for national shaping capacity is 
enormous. The shaping capacity of the Dutch government can be explained 
for a large part by variables related to the national polity; policy and politics. 
Consistent with the perspective coined ‘bureaucratic politics’ (Allison and 
Zelikov 1999, see also chapter 3 §4.2), the political and administrative 
fragmentation of the playing field at home and the incapacity to overcome 
this with timely and high-level co-ordination hampers timely formulation 
and subsequent coherent representation of the negotiating positions put 
forward by the Dutch government representatives. This finding contradicts 
the image, offered by (liberal) intergovernmentalists, of government 
representatives operating at the EU level with coherent mandates that have 
been formulated in effective co-ordination systems ‘at home’. Rather, it 
sustains the finding in comparative volumes such as that of Kassim (2000, 
259): ‘[…] the policies that governments pursue at the EU level are the 
outcome of often complex processes of intra-governmental bargaining, 
bureaucratic politics and co-ordination of variable quality’. For 
understanding the motivation and potential of a government to be active at 
the EU level a profound knowledge about domestic policy style and 
organisation is thus vital.  
 
The ability of a government to influence EU level proceedings depends on 
‘what happens at home’. A finding from the case-study analysis is that 
internal fragmentation of the Dutch government has actually facilitated the 
role of Dutch government representatives. In the EU level system of text 
negotiations, flexible positions and changing alliances are in high demand. 
In this expert-oriented negotiating process with its own dynamics, official 
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positions provided only the broad framework for particular issue, for 
example: pro or contra market opening and liberalisation, pro or contra EU 
level arrangements for biopatenting. The case reconstructions show that 
preferences for text elements were traded off and combined in package deals 
by the experts around the table. It is telling that this procedure is regarded by 
many respondents as explanatory for the shaping capacity of the Dutch 
government. Because Dutch government representatives were very informed 
as to the matters at hand, due to their relative autonomy and the fact that they 
were not constrained by intricate domestic co-ordination procedures, their 
positions were so flexible to be easily reshaped and accommodated in the 
negotiations.  
 
This does not mean, however, that the processes and outcomes of EU 
negotiations can be exclusively explained by processes, procedures and 
actors within national capitals. The performance of nationally-based actors 
is, from the first stages of policy initiation up to the setting of the final texts, 
closely linked to processes of policy formulation and representation by other 
member states. Instead of clearly separate processes of domestic formulation 
and subsequent representation, the negotiating positions represented by 
government officials were defined and reformulated in interaction with both 
state and non-state actors and in negotiation with the European Commission 
and other member states. This contests the image of national preference 
formation taking place in “splendid (…) isolation” (Kassim and Wright 
2001, 298). The picture that emerges is thus one of ‘the Monnet-method 
revisited’. Thereby, the claim central to intergovernmentalism and its the 
modern variant, that of member states as unitary actors and domestic 
preference formation processes as clearly distinct from EU level 
negotiations, is contradicted. However, again, key players in this process 
continue to be formal representatives of national governments. Where the 
playing field is thus mainly intergovernmental, the game being played in 
expert-networks has many characteristics of a multi-level game.  
 
The multi-level nature of the shaping capacity implies difficulties for 
national democratic control, transparency and accountability. The finding 
that EU policy is shaped through technical and specialist processes 
governance feeds into horror images of the ‘bureaucratisation’ of the EU. By 
Euroskeptics, it is even argued that bureaucrats would push for the 
establishment of a super-state at the EU level (Gillingham 2003). The EU’s 
democratic deficit refers to the finding that EU legislation often falls 
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between the prerogatives of national parliaments on the one, and the 
European Parliament on the other hand, so that no institution provides for 
effective parliamentary during the process of ‘shaping’ new policies. As the 
case studies suggest, one clear problem of routinised EU policy-making is 
that national politicians responsible are not actively engaged in national- or 
EU level processes related to the shaping of new EU policies. Comparative 
research projects on the role of national parliaments deal with the impact of 
Europe suggest that in most member states, national parliament do have a 
similarly low degree of involvement on EU policy-making and politics 
(Wessels 2003). Although the arrangements for involving parliament in the 
making of national EU policy-making differ across the member states, even 
the much-cited example of Denmark, where an active parliamentary 
‘European Committee’ plays an important role in devising mandates for 
Danish EU policy, demonstrates how due to lack of information and 
resources the role of parliament remains too re-active to play an effective 
role.  
 
In normative contributions to EU studies, many solutions for this problem 
have been suggested (Risse-Kappen 1996, 74). These include not only 
strengthening procedural involvement of politicians and parliamentarians in 
EU policy-making, for instance by reinitiating the ‘double mandate’ for 
MP’s to sit both at the European and the national parliament. One condition 
is, more generally, that the awareness of member of parliamentary bodies 
and politicians with regard to EU affairs and dossiers is increased. If the 
close link (and, sometimes, the causal relation) between ‘national’ policies 
and those decided at the EU level would be clear in an early stage, the 
artificial separation between the EU, as one dimension of foreign policy-
making, and nationally organised policy areas could be bridged. A related 
suggestion is to stimulate critical publicity of the EU in the member states, 
as media accounts of what happens in the EU are generally focused on 
European Council summitry instead of the day-to-day policy-making 
structures which have been the subject of this study.  
 
 
§4. Avenues for further research  
 
A recurrent section in studies and reports is concerned with possible 
directions of future related research projects. Overseeing the findings of this 
study, the following types of research deserve priority.  
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1) … More thinking about the ‘shaping’ 
In providing an overview about the current state of play in EU-member state 
relations, with a special emphasis on one particular member state, this study 
aimed to serve as a first step in the direction of more shaping-based studies. 
One recurrent observation has been that existing EU studies analyses 
discussing relevant moments and variables for how a member state 
government attempts to influence the EU are rare. Contributions focus either 
on analysing landmark decision-making, such as treaty changes or budgetary 
issues (Moravcsik 1999); they serve to explain implementation performance 
(Treib 2004) or focus on one particular element of EU policy-making, such 
as Presidencies (Hosli and Soetendorp 2000) or voting analysis (Schneider 
and Bailer 2004). 
 
A new strand of academic thinking about EU-member state relations seeks to 
avoid the one-sided loop of either ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ studies, by 
relating what happens in the implementation phases with the policy-shaping 
phases. This has been called the ‘third wave’ of EU studies, after classical 
integration theory and ‘impact of Europe’ Europeanisation studies. The 
purpose is to come to a more complete picture of what happens in the 
interaction between national governments and the EU level of common 
policy-making and the role and position of other stakeholders that play a role 
in these processes. Where multi-level governance has sketched a picture of 
how different jurisdictions and their stakeholders interact, the continuing 
dominant role of national representatives in the shaping and implementation 
of EU policies risks to be underestimated. It is recommended that future 
studies dare to go beyond this artificial separation of what has so eloquently 
been called the ‘taking’ and the ‘shaping’ to link these interrelated phases of 
EU policy-making and the key role of national governments therein.  
 As European integration has deepened and widened over the past 
decade, research into the ways in which national officials are involved in 
these processes may serve both academic and practical use. The added value 
for academic research on the EU has been discussed. For practitioners, 
insights into how a government may use particular variables and conditions 
to influence processes at the EU level increase the opportunity to operate 
‘efficiently’ as well as ‘effectively’.  
 
This study has focused on a particular member state government – which 
permits in-depth study of how EU policies are formulated and negotiated. 
The obvious advantage of comparative research projects is that is clears the 
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framework for analysis from ‘disturbing’ country-specific variables, so that 
more general conclusions can be drawn about the ambitions and capacity of 
governments to be active within the EU. 
 
2) … Replication and further case-study research about influencing EU 
policies 
One added value proposed by this study was to provide ‘thick’ case studies, 
in the form of detailed reconstructions of the policy process, which serves as 
an empirical base to test hypothesis of the role and influence of particular 
groups of actors. Due to limitations concerned with time and resources, the 
scope and time frame of this study have been limited. Problems with the 
general validity and reliability can be partly solved by choosing a 
methodological design. In this study, the method of process analysis has 
served this aim. It has been adapted to be fit for an analysis of international 
rather than national decision-making and the complexities of a multilateral 
playing field. A framework for analysis has been developed, which 
structures different variables that are supposed to have an impact on national 
shaping capacity. However, due to the scope of cases and time frame, it is 
impossible to make binding statements about shaping capacity. For example: 
at the moment of their reconstruction, the directives had been decided almost 
five years ago. This is a recurrent problem, as the EU is a ‘moving target’. 
However, a broader overview of EU policy-shaping would necessarily 
involve more and more recent cases; covering multiple policy domains (see 
for a worthy multiple-case study design: Sepos 2005). To understand the 
policy process and to determine which actor has influence in determining the 
outcomes of this process, the preferences of all actors, the relationship 
between actors and all institutional constraints and opportunities must be 
analysed. It is obvious that studies with this purpose requires much more 
time and resources. but add to our understanding of how the EU policy 
process works and generate practical insights for actors, such as 
governments. One example of a related question that has already been 
tentatively discussed is existing Europeanisation studies (Falkner 2004, 
Treib 2003) is to what extent implementation performance is related to 
national efforts in the (pre-) negotiating stages. 
 
Another challenge lies in the choice of a method for examining EU policy 
practices, key for ensuring validity and reliability. Traditional influence 
analysis departs from the assumption that actors have predefined positions, 
which are subsequently brought into an interaction in order to make another 
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actor change position. Establishing the causal relation is central to 
determining influence, but also its key problem. Influence analysis supposes 
a high degree of stability of preferences and institutional situations that has 
not been found in the cases. If the key actor regularly changes positions 
during the interactions with multiple other players, causality is very difficult 
to reconstruct. This holds even more in the EU setting, in which inevitably, 
more than two actors are involved and where institutional situations vary 
within negotiating situations. This is one pitfall that may be remedied when 
the researcher may profit from insight in multiple cases.  
 
3) … encompassing the second and third pillars of the EU 
Within the EU, national governments are confronted with different 
‘opportunity structures’, dependent on the relevant policy area. This research 
has discussed national shaping capacity in the EU’s ‘first pillar’, which 
concerns economic, social, monetary and related policies, mostly decided 
conform the supranational or ‘community’ method of policy-shaping. 
Governments must share the initiative and legislative competencies with EU 
level institutions and actors. In the more intergovernmental second and third 
pillars, governments can act relatively autonomously. The issue salience of 
these issues tends to be higher, as the issues at stake are perceived as closer 
to the core of national sovereignty. These policy areas are generally 
dominated by traditional co-ordinating authorities, mostly Ministries of 
Foreign Affairsm, which have less difficulty of getting sufficient resources 
and political attention than those involved in routinised first pillar legislative 
processes. At the same time, governments are less pressured to anticipate 
policy developments and act pro-actively, as under the second and third 
pillars, they have a formal right of initiative shared with the European 
Commission. This facilitates the setting of a coherent and consistent national 
policy – however, as the impact of EU level decisions grows, more 
discussions take place about the co-ordinating capacity. This can be 
witnessed in the Netherlands as regards to the role of the Ministries of 
Justice and Home affairs in third pillar co-operation. Discussions on national 
shaping capacity will probably become only more frequent with the growing 
Europeanisation of second and third pillar policies, which only increases the 
relevance of systematic academic analysis. 
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4) … continuing the academic and practitioners debate on Dutch shaping 
capacity  
This study has demonstrated that it is highly valuable to combine academic 
and practitioners insights’ in an evaluation of the shaping capacity of the 
Dutch government and for advancing proposals for reform. Probably the 
most obvious pitfall in the particular ‘Dutch system’ of dealing with EU 
affairs is the difficulty for the central government to pursue a consistent and 
rational EU policy, if specialised experts socialise to the extent that pre-
determined national positions are ‘given away’ for the sake of common 
agreement. As the influential advisory body ‘Council of State’ concludes in 
a recent advice to the Dutch government: ‘In many European groups, Dutch 
[negotiators] participate who do not represent the Dutch interest, but a 
departmental, sectoral interest’ (2005, 8). As government ministries are 
given the free reign, both co-ordination and implementation capacity are 
endangered. The complications to set a coherent strategy and to assure that 
all involved stick to the framework agreed may lead to particular 
implementation and legitimacy problems at a later stage. Political and 
parliamentary involvement comes only at the end of the process, experts 
from the line ministries often overrule the co-ordinating authority, and 
procedures for early consultation suffer from time and capacity problems. 
This increases the risk of expensive –in terms of both money and ‘image’ – 
implementation deficits (see Steunenberg and Voermans 2004, Rood et al. 
2005).  
 
This finding is particularly problematic if the EU is regarded as a dense 
intergovernmental organisation, involved in zero-sum negotiating games 
between unitary governments. Seen from this perspective, the Dutch 
government may be ill-equipped for dealing with Europe, as it is confronted 
with cumbersome processes for formulation and defining ‘national interests’ 
and representing these coherently and consistently in the form of ‘national 
positions’. It is thus no surprise that a fairly consistent call is concerned with 
the need for increasing co-ordination capacity at the level of the Dutch 
central governments. A first solution is the introduction of interdepartmental 
task-forces to increase information exchange in the Council working group 
phases of EU policy-shaping, which would remedy the ‘black hole’ of 
lacking coordination in the crucial working group phases (Gemengde 
Commissie 2005). Relatedly it has been proposed to transform the high level 
coordinating body (Cocohan), which currently convenes irregularly, into a 
standing committee that could contribute to the engagement of senior top-
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level departmental officials in EU policy-making (De Zwaan 2004). A 
related solution is either to introduce a co-ordinating ministry for European 
affairs, which has been repeatedly discussed and dismissed (see the Van 
Veen Rapport 1971, Rozemond 1987), or to increase the European 
competencies of the Prime Minister’s department of General Affairs (ROB 
2004, Raad van State 2005). An important argument underlying the latter 
suggestion is the ever-growing European engagement and involvement of 
the Prime Minister, due to the increased political saliency and the 
prominence and frequency of European Council meetings.  
 
From a radically different angle, the EU may be regarded as a specific 
negotiation arena, in which governments ‘move from a position of “decision 
maker” to that of “co-decision maker”’ (Wessels 1991, 136). In this view, 
the Netherlands may actually be relatively well positioned, due to the 
relatively high degree of relevant expertise and experience with Council 
negotiations. This expertise, if anything, facilitates relations with 
supranational institutions, where national positions are generally regarded 
with suspicion but added value as regards to the contents of policy proposals 
is gratefully welcomed. This ‘unique selling point’ of the Dutch system 
should not be underestimated in the ongoing discussions on system reform. 
Although a call for strengthening internal coordination mechanisms is a 
tempting Pavlov response to the fear of loss of competences, all measures 
proposed in order to improve and enhance national shaping capacity will 
have to be seen in the particular context of the Dutch ‘polder model’. In line 
with neo-institutionalist claims (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000), the 
limitations concerned with ‘path-dependency’ should be taken into account 
when groundbreaking changes, such as a radical repositioning of the co-
ordinating authority, are considered. To quote a Dutch saying: ‘the child 
should not be thrown away with the bathwater’: system reform dealing with 
EU procedures should not touch the elements of the system that do prove 
valuable, such as individual expertise and experience with EU matters.  
 
5) … while taking into account the changed negotiation context 
The empirical analysis in this study focused on the 1990s, a period in which 
the EU experienced and foresaw profound changes in terms of its 
‘deepening’ and ‘widening’. The enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25 
member states with a ‘big bang’ on 1 May 2004 has required new working 
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methods, to ensure the efficient management of the negotiations.6 These 
include the need to avoid table rounds and to submit positions in writing, 
while individual positions that do not add value to the search for 
compromise, are interrupted by the chair.7 This brings with it ‘... an 
increasing necessity for coalition building and bilateral consultations in the 
earlier stages of the European political process’ (Pijpers 2000, 9). In parallel, 
since the 1990s, processes of ‘deepening’ have been visible in the emergence 
of new policy instruments often referred to as ‘soft’ instruments, including 
methods such as co-ordination and benchmarking, distinguishing best 
practices and consulting stakeholders are increasingly common in policy 
fields such as social affairs; research policy and education. For governments, 
this shift from ‘hard legislation’ to elaborating common standards in regular 
consultation implies a new approach on preparing European policies, 
focusing on knowledge management and networking. For example, at home, 
‘best practices’ should be identified, in order to come to common norms and 
framework agreements at the EU level that satisfy domestic stakeholders. 
The growing scope of issues to be dealt with during and after elaborate 
accession negotiations is most prominent in the realm of ‘high politics’, the 
development of the EU’s second and third pillar, policy areas in which, 
according to integration theorists, co-operation would be least likely (Haas 
1967, 323; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, 264). From the perspective of 
‘national interest representation’, it is tempting to look at these developments 
in terms of ‘losses’ and ‘problems’. This study has demonstrated that the 
evolving ‘opportunity-structure’ offers new challenges for governments. As 
the debate continues, the results from this study merit an update, in order to 
encompass recent debates and developments, as well as an extension into the 
wider and politicised range of European dossiers.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6) A revised Code of Conduct was agreed in December 2003 and is part of Annex 
IV of the Council’s rules of procedure. 
7) Quote from the United Kingdom Presidency Guidance for Working Group 
Chairs, p. 13: ‘If colleagues are setting out familiar and similar positions […] 
you could try to draw a conclusion about the emerging consensus and ask if 
anyone disagrees or has anything to add’. (European Secretariat, Cabinet 
Office, London, November 2004). 
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§5. To conclude 
 
As the salience of EU policy increases, member state governments attempt 
to strengthen their grip on these processes, for example by tightening 
national co-ordination procedures and strengthening national representation 
within EU level institutions. This is the paradox described by Stanley 
Hoffmann (1966): member states strive to cooperate, so that EU processes 
gain importance, which makes national interest representation more difficult. 
At the same time, this leads to an increased relevance of national claims as 
more is at stake for governments. Seen in this light, national governments 
remain key players in the shaping and implementation of binding decisions 
and European integration is thus fundamentally intergovernmental in 
character. However, the findings of this study, which demonstrate the 
continuous interaction of preferences and positions at the domestic and EU 
level, suggest that this is a kind of ‘intergovernmentalism-light’ (Rood 
2001). Governments remain relevant, but instead of relying upon this 
dominant position and simply pushing their weight, the new ‘opportunity-
structure’ forces them to professionally invest in the quality of the process of 
formulating and representing national preferences. 
 
This study has enhanced insights in the capacity of governments to 
contribute to the shaping of new EU policies by analysing the variables and 
moments relevant for such actions. The title refers to the two locations of EU 
policy-making explored in this study: ‘at home’ and in ‘Brussels’. It suggests 
that the central government of the Netherlands would find itself at the 
crossroads of ‘Going Europe’, on the one hand, and ‘Going Dutch’, on the 
other hand. ‘Going Dutch’ obviously refers to the current emphasis on the 
financial costs and requirements of EU membership in the political debate on 
the EU, which has finally ‘gone public’ with the referendum on the 
Constitutional Treaty in June 2005. The only shared element in current 
political contributions on the topic of Dutch EU membership seems to be the 
fact that the Netherlands has developed into the largest per capita net payer 
to the EU’s budget (Raad van State 2005, 10). Because of lacking traditions 
of open debate on the vices and virtues associated with EU membership, the 
picture of the EU as a political arena in which the Dutch government would 
often lose out easily feeds into broader unease of the general public about the 
negative consequences of internationalisation for welfare state arrangements, 
culture and identity. But also for the central government, adjusting its self-
image from that of ‘founding father’ of the integration process, to just one of 
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many small member states, has proven a painful process. While there is yet 
no agreement on new directions for future Dutch EU policy, the policy of the 
central government towards the EU has recently shown a variable course. 
Some upsurges of confrontation have been prominent, including harsh 
threats by Dutch government representatives to veto EU decision-making. 
This strategy of ‘Going Dutch’ is potentially harmful, as it may turn the 
Dutch off Europe (Van Grinsven and Rood 2004). What is more, the 
findings of this study show how the two locations where EU policy is made, 
the national and the EU level, cannot be analysed separately. The interaction 
between the EU level and ‘home’ (i.e. the level of the member state) is a 
two-way process. Member state governments are not simply ‘confronted’ 
with new rules and legislation coming from ‘Brussels’ – they have multiple 
opportunities to be actively involved in the shaping of these decisions. 
Similarly, the EU level institutions are not operating autonomously in their 
contribution to the policy process, but are dependent on input and support 
from its member states. Congruently, for a government of a small, open and 
highly dependent economy as that of the Netherlands, there is no real choice 
of ‘going national’ – other than purposely setting out on a detrimental course 
of parochialism and isolation.  
 
This does not mean, however, that a strategy of ‘Going Europe’ is self-
evident. Recent processes of widening and deepening of the EU offer 
governments new venues and opportunities for influence. But any member 
state government’s ability to perform is increasingly dependent upon an 
investment in its strategic use of resources and potential and thereby by the 
ways it ‘goes national’. For example, the art of ‘European process-
management’ at the domestic level (Schreurs 2002) requires close 
cooperation between specialized experts and trained diplomats with sound 
knowledge of the negotiating positions of the other players and a horizontal 
overview of the different issues being discussed. As the EU spills over to 
policy-areas predominantly decided at the national level, EU knowledge 
should not be confined to those directly involved in shaping EU policies. 
Due to its considerable experience and expertise, the Dutch government 
seems actually relatively well-fit for ‘going Europe’. However, extending its 
shaping potential beyond the realms of first-pillar issues to politicised 
domains of EU policy-making requires an ex-ante identification of national 
ambitions and preferences, ideally based upon a long-term vision on the role 
and positoin of the Netherlands in an enlarged Union. ‘Going Europe’ also 
requires broad acceptation of the intrinsically consensual nature of EU 
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policy-making processes, in which ‘you win some, you lose some’ – a policy 
style for which those with long experience in a much-praised ‘polder model’ 
would seem particularly well-prepared. If the Dutch government is thus able 
to match the clear advantages of the current system with an impulse to its 
national strategic and co-ordinating capacity, the Netherlands may be very 
well positioned for influencing future EU policies. 
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Appendix 
The EU Policy Process in Brussels 
and The Hague 
 
1. The EU policy process 
The scope of regulation and policies decided at the EU level has 
considerably increased over the past decades. The development, since the 
1990s, of the ‘second’ and ‘third’ pillars of the Union (foreign and security 
policy and justice and home affairs) has been very important.1 However, 
regulation to improve the internal market and to enhance the freedom of 
goods, services, capital and human beings continues to constitute the vast 
majority of EU output. In this ‘first pillar’, the former European Community, 
policies are formulated in an interplay between the European Commission, 
the Council of ministers and the European Parliament (see figure 2). 
 
Figure 2  Commission, Parliament and Council interaction in EU policy-making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1) See table 1.3 for an overview of the EU’s pillar system. 
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According to the ‘community method’, the EU policy process begins with a 
text proposal submitted by the European Commission, which has the 
monopoly of initiative. The European Commission is headed by a college of 
25 Commissioners, one for every member state, and organised in Directorate 
Generals in which some 16.000 policy administrators (‘European civil 
servants’ recruited within the member states, but not representing them) co-
operate. Proposals for new policies are worked out by a ‘chef de dossier’ 
after consultation with the public and private sector in expert groups. This 
drafting phase already attracts much lobbying efforts from interested parties, 
including governments, which deliver input through direct contacts with 
Commission staff and via expert committees. Formally, the Commission 
represents ‘the European interest’, but due to shortage of staff and the need 
for political support of policy proposals at a later stage, its staff is generally 
eager for information and expertise from the member states. Political 
influence from governments is also directed through the Cabinets, which 
prepare the weekly deliberations on new proposals by the College.  
 
Once agreed by the Commission, proposals are sent to the two legislative 
institutions: the Council and the European Parliament. The Council, where 
the twenty five member states are represented, meets in nine different 
formations of ministers in charge of policy areas. Apart from the Council 
meetings, where each member state is represented at the ministerial level, an 
ambassadors committee (COREPER) and some 150 working groups convene 
on a daily basis in which national government officials prepare Council 
decisions. In these venues, the member state holding the rotating six-month 
Presidency is in charge of agenda-setting and mediation. The choice of the 
procedure for policy-shaping and thereby the competencies of the 
institutions is dependent on the ‘legal basis’ of the initiative in the Treaty. 
Although the Commission normally proposes a legal base, this is often 
subject to intense negotiations between member state representatives and 
other interested parties in the phases of agenda-setting and initiative as it can 
have far-reaching consequences for the procedure. Since 1987, the Council 
has increasingly made decisions under “qualified majority voting” (QMV) 
rather than under unanimity voting. Majority voting implies that a 
government can be overruled by a coalition of member states representing a 
majority of votes and that a ‘blocking minority’ can impede legislation to be 
agreed.  
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The competence of the European Parliament, a plenary composed of 732 
directly elected representatives of political groups across the member states, 
varies from advice to co-legislation. The procedure within the Parliament is 
led by a rapporteur responsible for collecting amendments on the proposed 
text. With the treaty revision in Amsterdam, in 1999, the Parliament came on 
equal footing with the Council through considerable extension of the 
‘codecision procedure’ (to which the two cases examined in this study have 
been subject). Under this regime, new legislation requires the support of a 
qualified majority in the Council and an absolute majority in the 
Parliament’s plenary. Both institutions need to sign the final decision. Once 
this is published in the Offical Journal, ‘comitology committees’ with 
national and European Commission officials may further work on technical 
specifications and annexes.  
 
EU decisions come in different forms, which differ in their impact upon 
national governments. The large majority is issued in the form of directives, 
which should be transposed into national law before a certain date, leaving 
governments the choice for method and format. Late or incorrect 
transposition may lead to a Court case initiated by the European 
Commission.  
 
2. Procedure for EU policy-making at central Dutch government level 
Mainly due to this direct effect of binding EU decisions, each member state 
tries to ensure that its negotiating positions for EU level deliberations are 
adequately and timely formulated and represented. For this, elaborate 
systems of national EU co-ordination function in all capitals, linked to 
Brussels through their Permanent Representation to the EU. In comparative 
perspective, the system for coordination of EU policies at the level of the 
Dutch central government has been compared to a ‘patchwork’ of inter-
ministerial committees, working groups and high-level groups. Most co-
ordination efforts to determine the Dutch stance as regards to EU policy 
initiatives take place at the administrative and interdepartmental level.  
 
The interdepartmental coordination procedure (see figure) starts when the 
inter-ministerial committee for evaluating new Commission proposals 
(BNC) appoints the lead ministry for each new draft decision. Within the 
committee, new dossiers or policy proposals are assigned to the most 
relevant ministry. Officials of this department draft a summary of each new 
legislative text proposal, including an estimate of its financial consequences, 
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as well as possible implications of the proposal for sub-national government, 
which serves to inform the national parliament. It should be noted, however, 
that this paper or ‘fiche’ rarely leads to parliamentary discussions on the 
stance to take in the EU level negotiations. Delivering input for subsequent 
meetings of the relevant Council working groups is from then on largely left 
to technical experts and specialist civil servants. How much information 
exchange takes place between ministries and with the Permanent 
Representation at the EU depends on the individual initiative of these ‘chefs 
de dossier’. An important variable is the degree to which a proposal is 
considered politically salient and, consequently, how much interministerial 
co-ordination is deemed necessary by the lead ministry. Generally, 
negotiating positions for proposals that are estimated to be of higher political 
importance are closely followed and often represented by the Netherlands 
Permanent Representation.  
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was appointed co-ordinating authority for 
EEC affairs in 1970, after a power struggle with the Economic affairs 
ministry. This turf battle is said to have ‘weakened attempts to impart some 
unity to the overall direction of EU policy’ (Griffiths 1980, 286). Congruent 
to the Dutch ‘polder’-culture of consensus, consultation and compromise and 
a tradition of autonomy of individual government departments, the Foreign 
Ministry has no formal competencies to establish priorities and to arbitrate 
between conflicting views. Much is left to the responsible ministries, only in 
the weekly instruction meeting, chaired by a senior Foreign Affairs official 
to set the negotiating instructions for the Permanent Representation 
delegation at COREPER meetings, positions on individual dossiers are 
linked. It is at this level that conflicts of interest may come out in the open. 
As no formal authority rules, however, the result of these inter-ministerial 
co-ordination efforts is often an intricate compromise, which leaves not 
much flexibility for the hands of diplomats and officials at the national 
Permanent Representation to the EU. When negotiations at the EU level 
proceed and adaptation is considered necessary, direct personal contacts 
between the Mission and the department provide for ad-hoc and on the spot 
co-ordination of the Dutch position during negotiations.  
 
The Junior Minister (Dutch: Secretary of State) for European Affairs, who 
functions at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and is charged with co-
ordinating European policy, forms the link between the administrative and 
the political levels of co-ordination. He or she chairs the weekly Co-
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ordination Committee, the ‘antichambre’ for the Cabinet meeting, which sets 
the negotiating instructions for upcoming Councils. In case of conflicts, 
Cabinet discussions may take place. In Council meetings, the representative 
of the Netherlands, a Council minister or in case of absence the permanent 
representative, has to stay within the limits of the negotiation mandate. 
However, because of changing realities, this may necessitate ‘on the spot’ 
co-ordination with The Hague, or a formal scrutiny reservation of the Dutch 
delegation. 
 
As regards to the ‘Brussels’ part of the national EU-coordination system, 
responsibilities lie with the Dutch Permanent representation of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands towards the European Union (est. 1958). The 
ambassadorial rank of representative, who has a standing invitation to attend 
all Cabinet meetings, is considered one of the most important diplomatic 
postings. Both the structure as the functioning of the permanent 
representation is highly segmented, reflecting the departmental structure of 
the central government organisation. In 2001, only 38% of its staff was 
Foreign Ministry employees (Soetendorp and Andeweg 2001, 215), the 
others being seconded from all twelve other government departments. One 
unique feature of the working methods at the ‘PV/EU’ is the daily meeting of 
all officials, serving as an informal exchange forum on information, 
strategies, positions and developments. The meeting is confidential and no 
minutes are taken, which makes it a good opportunity to search for common 
solutions or seek the limits of instructions from the capital. The permanent 
representative serves as an essential link from the capital to the European 
arena and has vital information and negotiation tasks. Especially in the early 
stages of the policy process, its officials often seek the assistance of the 
numerous unofficial co-ordination channels via nationals of the member 
states employed by the European institutions.  
 
This ‘decentralised’ system has advantages as well as weaknesses. The 
responsible ministry has the necessary knowledge to deal with the subject 
matter, and expert co-ordination increases flexibility and efficiency of 
organising the negotiations. At the same time, experts qualify the system as 
‘reactive’ and ‘passive’, as ministries not primary responsible are forced to 
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put much efforts into securing information and input.2 That 
interdepartmental co-ordination is not formally facilitated during working 
groups negotiations has been referred to as the ‘black hole’ of Dutch EU co-
ordination (Gemengde Commissie 2005, 11). This is increased by two 
political characteristics of the system: the practice of coalition governments 
implies that individual government ministers have a large degree of freedom, 
and ministries dealing with (parts of) foreign policy departments are 
generally not held by ministers of the same party, which does not facilitate 
co-ordination. Since the 1990s, multiple proposals for reform have been 
debated. Many are concerned with the need for more EU engagement and 
knowledge throughout politics and administration in order to close the 
artificial gap between those involved in EU policy-making and those focused 
on supposedly ‘national’ politics. Returning suggestions are concerned with 
upgrading the coordination authority to the level of the Prime Minister and 
his Ministry of General Affairs, analogous to a trend visible in many newer 
member states.3 
 
                                                 
2) The contrasting system of ‘active information’, characteristic of EU co-
ordination arrangements in the United Kingdom – implies that the expert 
official most involved is supposed to inform relevant others of the progress in 
the file ‘The rationale for keeping others informed, from a selfish or 
[ministerial] point of view, is to try to avoid the introduction of new objectives 
to the position of the United Kinddom towards the end of a negotiation … For 
this reason, copying papers is not necessarily enough. The implications of 
[Commission] proposals have to be made clear [to other ministries] …’, quote 
taken from Humphreys (1997). 
3) See chapters 5 and 9 for a discussion of these suggestions and their ‘fit’ with 
the Dutch system of preparing EU policy-shaping. 
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Nederlandse samenvatting 
 
Hoe kan een nationale overheid de totstandkoming van nieuw EU-beleid 
beïnvloeden? In een tijd van voortschrijdende Europeanisering lijkt de 
relevantie van deze vraag onbetwist. Niettemin toont de literatuurstudie in 
dit onderzoek dat in de Europese (EU-) studies tot nog toe verrassend weinig 
aandacht is geschonken aan de systematische analyse van nationaal 
‘invloedsvermogen’. Deze term (‘shaping capacity’), gedefinieerd als het 
vermogen van een overheid om nieuw EU beleid te beïnvloeden, staat 
centraal in deze dissertatie, waarin de belangenbehartiging van EU-lidstaat 
Nederland wordt geanalyseerd. Doel van het onderzoek is om, aan de hand 
van een landenstudie en reconstructies van het beïnvloedingsproces rond 
twee specifieke EU-richtlijnen, een bijdrage te leveren aan het actuele 
academische Europeaniseringsdebat. De analyse biedt tevens handvatten aan 
zowel beleidsmakers als politici voor hun werkzaamheden in het kader van 
de totstandkoming van nieuw EU-beleid en nationale belangenbehartiging.  
 
Het eerste hoofdstuk behandelt ter inleiding de onderzoeksvragen en 
definities, de theoretische plaatsbepaling en ook de onderzoeksopzet van de 
studie. Hoofdstuk twee bespreekt de resultaten van een zoektocht, in de 
literatuur, naar inzichten over de rol en positie van overheden in de EU. De 
eerste academische golf hierbinnen analyseerde de interactie tussen lidstaten 
en het EU-niveau van besluitvorming ‘van onderaf’. Belangrijke vragen 
waren die naar het wezen van het integratieproces en de mogelijkheden om 
tot duurzame samenwerking tussen staten te komen. De belangrijkste 
twistappel tussen de twee belangrijkste ‘klassieke’ integratietheorieën uit de 
jaren vijftig, intergouvernementalisme en neofunctionalisme, behelst de 
vraag of het Europese integratieproces de positie van nationale staten 
uiteindelijk versterkt, danwel verzwakt. Deze tegenstelling wordt in de 
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literatuur uitvoerig besproken, maar het gaat in dit onderzoek met name om 
de rol van overheden in dit proces. In dit verband is intergouvernmentalisme 
vooral relevant door de visie op de rol van overheden als ‘vormers’ en 
‘ontvangers’ van Europees beleid die in deze theorie centraal staat. 
Neofunctionalisme, een theorie die op het eerste gezicht wellicht minder 
relevant lijkt vanwege de nadruk op de verzwakking van de nationale staat, 
biedt daarentegen interessante inkijkjes in de interactie van overheden met 
supranationale instellingen, in het bijzonder de Commissie en het Parlement. 
Bovendien beschrijft neofunctionalisme relevante processen van 
‘socialisatie’ van tussen nationale ambtenaren en politici en hun 
internationale collegae in het proces van besluitvorming.  
 
In de jaren zeventig raakten ook politicologen en bestuurskundigen 
geïnteresseerd in het Europese integratieproces, dat tot dan toe vooral 
onderwerp van studie was binnen de leer der internationale betrekkingen. 
Meer academische analyse van het beleidsproces op Europees niveau en 
binnen de lidstaten was hiervan het gevolg. Deze zgh. ‘tweede golf’ binnen 
de Europese studies staat centraal in het derde hoofdstuk van dit onderzoek. 
De jaren negentig van de twintigste eeuw – een tijdperk van opeenvolgende 
verdragsherzieningen die de reikwijdte en invloed van het Europese 
besluitvorming verder vergrootten – bleken een buitengewoon vruchtbare 
periode voor de ontwikkeling van nieuwe concepten binnen de EU-studies. 
Voor dit onderzoek zijn twee daarvan in het bijzonder relevant: ‘multi-level 
governance’ en ‘Europeanisering’.  
 
Multi-level governance beschrijft de interactie tussen verschillende niveaus 
of locaties van beleidsvorming: regionaal, nationaal en Europees. Teneinde 
grip te houden op grensoverschrijdende beleidsproblemen en ontwikkelingen 
zoals migratie, globalisering en milieuverontreiniging werken overheden 
actief samen. Voortschrijdende Europese integratie betekent echter ook een 
verlies aan invloedsmogelijkheden. Er staat immers steeds meer op het spel, 
terwijl de regie moet worden gedeeld. Derhalve wordt het nationale belang 
en de druk van succesvolle nationale belangenbehartiging van grotere 
importantie. Als de belangenbehartiging niet goed of niet tijdig is 
georganiseerd, kan men als lidstaat ‘verliezen’ en de schade daarbij kan 
groot zijn. Lidstaten moeten bindende Europese wetgeving immers 
implementeren, wat de nodige bestuurlijke, financiële kosten met zich mee 
brengt. Bovendien is er een levendige vorm van beleidsconcurrentie tussen 
nationale actoren (overheden op centraal en decentraal niveau, private 
Nederlandse samenvatting 
 
 
 
 
247 
belangen en belangengroepen) die allen hun zegje willen doen op het 
Europese vlak. Hoe dan ook moeten nationale overheden aldus investeren in 
procedures om ten aanzien van nieuwe beleidsvoorstellen tussen alle 
betrokkenen een gezamenlijk ‘nationaal’ standpunt te formuleren en dit op 
consistente wijze te vertegenwoordigen op het EU-niveau.  
 
Overheden die relevant willen blijven, moeten hun ‘Europese zaken’ dus 
goed op orde hebben. De academische literatuur over ‘Europeanisering’ zou 
in potentie aan deze ordening een nuttige bijdrage kunnen leveren. Echter, 
uit de literatuurstudie in hoofdstuk drie blijkt dat deze tot nog toe vooral is 
gericht op wat er binnen de lidstaten gebeurt, terwijl de interactie tussen de 
hoofdsteden en Brussel daarbij onvoldoende wordt betrokken. Veel studies 
zijn in algemene termen geformuleerd of richten zich daarentegen op een 
specifiek element van belangenbehartiging, zoals de uitgebreide literatuur 
over de stemmacht van (individuele) lidstaten in de Raad. Daarmee wordt 
ook de vraag relevant, welke invloedsmogelijkheden ‘ge-Europeaniseerde’ 
nationale overheden (nog) hebben om de vorming van nieuw beleid te 
beïnvloeden. Een belangrijke doelstelling van dit onderzoek is een bijdrage 
te leveren aan deze nieuwe zgh. ‘derde’ stroming binnen de EU-studies. 
 
Voor een omvattend onderzoek naar het optreden van een lidstaat bij de 
totstandkoming van EU beleid is een eerste stap het ontwerp van een 
analysekader, om de verschillende factoren en variabelen en hun verhouding 
ten opzichte van elkaar in kaart te brengen en te categoriseren. Dit kader 
wordt in hoofdstuk vier opgebouwd vanuit twee hoofdcategorieën: “ambitie 
en voorkeuren” en “capaciteit en hulpbronnen”, die hetzij voortvloeien uit 
structurele factoren, danwel verbonden zijn met of zich manifesteren in een 
specifieke situatie. Naast voor de hand liggende factoren, zoals grootte en 
stemmacht van een lidstaat, die samen als het ware de ‘massa’ van een land 
vormen, zijn ook de mate van Europa-gezindheid van nationale politiek en 
de kennis en kunde van onderhandelaars van belang.  
 
Het is overigens van belang te benadrukken dat dit analysekader niet als 
oogmerk heeft, een recept te bieden voor succesvolle belangenbehartiging, 
doch daarvoor slechts mogelijke ingrediënten biedt. De invloed van een land 
binnen de Unie is immers afhankelijk van zoveel meer variabelen dan de 
eigen inzet. Ook de condities, de context en de positie van andere actoren 
zijn hiervoor relevant.  
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Capaciteit om te 
beïnvloeden / 
(‘Shaping 
capacity’) 
Wil Potentieel 
Stabiele 
variabelen 
AMBITIES 
 
Kernwaarden en beleidsconstanten; 
politieke en economische ‘massa’, 
w.o. relatieve economische 
ontwikkeling en politieke constel-
latie; publieke steun voor actief EU 
lidmaatschap; lengte lidmaatschap; 
imago; ‘passendheid’ van ambities 
en doelstellingen  
VERMOGEN 
 
Beleidsstijl; mate van fragmentatie; 
coördinatie-capaciteit; (Europees 
bewustzijn binnen de) bestuurlijke 
en politieke organisatie; strategisch 
vermogen; vermogen coalities te 
bouwen; organisatorische en 
personele verbanden tussen het 
nationale en het EU niveau  
Situationele 
variabelen 
VOORKEUREN 
 
Belang dat aan het onderwerp 
wordt gehecht; belangen-
constellatie; institutionele omstan-
digheden, w.o. EU voorzitterschap; 
‘fit’ en extremiteit van het standpunt 
/ positie 
HULPBRONNEN 
 
Belangenconstellatie; kennis, 
vaardigheden; competenties; antici-
patievermogen; mogelijkheden om 
nationale contacten te gebruiken; 
flexibiliteit van de onderhandelings-
positie; onderhandelingsstrategie 
en -tactieken 
 
Het analysekader wordt in hoofdstuk vijf toegepast op de gevalstudie 
‘Nederland’, dat begint met een korte inleiding op de grondslagen van het 
Nederlandse EU beleid in de afgelopen decennia: de traditioneel sterke 
transatlantische oriëntatie en de Nederlandse voorkeur voor economische 
integratie, alsmede het ‘instrumentele’ supranationalisme dat voortkwam uit 
welbegrepen eigenbelang. In de specifieke constellatie van de op brede 
consensus gerichte gedecentraliseerde eenheidsstaat stonden deze waarden 
lang niet ter discussie. In de jaren negentig ontstond echter onder academici 
en beleidsmakers geleidelijk aan meer debat over de invulling van de 
‘Europese roeping’ van Nederland en de inhoudelijke en procesmatige 
aanpak van het nationale EU beleid, waarin het als gevolg van een aantal 
politieke en bestuurlijke kenmerken moeilijk zou zijn om strategie en lijn te 
brengen. Deze kenmerken zijn de grote mate van politiek-bestuurlijke 
fragmentatie; de traditie van departementale autonomie en de decennialange 
depolitisering van het nationale Europabeleid, dat werd gevormd en 
uitgevoerd door een relatief kleine groep politiek-bestuurlijke insiders. 
Afgemeten aan het analysekader zouden deze kenmerken schadelijk zijn 
voor het vermogen tot beïnvloeding van de Rijksoverheid. Tegelijkertijd 
versterkt de departementale autonomie ook de inzet van kennis en expertise 
in EU onderhandelingen op basis van een lange ervaring met EU-
lidmaatschap, één van de sterke punten van het systeem.  
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De Nederlandse onderhandelingsinzet wordt sindsdien gekenmerkt door 
meer pragmatisme, een focus op de kosten van het integratieproces en 
aarzeling ten aanzien van de politieke samenwerking op terreinen van 
buitenlands beleid en interne en externe veiligheid.  
 
Het analysekader wordt getoetst in twee specifieke gevalstudies van interne 
marktwetgeving op het terrein van energiebeleid en biotechnologie. Het 
analyseren van relevante momenten en factoren in het 
onderhandelingsproces is binnen het veld van de EU studies relatief 
onderbelicht. Derhalve is bij de reconstructie van de onderhandelingen die 
leidden tot de Gasrichtlijn (98/30/EG) en de Biopatentrichtlijn (98/44/EG) 
gebruik gemaakt van een uit de politicologie geleende methode van 
dossierstudie en, meer specifiek, invloedsanalyse: intensieve procesanalyse. 
Bij toepassing van deze methode, die in hoofdstuk zes wordt uitgelicht, op 
internationale onderhandelingsprocessen is een ex-ante selectie van actoren 
en beslissingen des te noodzakelijker. De acht stappen van de methode 
worden gevolgd bij een analyse van de besluitvormingsprocessen teneinde te 
reconstrueren welke actoren, momenten, voorwaarden en kenmerken 
mogelijkerwijs relevant zijn geweest bij de beantwoording van de vraag hoe 
vertegenwoordigers van de Nederlandse overheid trachtten dit proces te 
beïnvloeden. 
 
De empirische data die deze twee gevalstudies leveren worden in hoofdstuk 
negen vergeleken met het analysekader, met het oogmerk na te gaan welke 
variabelen hierbij ‘oplichten’. Een eerste conclusie is dat de uit de 
Europeaniseringsliteratuur bekende hypothese van ‘goodness of fit’ – die 
stelt dat de mate van ‘passendheid’ van nieuwe EU regelgeving met 
bestaande nationale arrangementen voorspellend zou zijn voor het succes 
van de belangenbehartiging – minder statisch blijkt dan de literatuur 
aangeeft. Door actieve belangenbehartiging kunnen overheden deze ‘misfit’ 
voorkomen. Bovendien geven de cases aan dat de (interpretatie van) mate 
van passendheid onderdeel kan worden van het politieke debat en bovendien 
door vertegenwoordigers van een nationale bewust gestuurd kan worden op 
nieuwe juridische of bestuurlijke arrangementen die via het Europese niveau 
nationaal (zullen) worden opgelegd.  
 Dit laatste is dan met name bepaald door een tweede factor die uit de 
cases naar voren komt: de politieke en bestuurlijke relevantie die aan een 
beleidsonderwerp wordt toegekend en die in een representatieve democratie 
een functie is van de politiek-economische belangenconstellatie en de 
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publieke opinie. Deze relevantie kan vervolgens beperkingen van capaciteit 
of hulpbronnen overkomen. Met name het belang van expertise en kennis 
van Europese processen komt hierbij naar voren.  
 De cases suggereren, ten derde, dat de rol van overheids-
vertegenwoordigers in het Europese – en dan met name op Raadsniveau – 
een aanzienlijke is. Er is in beide gevalstudies weinig sprake geweest van 
invloedspogingen gericht op de Europese Commissie of het Europees 
Parlement, hoewel de invloedspogingen van beide instellingen effect hebben 
gehad op de totstandkoming van de uiteindelijke compromistekst van beide 
richtlijnen. Met de toegenomen relevantie van EU beleid trachten alle 
nationale overheden van de lidstaten hun grip op de totstandkoming daarvan 
te vergroten, bijvoorbeeld door te investeren in de kwaliteit en menskracht 
van nationale vertegenwoordiging binnen de instellingen. Hoewel dit op het 
eerste gezicht lijkt te duiden op een bekrachtiging van de stelling van de 
intergouvernementele theorieën, duiden de bevindingen van dit onderzoek 
op een vorm van ‘intergouvernementalisme-light’. Overheden zijn en blijven 
relevant, maar kunnen door hun onderlinge afhankelijkheid die het gevolg is 
van meer (politiekere) samenwerking slechts kritische massa vormen in 
samenwerking met elkaar en met de EU-instellingen.  
 
De titel van deze studie en de illustratie op het omslag suggereren dat de 
Nederlandse overheid zich zou bevinden op het kruispunt van twee wegen: 
die richting Europa en de ‘nationale’ weg. De woordspeling ‘going Dutch’ 
refereert daarbij vanzelfsprekend aan de politieke fixatie op de kosten van 
het integratieproces zoals die zich in de afgelopen jaren heeft gemanifesteerd 
en die volgens sommige invloedrijke adviescolleges het enige strategische 
element zou zijn in het hedendaagse Nederlandse EU-beleid. Deze 
eenzijdige blik op het integratieproces doet geen recht aan de complexe 
inhoud en processen van Europese integratie. De Nederlandse overheid heeft 
sinds de jaren negentig het zelfbeeld moeten aanpassen van dat van een 
actieve oprichter, met relatief veel invloed binnen een kleine EG, naar dat 
van één van de kleinere lidstaten in een steeds politiekere Unie. Dat de 
nationale weg, geplaveid met een parochalistisch discours en politieke 
isolatie, voor Nederland geen reële is, al was het maar om economische 
redenen, moge voor de lezer van deze studie duidelijk zijn. Het inslaan van 
‘de Europese weg’ is daarmee echter nog geen vanzelfsprekendheid.  
 Voor een actieve bijdrage aan de totstandkoming van ‘normaal’ EU 
beleid in onderhandelingen die over het algemeen worden gedomineerd door 
experts en specialisten, lijkt het Nederlandse systeem van standpuntbepaling 
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en -behartiging relatief goed geëquipeerd. Al was het maar door de lange 
ervaring opgedaan in EU fora en de autonomie van departementale 
organisatieonderdelen om instructies aan de laatste stand van zaken en 
inzichten aan te passen. In dit licht is het opmerkelijk dat in de vele 
discussies tussen academici en deskundigen uit de beleidspraktijk, de 
nadelen van het Nederlandse systeem van EU beleid – zoals de gebrekkige 
mogelijkheden voor strategiebepaling en onderlinge afstemming – welhaast 
onevenredig worden benadrukt.  
 Niettemin tonen deze analyses wel aan dat het model van belangen-
behartiging binnen de Nederlandse overheid voor de politieke dimensie van 
het integratieproces minder toegesneden lijkt te zijn. Politieke betrokkenheid 
komt slechts aan het einde van een proces waarin het optreden van 
departementen op individuele dossiers niet wordt opgehangen aan een vooraf 
bepaalde onderhandelingsstrategie. Er worden nauwelijks prioriteiten 
bepaald en afstemming op hoog niveau blijft, mede als gevolg van eerder 
genoemde politiek-bestuurlijke kenmerken, een moeizaam proces. Dat het 
risico met zich meebrengt van late en incorrecte implementatie van in EU 
kader afgesproken beleid wordt aangetoond door recente empirische data. 
Zoals bediscussieerd in dit onderzoek blijft, naast politieke massa, voor 
doelgerichte Europese actie ook de strategische inzet van menskracht en 
andere hulpbronnen van belang, evenals het tijdig maken van keuzes en het 
stellen van prioriteiten. De Nederlandse overheid heeft met zo’n actief 
lidmaatschap binnen EU kaders inmiddels ruim vijftig jaar ervaring. 
Wanneer zij in deze ruime ervaring en kennis blijft investeren en dit koppelt 
aan een breed gedragen lange-termijn visie op de Europese prioriteiten, is zij 
goed gepositioneerd voor toekomstige actieve invloedspogingen. 
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